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A man walks into his kitchen and greets his wife after a hard day’s 
work. As he sniffs the pots boiling on the stove, she reminds him that 
he has a union meeting that night. He says he told the guys he had 
something else to do. She asks if he will go to the PTA meeting with 
her. Again, he begs off. She sighs, knowing he is making a mistake. 
He goes to bed later, content with his uninvolvement in his world. 
He wakes in a nightmare world. His happy household is gone, his 
family replaced by automatons he recognizes but does not under-
stand. His loving, supportive wife has become cold, calculating, and 
demanding. His oldest daughter has been transformed from a boy-
crazy teen into a zealot who moves away to work on a government-
sponsored farm. His younger children threaten to turn him in to the 
authorities for violating rules he does not even know exist. Placed on 
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trial, he is sentenced to death. Before his punishment can be meted 
out, however, he awakens from his “Red nightmare,” shaken but with 
a renewed dedication to family and community.1
This scenario from a 1961 Department of Defense film looks 
corny today, but it epitomizes the way anticommunism had perme-
ated American society in the years after World War II. The blue-collar 
worker, who makes enough money—thanks to defense spending—to 
live a middle-class lifestyle, takes his good life of peace, prosperity, 
and freedom for granted. As a result, the film shows, he could lose 
everything. Vigilance, the government warned, was necessary at all 
times. Interestingly, the person who seemed to understand the need 
for caution was the wife. Although she is portrayed as a typical 
housewife who nags her husband to become involved in his union, 
his church, his children’s lives, and his community, she recognizes 
the importance of participation in these activities as a way to protect 
their way of life. She is going to the PTA meeting. During the night-
mare, however, communism turns the wife into a hard, authoritative 
figure, completely unlike the warm, soft American woman she had 
been previously. The communist woman is obsessed with the party, 
whereas the American woman’s activities are centered around her 
home, family, and community. The filmmakers clearly intended to 
show how communism would destroy the American family. Probably 
unconsciously, they also indicated the essential role women played in 
the struggle against communism.
The relationship between women and postwar anticommunism is 
the subject of this book. At a time when governmental, religious, and 
social authorities encouraged women to fulfill themselves only as wives 
and mothers, millions of women expanded their notion of household 
responsibilities—at least temporarily—to include the crusade against 
communism. Some participated in traditional “womanly ways” by 
writing letters or hosting teas. Others took up the banner and ran for 
political office. Most did not see their participation in the war against 
communism as anything profound or controversial; they were simply 
doing what needed to be done to protect their families. In joining the 
ranks of male anticommunists, however, these women challenged 
existing assumptions about women as political players. Additionally, 
their view of the crisis, their methods of confronting communism, and 
their actions affected the overall tone and success of the movement. 




The fight against communism dominated American politics, econ- 
 omics, and society for almost fifty years. It colored Americans’ views of 
the rest of the world, led them into two wars, and generated numerous 
military actions. It fueled the prosperity of the postwar years and, 
later, economic instability. It fostered an atmosphere of suspicion 
that at times threatened to undermine basic American civil liberties. 
It leached into society and culture, affecting in a multitude of ways 
Americans’ thoughts, purchases, and leisure activities. It spawned 
both an anticommunist movement carried out by a variety of individ-
uals and groups and an anticommunist mind-set that permeated the 
image Americans had of themselves and others. It permanently altered 
the way Americans and the rest of the world view the United States. 
Understanding the depth, breadth, and longevity of anticommunism 
is essential to comprehending late-twentieth-century America.
Responding to this imagery as well as news reports from the media 
and speeches by politicians, a vast majority of Americans said they 
viewed communism as evil. They might not have been able to explain 
communism as an intellectual theory or an economic system, but they 
perceived it to be a threat to America’s international position, the 
country’s national security, and even the internal stability of their local 
communities. Many accepted the government’s rationale for taking 
steps to protect Americans from military threats abroad and subversion 
at home. For most Americans, however, their acknowledgment of the 
existence of the dangers of communism manifested itself infrequently 
in dinner conversations, in voting for “patriotic” Americans, in signing 
petitions, or in waving the flag on the Fourth of July. Most were more 
concerned about paying bills, saving for a new car, or going to a ball 
game than they were about eternal vigilance against the Red menace.
Other Americans understood that the danger was imminent. 
Ignoring ideological and geopolitical issues, they saw communism as 
a direct threat to their personal freedom. They believed the commu-
nist system forced everyone under its jurisdiction into a singular 
mold, depriving individuals of choices regarding religion, lifestyle, 
and employment. They feared what they perceived would be the 
inevitable destruction of family life as communist leaders sent fathers 
to factories or the army, mothers to work outside the home, chil-
dren to indoctrination schools, and babies to communal care centers. 
Communism, in their minds, deprived its victims of control over their 
finances, their families, their futures. This perfidious ideology would, 
they argued, ultimately enslave all Americans.
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As a result of their deeply held fears, these Americans did not trust 
government officials and politicians to end the crisis. These anticom-
munists remained constantly on guard, scrutinizing official actions, 
educating the public, searching out new encroachments against their 
version of democracy and free enterprise. For these anticommunists 
the fight against communism took on the language and urgency of 
a crusade. Some formed committees, both local and national—some-
times with thousands of members, sometimes with a handful of like-
minded souls—to do their part in protecting the American way of life. 
Others worked on their own, writing books, articles, and newslet-
ters. The memberships of these committees often overlapped, with 
the same names appearing on numerous boards of directors and 
mastheads of magazines. Anticommunist crusaders corresponded 
with one another, comparing notes, discussing strategies, looking for 
volunteers or funds.
Although they shared a common loathing of “the Left,” they did 
not always agree on the specifics of what that term meant. Some only 
reacted vigorously to card-carrying members of the Communist Party 
USA or to the geopolitical threat posed by the Soviets and Chinese. 
Others widened their lens to scope out fellow travelers, people who 
either consciously or indirectly helped the “real” communists. True 
zealots went even further, arguing that Americans faced a wide variety 
of threats from groups ranging from liberals to those who supported 
social welfare programs, Democrats, civil rights activists, feminists, 
homosexuals, and, for some, Jews. For the purposes of this book, this 
divergent group of organizations and individuals constitutes the anti-
communist movement. When I write about anticommunists, I mean 
these activists.
These anticommunists also constituted an important component 
of the evolving conservatism of the postwar period. Throughout much 
of the twentieth century, men and women espousing very different 
views thought of themselves as “conservatives.” Thus, some conser-
vatives were classical liberals who desired limited government inter-
vention, especially in economic affairs; others were traditionalists who 
advocated government support of Judeo-Christian values. Because 
they fought as much with one another as they did with their more 
liberal opponents, they lacked the unity or the numbers to challenge 
progressives within the Republican and Democratic parties. Although 
the New Deal policies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, which increased 
the federal bureaucracy and the presence of women and minorities in 
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Washington, D.C., had galvanized conservatives of all varieties, it took 
the threat of communism to bring them all together. Both economic 
and social conservatives hated communism, so the crusade provided 
them with common ground. Consequently, many of the most fervent 
anticommunists shared not only a loathing for the Soviet Union but 
also a deep distrust of the federal government in general and Demo-
crats in particular.2 For these reasons, conservative anticommunists 
conflated their two enemies: communism and the American political 
Left. In fact, while anticommunism helped unite conservatives, it 
also served as a convenient platform from which conservatives could 
advocate for a right-wing agenda along with hatred of communism.
By placing women at the center of the struggle against commu-
nism, this book enhances our understanding of the Cold War in several 
ways. First, it shows the way women translated the key political 
and ideological issues that fueled the anticommunist campaign for 
the general public. Frequently describing communism as a personal 
threat, the words of female activists paint a striking portrait of America 
in those years—simultaneously belligerent, arrogant, and frightened. 
Their actions as well as their writings helped mold the overall tenor of 
the campaign. Second, an emphasis on women’s participation shows 
the depth of the fear and paranoia communism created in Ameri-
cans. Despite idealized mores of the era that discouraged middle-
class women from entering the political sphere, male anticommunist 
crusaders recognized that all citizens, including traditionally nonpo-
litical women, must unite to battle this enemy. Third, many women 
acted at a local level, indicating that this struggle went all the way 
to the grass roots. Political leaders pursued the diplomatic policy of 
containment at the national level, but concerns over brinkmanship in a 
nuclear age spread throughout the populace, drawing average citizens 
into the war against the Red menace. Finally, the gendered language 
and imagery used to describe the Cold War frequently reinforced the 
connection between a complicated diplomatic and political situation 
and the reality of everyday life for American men and women.
Anticommunist activity provided women with a way to involve 
themselves in the politics of the day. At a time when the image of 
female domesticity smothered most women’s career aspirations, 
women found few outlets for their political ambitions. Because almost 
all Americans believed communism was evil and must be stopped, 
however, working against communism afforded women the opportu-
nity to jump into a national political struggle without having to justify 
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their actions, as might be required of women who supported women’s 
rights or unionism or any number of left-wing causes. These anticom-
munist women could engage themselves in politics while espousing 
the female domestic virtues endorsed by mainstream society.
Female anticommunist crusaders built on a historical tradition of 
American women’s participation in politics, especially when danger 
threatened home and family. For example, in the years preceding the 
American Revolution, women found themselves drawn into political 
debates that affected them through their roles as household managers. 
Colonial boycotts against English goods transformed shopping into 
a political exercise that turned women into active participants in the 
rebellion. Later, intensifying hostilities forced women to play roles 
usually forbidden: soldier, businesswoman, head of household. 
Although most men and women viewed these actions as tempo-
rary, a significant change in gender relations did occur in the after-
math of the Revolution. The development of the ideal of Republican 
Motherhood created a way for women to participate in the political 
process without appearing to undermine the traditional political role 
of men. Educated and informed about local and national concerns, 
the Republican Mother served as teacher, guide, and role model for 
her children. She showed them how to be good citizens, no matter 
how large or small their role in the body politic might be. Maintaining 
their primary function as wives and mothers, American women 
during this period nevertheless broadened their sphere of activity, if 
only slightly.3 Their domestic responsibilities were now invested with 
political significance.
The industrialization of early America similarly brought changes 
to women’s lives. As men’s labor began to shift from the farm to the 
factory and from rural to urban areas, women—especially middle-
class white women—were increasingly inundated by advice manuals, 
novels, and religious sermons that emphasized what historian Barbara 
Welter called “the cult of true womanhood.” A woman, according to 
religious and social leaders, should be pious, pure, domestic, and 
submissive. Too delicate to perform any “real” (i.e., paid) labor, women 
were directed to focus on home and family, providing a safe haven for 
husbands and children against the dirty, dangerous world of industry. 
Women, according to this view, utilized their natural moral superi-
ority to balance men’s more aggressive and sinful tendencies. This 
image also served as a way to distinguish between the classes; many 
immigrant and black women hired themselves out as wage laborers, 
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while proper middle-class white women did not. For all its hypoc-
risies, the cult allowed middle-class women to cloak themselves in 
respectability.4
Some women took advantage of the ideals of Republican Mother-
hood and the cult of true womanhood to operate outside their normal 
boundaries. Domestic reformer Catharine Beecher accepted the 
premise of separate spheres and worked to carve out a unique place 
for women within that system. Rather than seeing the cult as a limita-
tion, she empowered women’s position within the home by redefining 
domesticity and motherhood as a vocation that preserved essential 
American values. Other women, working within their proper area 
of domesticity and piety, involved themselves in church and reform 
activities, carefully selecting those that conformed to their assigned 
sphere. Thus, women worked for missionary societies, joined ladies’ 
clubs organized to save children and fallen women, and tried to 
eliminate the evils of alcohol. Once they became involved in public 
activities, women might move beyond such “womanly” reforms 
to embrace much more overtly political concerns such as abolition 
and suffrage. By the mid-nineteenth century, women had created a 
unique political role for themselves. In addition, by expanding the 
boundaries of home, women expanded their sphere of influence 
to include “anywhere women and children were [located].” In the 
process of redefining their sphere, they created a “distinct . . . political 
culture.”5
This expansion was perhaps most evident during the Progressive 
era around the turn of the twentieth century. Unmarried, educated 
middle- and upper-class women found new opportunities to broaden 
their activities. Like their earlier sisters, these women joined reform 
societies that fought alcohol, moral decline, and child labor. They 
went further, however. Taking their cue from European women, Jane 
Addams and Ellen Gates Starr founded Hull House, a settlement house 
in Chicago. Their aim was to help immigrants in surrounding areas 
cope with the adjustment to life in America. Other such enterprises 
followed, providing needed help to the poor and working classes and 
creating a new profession for women: social work. Since these women 
acted as nurturers and caretakers, many Americans tolerated the fact 
that the settlement house workers exhibited nontraditional female 
behavior. After all, they were just cleaning up the mess left by male 
politicians and businessmen who welcomed the immigrants’ labor 
but ignored their troubles.
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As women pushed the limits of accepted behavior, however, they 
met with opposition from both men and other women. In particular, 
the suffrage issue caused problems. Ironically, both sides fell back on 
the “cult” imagery to make their arguments. While suffragists often 
used the language of moral superiority as a justification for granting 
women the vote, those opposed claimed women were moving too far 
outside their domestic sphere. Anti-suffragists feared that if women 
entered the male world of politics, all women would lose the protec-
tions and privileges the ideology of separate spheres had afforded 
them.6 Recognizing that they would have to move into the polit-
ical realm to fight their enemies, anti-suffragists rationalized their 
behavior. They told themselves that their foray into politics was just 
temporary, designed to achieve a higher purpose, and that it would 
have no lasting implications for women’s social role. Once they had 
achieved their goal, they would gladly go back to the responsibilities 
of home and children.
Throughout much of American history, both advocates of women’s 
political participation and those who opposed it have used the image 
of woman as housewife to benefit their cause. Colonial women 
boycotting English goods, abolitionist women protesting the degra-
dation of slave women, and Progressive women setting up kitchens 
in settlement houses discovered that their normal duties could take 
on a political meaning. Similarly, anti-suffragists used their desire to 
preserve women’s housewifely role as a justification for their polit-
ical activities. These early-twentieth-century women so successfully 
incorporated the concept of “municipal housekeeping” into the image 
of the lady that future generations assumed “good” women could be 
active in certain areas of the “man’s world.” Clearly, the image of the 
homemaker-mother was fraught with political overtones.7
The idealization of the housewife image, however, truly came into 
its own in the years following the Depression and World War II. After 
two decades of economic and international disruption, many women 
and men longed for the safe haven glorified in myths of the “good old 
days.” They wanted what they perceived to be the perfect family, with 
Mom staying at home and Dad going to work. The prosperity of these 
years made this dream a possibility, at least for a time. In fact, the 
enormous increase in the variety and availability of consumer goods 
helped turn the nineteenth-century “true woman” into a shallower 
version of herself in the 1950s. The earlier woman had lived for the 
moral good of her husband and children; the 1950s wife and mother 
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spent much of her time trying to maintain the symbols that marked 
her family as middle class.8
A deeply entrenched and comfortable image of middle-class pros-
perity became a valuable tool for both men and women activists as they 
worked to enlist the majority of American women in their campaign 
against communism. Glorifying the role of housework and the posi-
tion of homemaker, anti-communists showed women that they could 
participate in politics without abandoning their traditional roles. At 
other times, activists recognized the valuable role housewives played 
in the economy and used that to their advantage. Whichever strategy 
they utilized, these men and women succeeded in more than simply 
drawing women to their cause. They also reinforced the current 
domestic ideal of femininity as the only viable option for women.
Although female activists all along the ideological spectrum 
utilized the expanded housewife imagery, it was especially vital for 
more conservative women. Because women on the Right theoreti-
cally supported status quo gender roles, advocating women’s polit-
ical participation contradicted their underlying principles, much 
as the activism of anti-suffragists had challenged their deeply held 
convictions. They could avoid appearing hypocritical, however, by 
explaining their behavior as a temporary breach of the norm required 
by the serious threat of communism. They reassured the men in their 
lives, and themselves, that everything would return to “normal” once 
the danger had passed.
Conservative anticommunist women followed this tradition and 
used it to their full advantage. Draping their work in maternalistic 
rhetoric and housewifely images, women activists reassured their 
male colleagues that they wanted nothing more than the end of 
communism; they posed no threat to the power structure. In many 
ways, in fact, they became storm troopers for patriarchal dominance. 
They did, however, expect to be taken seriously as concerned citizens; 
they assumed they had a right to participate in the struggle to save 
their homes and families from the communists. Far from submissive, 
hesitant “little women,” conservative anticommunist women boldly 
jumped into the national debate on the issue of communism, all the 
while acting as though they were not challenging the existing gender 
structure.
Out of necessity, conservative anticommunist men accepted this 
version of reality. The fact that women were not challenging men’s 
political dominance helped ease the minds of conservative male 
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activists. Convinced of the virtue of the housewifely woman, men 
generally treated women activists with the tolerant respect accorded 
to mothers and “ladies.” In turn, the women became adept at over-
looking male condescension, paternalism, and sexism as they pursued 
advocacy of their cause. With no one’s worldview threatened, men 
welcomed female participation—within limits—in the anticommunist 
movement.
To fight communism successfully, men needed women’s involve-
ment in at least three ways. First, they needed the women’s vote. As a 
result, men frequently spoke to groups of women, encouraging them 
to be informed, to write letters, and to support strong anticommunist 
candidates. The men usually couched their speeches in very tradi-
tional ways; they spoke to the women as wives, household managers, 
and mothers. Second, male anticommunist crusaders recognized that 
within their “careers” as wives and mothers, women could provide 
valuable service to the cause. Women willingly did much of the 
educational work needed at the grassroots level to build support for 
the cause and for right-wing candidates. Third, male anticommunists 
used women, especially in their roles as housewives and mothers, to 
define both the evils of communism and the virtues of America. In 
fact, the image of an idealized family lay at the center of most anti-
communist versions of the American way of life.
Although they lacked much formal power to battle communism 
either around the world or at home, female anticommunist zealots 
did possess certain tools that benefited both the cause and themselves. 
In short, they utilized their gender as an asset rather than a limita-
tion in fighting against the Reds. As a result, women were involved 
in all levels of anticommunist activity. Coming from a variety of back-
grounds, these overwhelmingly white, middle-class women did not 
let preconceived notions of femininity stop them from participating 
in a battle they felt was vitally important. They claimed the right to 
speak and write about the evils of foreign and domestic communism. 
Sometimes they spoke in general terms as Americans; other times 
they framed their arguments as women who could and should speak 
to and for their gender.
Gendered language and images pervaded discussions of commu-
nism’s danger to the world and to the American way of life. From 
the testosterone-laden speeches of “Tailgunner” Joe McCarthy to the 
portrayals of Soviet women as heartless amazons, anticommunists 
utilized gendered symbols in making their arguments to the Amer-
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ican people. Gendered subtexts allowed anticommunists to broaden 
their appeal by linking the fight against communism to concerns over 
the shifting roles of men and women in the postwar world. Americans 
who might not understand the intricacies of government machina-
tions abroad or bureaucratic spy networks at home had no difficulty 
seeing a threat in the increasing number of women working, African 
Americans protesting, or homosexuals coming out of the closet. Addi-
tionally, emphasizing their femininity provided “cover” for anticom-
munist women who adopted masculine characteristics and language 
in their advocacy of crushing communism. Whereas this gendered 
language legitimized their participation in the crusade against 
communism, anticommunist women found it could also be used to 
undermine the value of their work for the cause.
Like the anticommunist movement itself, the women in this book 
are a diverse but not all-inclusive group. They are overwhelmingly 
white and middle class, as mentioned previously. There were a small 
number of conservative anticommunist African American women, 
but I chose not to include them because their focus tended to be less 
on anticommunism than on obtaining civil rights and fighting segre-
gation. Additionally, although working-class women were concerned 
with communism, most lacked the time and extra income necessary 
to join an active crusade.
Within these parameters, the anticommunist women in this study 
include a variety of American women. Some were well-known and 
powerful; most were not. Some feared elements of the U.S. govern-
ment almost as much as they did the Soviets. Others focused on threats 
closer to home to protect their children from outside influences. Most 
were genuinely concerned about the future of their country and their 
families. Some, however, were extremists who took their beliefs to 
irrational ends. I have included a few of the more zealous to show 
the variety of women’s views and the responses of the community at 
large. Often, men and women used the obsessive behavior of a few 
women to undermine all women’s political activity.
Whether they stood on the extreme Right of the ideological spec-
trum or leaned more toward moderation, anticommunist women 
shaped the anticommunist crusade. They brought anticommunism 
into the home, motivating women to expand their domestic duties to 
include ridding their houses of the Red menace along with dust and 
grime. In the process of enlightening less politically aware women, anti-
communist activists created a space for themselves within the political 
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arena. Particularly on the local level, women discovered their power to 
effect change through demonstrations, letter-writing campaigns, and 
newsletters. Other women tried to influence national domestic and 
foreign policy through research, speeches, and writing books. Anti-
communist women utilized gendered language and imagery both to 
reinforce their right to participate in the crusade against communism 
and to emphasize the importance of their cause. In the end, these local 
campaigns and controversial books and images transformed the anti-
communist movement in ways both contemporaries and historians 
have overlooked. Only by examining women’s participation in the 
struggle against the Left can we begin to understand the depth of 
the influence anticommunism had on American society and politics. 
Conversely, without probing anticommunist activity, we cannot see 
the complexity of women’s lives during those years.
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The Cold War World
Even for men and women who did not actively participate in the anti-
communist crusade, the Cold War changed their lives. The develop-
ment of hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union 
seemed to make the world a more dangerous place by creating the 
potential for armed conflict. In a nuclear age, that potential threatened 
even to include civilians in small towns and large cities in the Amer-
ican heartland. The outbreak of fighting in areas of Eastern Europe 
and especially in Asia confirmed the validity of those fears. At home, 
the discovery of a communist spy network frightened Americans who 
worried that the government might be overrun with infiltrators. The 
paranoia proved contagious; in their fear, citizens questioned anyone 
or anything that was “different,” assuming the differences were a sign 
of communist sympathies.
c h a p t e r  o n e
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On a more positive note, Cold War–driven defense spending 
fueled an economic prosperity that allowed many families to move 
into the middle class. Accompanied by increased consumer spending, 
the ever-growing defense budgets provided jobs and rising incomes 
for many Americans. This prosperity, combined with the effects of 
government initiatives such as the GI Bill and the Federal Housing 
Authority, pushed many families into middle-class status and allowed 
others to appear so through increased consumerism. The growth of 
suburbia developed alongside a new emphasis on family and confor-
mity that resulted in part from Cold War anxieties.1
The Cold War, the rise of the middle class, and the renewed 
emphasis on domesticity had a particularly powerful impact on 
women. They were supposed to find their ultimate fulfillment as 
wives and mothers, staying at home and tending to home and 
family. Everyone, from preachers to teachers to government officials, 
believed that was what women wanted. Many women mouthed 
similar sentiments, even as the reality of their lives proved the “femi-
nine mystique” was a myth. Although men and women continued to 
insist that domesticity should be every woman’s ideal, women took 
jobs, joined clubs, and volunteered with organizations that took them 
away from home.2
The Cold War was actually much more complex than the black-
and-white explanations American leaders gave their fellow citizens. 
Tension between Russia and the United States predated the creation of 
the Soviet Union in 1924. Nationalism on both sides, combined with 
American distrust of the autocratic and anti-Semitic Russian czars 
and Russian resentment of American arrogance and expansionist 
tendencies, created an underlying hostility between the two nations. 
The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 added an ideological element to an 
already existing antagonism. While the onset of World War II forged 
a temporary alliance between the two countries in an effort to defeat 
fascism, the smoldering mistrust never completely disappeared. Even 
as the Soviets stood alone in their struggle in 1942, Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt had difficulty convincing both Congress and the American 
people to extend Lend-Lease aid to their new allies. Recognizing 
American ambivalence toward them and determined to protect their 
borders from future invasions, the Soviets reacted defensively as they 
liberated Eastern Europe from Nazi control by maintaining armies in 
the countries of that region. By the end of World War II, the allies were 
deeply suspicious of each other.3
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In the five years following V-J Day, misunderstandings between 
the Soviet and U.S. governments hardened into belligerent defensive-
ness. Beginning from a position of suspicion, government leaders on 
each side saw the other’s actions as threatening and dangerous. Offi-
cials in the Kremlin and the U.S. State Department refused to recog-
nize their own part in the growing conflict. Soviet leaders ignored the 
call for free elections and crushed any opposition to their authority. 
When the Americans, British, and French began cooperating with one 
another in Germany, the Soviets suspected a Western plot to isolate 
them. Their response, closing off ground access to Berlin, only height-
ened the Western nations’ concern that the Soviets planned to take 
over Europe. Each side assumed the other was out to destroy it and 
saw every action as a threat.
Meanwhile, Americans developed the containment policy. At 
heart, this policy divided the world into two, and only two, spheres: 
the free world (those on America’s side) and the communist world 
(those on the Soviets’ side). Nations had to be on one side or the other. 
Containment thus left little room for negotiation or compromise; you 
agreed with the good guys, or you were assumed to be one of the bad 
guys. One result of U.S. officials’ acceptance of that bipolar vision of 
the world was their blindness to the existence of those who fell into 
gray areas; in other words, those who did not fit neatly into one cate-
gory or another. For example, Yugoslavian president Josip Tito, tech-
nically a member of the communist bloc, stood up to Soviet premier 
Joseph Stalin and wanted to form a relationship with the United 
States; Chinese leader Mao Zedong practiced a variation of commu-
nism that troubled Stalin almost as much as it did the Americans; and 
various nations of the developing world, such as India, did not want 
to be drawn into the great power struggle. From the opposite perspec-
tive, Americans reacted incredulously to French president Charles de 
Gaulle’s refusal blindly to accept U.S. dictates. In ignoring nations that 
did not fit the containment mold exactly, Americans missed opportu-
nities to develop a realistic vision of the international situation. The 
Cold War world was much more complicated than the containment 
view allowed.4
Despite its complex reality, American political leaders described 
the Cold War to the U.S. public in very simplistic terms. FBI chief J. 
Edgar Hoover, who first expressed concern over the Bolsheviks in 
1919, epitomized the standard anticommunist refrain. Bolshevik 
doctrines, he explained, “threaten the happiness of the community, 
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the safety of every individual, and the continuance of every home 
and fireside.” Ultimately, this system would “destroy the peace of 
the country and thrust it into a condition of anarchy and lawlessness 
and immorality that passes imagination.”5 The passage of time did 
nothing to change Hoover’s views of the Bolsheviks-turned-Soviets. 
In fact, his continued study of the ideology and its practitioners deep-
ened his hatred and distrust of the enemy. Fearing the Truman admin-
istration underestimated the seriousness of the threat from the Reds, 
Hoover testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee 
in 1947. Once again, he emphasized the sinister nature of commu-
nism. “It stands,” he proclaimed, “for the destruction of our American 
form of government . . . American democracy . . . [and] free enter-
prise.” Communism’s goal, according to Hoover, was the “creation of 
a ‘Soviet of the United States’ and ultimate world revolution.”6
Like many Americans, Hoover viewed the threat of communism 
in ideological terms. Rather than speak of tanks and totalitarian coun-
tries, Hoover tended toward religious language. “The real danger in 
communism,” he explained, “lies in the fact that it is atheistic and 
seeks to replace the Supreme Being.” Without God as the center, he 
stated, there would be no moral guidelines, and society would fall 
into chaos. Not only would Americans lose their everyday freedoms, 
but their families would be destroyed as well. “Children,” Hoover 
explained, “would be placed in nurseries and special indoctrination 
schools.” Women, relieved of child-care responsibilities, would go to 
work in factories and mines with the men.7 This scenario contrasted 
sharply with the American ideal of a stay-at-home mom who served 
as the bulwark of the family. Obviously, Hoover believed the Amer-
ican system was superior.
For others, such as President Harry Truman, ideology took a back 
seat to questions of an international balance of power. Already both-
ered by the Soviets’ refusal to allow free elections in Eastern Europe, 
Truman decided to take a firmer stand when asked to help anti-
communist forces in Greece in their battle against the Red menace. 
Truman realized he needed to convince Congress and the American 
public to spend sufficient funds to halt communism in Greece and 
the surrounding area. He feared Congress and voters would be reluc-
tant both to commit such a large sum and to re-engage in a world-
wide struggle. After consulting with his advisers and congressional 
leaders, Truman decided he needed to frighten the public into agree-
ment. The Truman Doctrine, as it became known, warned that if the 
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United States did not aid Greece and Turkey “in this fateful hour,” the 
consequences would “be far reaching to the West as well as the East.” 
With this speech, Truman implemented the containment policy and 
established a pattern anticommunists, particularly those in govern-
ment, would continue to follow for decades. Combining frightening 
rhetoric about the potential threat to U.S. shores with a sense of Amer-
ican duty, government anticommunists legitimized the reality of the 
communist danger.8
Nongovernmental anticommunists echoed the concern. In 1948, 
James F. O’Neil, national commander of the American Legion, used 
vivid imagery to explain to his fellow Legionnaires that the “rape of 
Czechoslovakia” posed a threat even to Americans safe within their 
meeting halls. What happened in far-off places, he wrote, foreshad-
owed what could occur in the good old United States if Legionnaires 
did not open their eyes to the foreign agents in their midst.9 Contain-
ment, it seemed, was not just a policy for diplomats.
President Truman, struggling to stay ahead of the public’s 
concern, turned the problem over to his National Security Council 
(NSC). The NSC issued its report in April 1950, but NSC-68 did little 
to calm the growing fears. In fact, the report set a very somber tone. 
The situation Americans faced was “momentous, involving the fulfill-
ment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself.” 
According to the NSC, the Soviet Union desired “to bring the free 
world under its dominion by methods of the cold war.” The report 
exposed the “risks” if the free world—that is, America—did not begin 
to build an adequate defense system. Using words and phrases meant 
to instill a sense of urgency, the report cautioned that a delay in deci-
sion making could prove fatal. Americans must accept “that the cold 
war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at 
stake.”10
By the early 1950s, the Cold War battlefront had shifted from 
Europe to Asia. The success of Mao Zedong and his communist forces 
in pushing American-supported Jiang Jieshi into exile, combined with 
the creation of the People’s Republic of China, shocked Americans. 
Suddenly, it appeared to many Americans as though communism 
was winning the struggle to control the globe. The situation wors-
ened in June 1950 when communist North Korea invaded U.S. ally 
South Korea. The Cold War had turned hot. Despite nominal United 
Nations support, Americans paid for the war in Korea in both blood 
and dollars, as American GIs provided the bodies and U.S. taxpayers 
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footed the bill for the conflict. Expecting an easy victory, Americans 
watched incredulously as the conflict settled into a stalemate. Only 
a limited victory seemed possible, and no one was sure exactly what 
it would entail. They did know, however, that it was not the same 
as winning the war. America, which had defeated both Japan and 
Germany in 1945, suddenly seemed incapable of defeating a small 
developing nation. Frustration over the situation exposed what for 
most Americans proved the bitter reality of the containment policy—
it worked to maintain the status quo instead of vanquishing the 
enemy—and caused some Americans to push for increased defense 
spending; they could only rationalize that the Korean stalemate had 
resulted from a failure to prosecute the war to the fullest.11
Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy and numerous other political 
leaders continued to pursue this theme in the coming years. In his 
career-making speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, in 1950, McCarthy 
chillingly reported that the number of people living under commu-
nist rule had increased by 400 percent since 1945. He stated that this 
increase indicated “the swiftness of the tempo of Communist victories 
and American defeats in the cold war.” Richard Nixon, senator and 
future vice president, cautioned Americans who wanted to stay out 
of the struggle that this was no longer an option: “If Europe [were] 
allowed to go Communist, it [would] mean that within five or ten years 
we will be faced with a war which we are likely to lose.” FBI director 
Hoover also urged Americans not to relax their guard. Facing “formi-
dable weapons,” Americans could not afford the “luxury of waiting 
for communism to run its course like other oppressive dictatorships.”12 
Instead, according to New Hampshire senator Styles Bridges, Ameri-
cans had to assume a leadership role. The U.S. government should 
concentrate less on the people already lost to communism and more 
on the “millions of Asiatics waiting to be arrayed against Communism. 
They are waiting only on American leadership.”13 Without a willing-
ness to press on with the struggle as well as continual vigilance, these 
leaders warned, Americans risked losing their way of life.
Other Americans disagreed with this way of thinking. Although 
they also found the Soviet system repugnant and feared its inten-
tions, these Americans worried that the obsession with defeating 
communism everywhere might prove equally dangerous for Amer-
icans. Some, like President Dwight Eisenhower, warned that the 
ever-growing defense expenditures were weakening the budget and 
could permanently damage the economy. In his Farewell Address, 
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Ike encouraged Americans to refrain from thinking that “some spec-
tacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution” to 
destroying their “ruthless” enemy.14 Others, such as author, critic, and 
philosopher Lewis Mumford, thought the increasingly belligerent 
language ruined any chance to seek peaceful solutions to crises. They 
were concerned that the government would only consider military 
options to resolve conflicts.15 Democratic presidential candidate in 
1952 and 1956 Adlai Stevenson expressed concern that the actions of 
some of the more zealous anticommunists undermined “the bright 
image of America” held by peoples around the world.16
Meanwhile, the development of more overt conflict between the 
United States and the USSR invigorated existing anticommunist and 
antiradical factions across the country. Building on the anti-immigrant 
and anti-labor sentiments of the late nineteenth century, this early 
anticommunist movement came into its own during the Red Scare 
following World War I. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, aided 
by his young and dedicated assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, succeeded in 
deporting a number of communists (most notably Emma Goldman 
and Alexander Berkman) before overplaying their hands in a series of 
highly publicized, ethically questionable, and ultimately unproduc-
tive raids on supposed communist cells. Palmer’s loss of prestige did 
not lead to cancellation of the Investigative Bureau (later the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation [FBI]) he had created to look into subversive 
groups. The new head of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, took his responsi-
bilities seriously and began compiling lists of individuals and organi-
zations he found “subversive.”17
Hoover was not alone. In fact, during the 1920s and 1930s, concern 
about the threat from the Left arose in different areas. Corporate 
leaders and some members of the middle class increasingly associated 
communism and socialism with the efforts of various labor groups 
to organize and protect laborers. The Catholic Church proclaimed its 
opposition to the communist regime in Russia, citing both Lenin’s 
atheism and the treatment of priests and nuns under radical regimes. 
Disillusioned former leftists, such as J. B. Matthews, and virulent anti-
Semites, such as Elizabeth Dilling, worked to build libraries of infor-
mation and published books in their attempts to warn the American 
public of the continued threat communism posed.18 The creation of 
the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1938 provided a 
perfect springboard from which to launch a crusade against the Red 
menace. Although initially formed to investigate German Americans’ 
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connections to the Nazi regime, the committee—under the influence 
of Matthews, who served as chief investigator, and Texan Martin 
Dies—soon turned its attention to communism.19
On the eve of World War II, an ill-defined, disorganized, and 
multifaceted anticommunist sentiment existed among Americans. 
Most Americans could not have defined the philosophy of commu-
nism, but they sensed that it was bad. They knew communists did 
not allow people to practice religion or own private property. Some 
feared the Soviet Union’s power to spread anti-capitalist sentiment 
throughout Europe and the rest of the world. Many others conflated 
concerns about foreign communism with a dislike of the political poli-
cies of the Roosevelt administration. These people were not certain 
where the line ended separating true communism from the make-
work programs of the New Deal. In their view, encouraging the poor 
to expect help from the government, which would take money from 
the rich in the form of taxes, sounded radical enough to be commu-
nism. Still, the vagueness of their apprehensions meant most Ameri-
cans willingly suppressed their anxieties about the Soviets during the 
period of the Grand Alliance.
Those underlying doubts came roaring back, however, after the 
exposure in 1945 and 1946 of Soviet spies in Canada, England, and even 
the United States. At that point, most Americans recognized the need 
to eliminate any legitimate threats to the government. The convictions 
of former State Department employee Alger Hiss (for perjury) and 
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg (for espionage) appeared to prove that a 
serious problem existed.20 Building on these concerns about national 
security, politicians such as Senator Joseph McCarthy began to hunt 
for spies in every nook and cranny of the government. In their quest 
to ferret out any potential subversives, McCarthy and his ilk willingly 
accused people based on circumstantial evidence, hearsay, or other 
seemingly unrelated factors. Spy hunters, for example, declared open 
season on homosexuals. Similarly, anyone who appeared to support 
the growing Civil Rights Movement drew criticism from McCarthy 
and his associates. Even being friends with someone of a different race 
was suspicious behavior and raised concerns that one was a potential 
communist, or “fellow traveler.”
The extreme nature of many of McCarthy’s views caused concern 
among some anticommunist politicians and intellectuals, who feared 
that the obsession with spies blinded Americans to reality. They 
believed the danger from any remaining communists was slight 
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compared with the damage being done to the American justice 
system.21 For example, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. accepted that 
communism posed a threat but ridiculed the idea that a party of 
70,000 or fewer members would “contemplate a violent revolution” 
in the United States.22 Even President Truman, one of the original 
creators of containment, worried that some anticommunist measures 
went too far. In vetoing the Internal Security Act of 1950, he wrote that 
the proposed measure would discredit “as hypocrisy the efforts of the 
US on behalf of freedom.” He warned that implementation of the bill 
could constitute the “greatest danger to freedom of speech, press and 
assembly, since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798.”23 McCarthyites 
charged that such an attitude indicated a “softness” on the part of the 
individual and marked that person as a “pinko”—a commie sympa-
thizer at worst and a dupe at best. Historian Richard Gid Powers 
separated what he labeled “countersubversives,” those who saw little 
difference between a Soviet communist and an American Democrat, 
and liberals, who worried about the Soviet Union’s power but saw 
little threat in the American Communist Party.24
Increasingly, these differences in approach to anticommunism 
took on a partisan flavor. Both Republicans and Democrats—in fact, 
almost all Americans—professed to espouse some measure of anti-
communism. Moreover, within the major political parties were those 
who disagreed on the amount of time and money that should be spent 
fighting communists abroad and searching out subversives at home. In 
general, however, Republicans pushed continually to increase defense 
spending and sought military solutions to problems abroad. At home, 
they were more vehement in their efforts to sniff out Reds. Democrats, 
who had originated the Cold War under Truman, also voted for large 
defense budgets but were more leery of an over-reliance on military 
solutions. In addition, they feared the quest for spies in government 
had run amok. Democrats argued that what they had begun as a legit-
imate security measure, Republicans had turned into a free-for-all.
More important than these slight variations in tone and degree, 
however, was the way anticommunism became a weapon to be used in 
partisan warfare. Mud slinging reached new lows as Republicans and 
Democrats smeared one another every shade of red and pink. Repub-
licans proved particularly adept at this in their effort to regain control 
of the White House after their long exile under the Roosevelt-Truman 
presidencies. The GOP had grown impatient and frustrated after a 
twenty-year banishment; they wanted control of the Oval Office. Anti-
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communism was a way to get there. Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, 
Barry Goldwater, and numerous others successfully defeated their 
Democratic opponents by accusing them of being “soft on commu-
nism.” Taking the charge a step further, some Republicans began 
equating “liberalism” with communism, thus making it even easier 
to undermine not just their opponents but also any programs they 
disliked. Reaching its peak in the early 1950s, Red baiting remained a 
useful partisan tool throughout the rest of the twentieth century.25
Even as the hysteria of the Red Scare climaxed in the early 1950s 
with the Army-McCarthy hearings, circumstances abroad and polit-
ical developments at home provided Americans with the opportunity 
to reevaluate their Cold War thinking. The death of Stalin in 1953, 
followed by the eventual rise to power of Nikita Khrushchev and the 
increasingly visible and important role in geopolitics of developing 
nations in Asia and Africa, changed the players and settings of the 
Cold War drama without interfering with the basic plot. The standoff 
between the United States and the Soviet Union settled into a tense 
stalemate, with an occasional exchange of hostile words or displays 
of military prowess. Despite his campaign promises to get tough with 
the commies, Republican Dwight Eisenhower’s victory in 1952 did 
not intensify the battle, liberate “captive nations,” or take the Soviets 
to the brink of nuclear war. In fact, much to the regret of some of his 
supporters, Ike spent much of his time—especially after winning 
reelection in 1956—trying to thaw the ice blocking communication 
between Washington and the Kremlin. His willingness to meet with 
Khrushchev and his desire to end the arms race met with little ultimate 
success, as the containment view of the world still predominated. That 
mind-set continued into the early 1960s even as Eisenhower’s Demo-
cratic successors, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, heated up 
the conflict in places like Cuba and Vietnam. The thick layer of ice 
keeping the United States in the Cold War proved very difficult to 
thaw.26
The Cold War played a similarly influential role in Americans’ 
economic lives. The prosperity of the postwar years was intimately 
connected to the evolving Cold War in a number of ways. At its most 
basic level, America’s campaign against communism cost a tremen-
dous amount of money. The containment policies required huge 
expenditures to arm and maintain a large standing army, fund the 
training of foreign troops, aid the development of evolving nations 
around the world, and continue research and development on every-
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thing from weapons to medicines to space exploration. By funneling 
all this money into defense expenditures, the federal government 
helped create thousands of new industries and jobs, many of them 
in the southern and southwestern states. New jobs combined with 
the educational benefits available through the GI Bill helped keep the 
unemployment rate consistently low throughout the 1950s and into 
the mid-1960s.27
The combination of shifting populations, returning veterans 
benefiting from the GI Bill, and increased employment affected 
various segments of the American population in different ways. For 
many African Americans, their new middle-class status was bitter-
sweet, since it did not guarantee an end to segregation in schools or 
housing. New income and educational levels, however, did help fuel 
existing civil rights organizations such as the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People, which was challenging the old 
system through the courts, and the Montgomery Women’s Political 
Caucus, which attacked segregation on the streets and buses. Building 
on half a century of work, the African American Civil Rights Move-
ment of the postwar years would utilize every weapon at its disposal, 
including Cold War fears, to demand equality.28
Even as they fought for equality, many middle-class African Amer-
icans joined their white counterparts in fueling another key ingre-
dient of the booming postwar economic stew—consumer spending. 
Released from the enforced frugality of the Depression and war years, 
Americans eagerly gobbled up consumer goods as fast as they could 
be produced. They bought houses and filled them with furniture and 
appliances, including new technological wonders such as televisions 
and transistor radios. In their new cars, they zoomed off on the new 
interstate highway system (defended as a military necessity as an 
escape route in case of an atomic blast but sponsored by automobile 
manufacturers and trucking and oil companies), pausing to eat at a 
new McDonald’s and spending the night at a Holiday Inn on their way 
to Disneyland. The old adage “a penny saved” was replaced by the 
seductive tones of advertisers (and government officials) encouraging 
people to spend, spend, spend. Consumerism, the ads and politicos 
promised, would not only make you a happier and better person, it 
would also help keep the economy going and the Reds out.29
The most important purchase most people made was a new house 
in the suburbs springing up around most large and many smaller 
cities. Returning veterans and others with new families needed a place 
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to live and longed for their own bit of land. The need for housing 
was particularly acute in the South and Southwest, where the popula-
tion was exploding exponentially. Answering the call, home builders 
utilized mass production to create entire communities almost over-
night. The federal government contributed by making easy loans 
available through the Veterans’ Administration and the Federal 
Housing Authority. Children of immigrants and working-class men 
and women, whose parents’ dreams of home ownership had never 
been realized, eagerly leaped at the chance to fulfill their parents’ and 
their own fantasies and rushed to buy up these houses as soon as they 
became available.30
In part because of this rise in home ownership as well as the 
increase in the number of white-collar, managerial jobs, America 
seemed more and more like a middle-class nation. As people poured 
into the suburbs, buying new houses and cars and the accoutrements 
that went with them, Americans began to look middle class, even 
if their incomes did not always fit within that sociological range or 
their shirt collars were not white. Even many of those who remained 
solidly working class found themselves with incomes sufficient to join 
the ranks of suburbanites. Some unions, frightened by threats from 
McCarthyites, abandoned their leftist members and goals and traded 
worker loyalty for job security, higher wages, and benefits. As a result, 
plumbers and machinists shed their uniforms in the locker rooms at 
work and looked like every other father and husband returning to his 
castle at the end of a long workday.31
An essential element of this middle-class suburban existence was 
the family. For a variety of reasons—making up for lost time after the 
Depression and war years, anxiety over the Cold War, taking advan-
tage of prosperity—more and more people were getting married and 
having more and more children. Prosperity allowed people to marry 
younger, which gave them time to have more children; concern over 
the future created a need for family comfort and security; and the 
housing boom created a safe and roomy environment for a family. In 
turn, the baby boom fueled consumer spending and necessitated the 
development of more housing units. Regardless of whether people 
consciously thought of it, and few probably did, this emphasis on 
family life also served as a counterpoint to the accepted view of the 
lonely, rigid existence under communism.32 For many Americans, their 
ability to have a barbeque in the backyard surrounded by friends, 
neighbors, and kids proved they were living the American dream.
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In this idyllic image of suburban family life, women played the key 
role. They were wives and mothers, cleaners and cooks in the man’s 
castle, nurturers and chauffeurs for the children, the linchpin that kept 
everything running smoothly. Although they could not control their 
own economic existence (a woman needed a man’s signature for a 
loan application, for example), women usually served as managers of 
the household budget and thus as the chief consumers. A woman was 
her husband’s partner, albeit a junior one, in the quest to enhance his 
career, obtain the right house, and function as the perfect family. In 
other words, she was to have no existence apart from her family. Most 
important, perhaps, she was not supposed to want anything else.
At least that was the message delivered by political, cultural, and 
economic leaders. Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson told a group 
of female college graduates that they could have no higher career aspi-
ration than that of wife and mother. The new media, television, rein-
forced the image of woman as domestic goddess. Sitcoms of the era 
such as Leave It to Beaver, Father Knows Best, and The Adventures of Ozzie 
and Harriet emphasized women’s important supporting role as wife and 
mother. The few single characters on the shows almost always spent 
their time searching for a husband or lamenting their “spinsterhood.” 
During breaks in the shows, businessmen acknowledged women’s 
role as consumers by aiming ads at them. Rarely did the commercials 
portray women as anything other than a housewife obsessed with 
cleanliness, a mother protective of her children, or a young beauty 
looking for love. From all sides, women constantly heard that they 
should be happy and fulfilled by their role as wife and mother.33
Commentators and historians in succeeding years uncritically 
accepted this view of postwar women as reality, establishing it as the 
norm for American women at the time. The most famous example 
was Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique. Based on questionnaires 
completed by Smith College graduates, the book exposed the vague 
unhappiness of women who felt constrained by the role of house-
wife-mother. For women who had felt alone in their discontent, the 
book was a godsend. It meant they were not crazy. Interestingly, 
although this best-seller indicted the era as oppressive for women, it 
also assumed that the image had been an unpleasant reality for most 
women. Friedan and later scholars focused on the predominant image 
and ignored contrary evidence.34
Most women, however, did not neatly fit the image Friedan and 
others accepted as real. Despite advertising’s whitewash of happy, 
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smiling women mopping floors, a closer examination of 1950s media 
reveals that women reacted in various ways to this emphasis on domes-
ticity. Women’s magazines discussed the difficulties women faced in 
trying to live up to an impossible ideal. Although the editors usually 
ended up encouraging women to look to the home for solutions to 
their frustration, many articles acknowledged that a problem existed. 
In their responses to these articles, many women asserted that they 
were neither “sheep following the rest of the herd” nor “poor little 
housewives.” They rejected the idea that they were passive victims 
and claimed to be happy with their choices. Similarly, television shows 
presented conflicting images of women. Alongside Ozzie and Harriet 
was Our Miss Brooks, in which a single female teacher proved to be the 
smartest character.35 Armed with this evidence, historians have begun 
to challenge the traditionally held view of the “feminine mystique.” 
Studying the lives of women of color, as well as those of politically 
active and career women, scholars have begun to agree that many 
women of the era chose alternative lifestyles or consciously molded 
the image of housewife to suit their particular needs.36
For example, middle-class African American and Mexican Amer-
ican women were very much a part of the emerging Civil Rights Move-
ment of the postwar years. In joining and helping to create various 
activist groups, women fulfilled traditional female functions of writing 
letters, stuffing envelopes, making coffee, and generally working in 
the background of such groups as the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference and the Community Service Organization. They used their 
positions as wives and mothers to convince other women to register 
to vote or to sign petitions to protect their children. Women of color 
moved beyond these roles and took on leadership responsibilities 
in various organizations. For example, the highly organized Mont-
gomery Women’s Political Caucus (MWPC) was able to capitalize on 
Rosa Parks’s arrest in 1955 and mobilize the black community in an 
effective boycott of the city’s transportation and commercial services. 
In fact, the MWPC chose Parks’s arrest as the catalyst because she 
was a respected woman in the community. Similarly, Dolores Huerta 
played such a key role in founding the Farm Workers’ Association 
that she became the group’s first vice president. Huerta might have 
been the most visible woman in the organization, but she was far from 
the only one. Thousands of women combined their duties as wives 
and mothers with their organizing activities. Protecting the future 
of their families was more important to them than obeying societal 
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and cultural norms that would have kept them at home.37 Although 
these women frequently dealt with sexism among the men in their 
communities, the overwhelming racism they faced necessitated that 
all volunteers be utilized.
Women in labor organizations fought both the biases of their 
male colleagues and the backlash against left-wing organizations. 
The unions’ male leadership hesitated to include women because 
they feared the wrath of men who held traditional views of women’s 
place in society. Moreover, male workers often believed the pres-
ence of females in the workplace lowered wages and prevented 
men from getting jobs. Women persisted, however. As they had in 
earlier years, female members demanded that union leaders protect 
women workers from unfair practices such as job segregation and 
wage discrimination. In addition, during the 1950s, as women still 
reeled from postwar layoffs, some women aggressively fought both 
union and corporate leadership to maintain employment and wage 
levels. As women moved increasingly into new areas of work, they 
took their positive view of labor organizing with them and insisted 
on having a voice in existing unions and in the creation of new locals 
where that proved necessary. Of course, women were more successful 
at arguing their cause in some labor organizations than in others. 
As the anticommunist crusade chilled support for labor organizing, 
unions sometimes had no choice but to turn to their female members 
for continued support, providing those women with new leadership 
opportunities.38
Despite prevailing domesticity and anticommunist rhetoric, 
women on the Left continued to voice strong support for political 
causes. Members of the National Woman’s Party (NWP), the Commu-
nist Party USA (CPUSA), and groups such as Women Strike for Peace 
(WSP) faced ridicule, ostracism, and even the threat of federal investi-
gation and prosecution. Interestingly, organizations lumped together 
as “left wing” by mainstream American culture frequently disagreed 
with one another and shared commonalities with the dominant society. 
For example, NWP members, although continuing to fight for the 
Equal Rights Amendment and actively pursuing a “feminist” agenda, 
distanced themselves from the CPUSA by forcing out communist 
members. The WSP followed a similarly anticommunist agenda. Both 
CPUSA and WSP female members frequently emphasized marriage 
and children, relating to more typical womanly occupations even as 
they challenged the dominant political powers. In other words, these 
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women frequently looked like “normal” housewives, even as they 
participated in “abnormal” activities.39
But what about the “normal” housewife? Did the white, middle-
class suburban woman—the model for the normal housewife—fit the 
image of the feminine mystique? Was she sitting at home, cooking, 
cleaning, parenting, and slowly going out of her mind? Certainly, 
some women appeared to live out this scenario. There were wives 
and mothers who claimed to be perfectly happy as homemakers, but 
there were obviously others who claimed to be happy when all the 
while they were drinking bourbon or popping pills.
Even for women who embraced the domestic ideal of the time, 
wife and mother were only two of their job titles. To help maintain the 
newly attained middle-class lifestyle, an increasing number of women 
worked outside the home. By 1960 there were 23.3 million women in 
the workforce, more than the number during the war years. Included 
in this figure were a large number of white married women who 
joined their African American, Mexican American, and immigrant 
sisters as wage laborers. Like other traditional working-class people, 
these women had jobs but not careers. Many saw their employment as 
a temporary measure to help pay for braces for the kids’ teeth, a new 
car, or their children’s education. Answering the “Help Wanted—Girl” 
ads in the newspapers, women usually found work in traditionally 
female occupations—teacher, nurse, sales clerk, secretary.40 Moreover, 
this outside employment was undertaken in addition to, not instead 
of, her main responsibilities at home.
For those fortunate enough not to have to work, life frequently 
did not fit the “happy homemaker” pattern. In addition to caring for 
their families and homes, middle-class suburban women also partici-
pated in many community service and volunteer organizations. 
Groups ranging from the League of Women Voters to the PTA noted 
an increase in membership during these years. Especially for women 
whose children were in school or who were childless, such organized 
activity helped fill the time between household tasks. A particular 
beneficiary of this impetus was the General Federation of Women’s 
Clubs, whose membership increased significantly during these years. 
This national organization allowed local chapters to choose their own 
agendas. Thus, women could shop around for a group that fit their 
personal likes and needs.41
The mainstream political parties also utilized women volunteers. 
During the 1950s, political organizers increasingly turned to suburban 
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women for help with the day-to-day operations of party machinery. 
The booming economy meant men were employed full-time, leaving 
them with less time for party work and creating a need for new volun-
teers. Middle-class housewives had both the time and the desire to 
participate. In addition, male workers found that women excelled at 
the tasks necessary to maintain a party during and between elections. 
Women had excellent “people skills,” making them perfect for what 
historian and activist Jo Freeman called the “grunt work of canvassing, 
telephoning and mailing.” As a result, by the 1960s women had 
completely infiltrated both the Democratic and Republican parties at 
the lowest levels. Men claimed the spotlight, but women were running 
the operations.42
Obviously, despite the lingering image of the 1950s woman as a 
homebody with little concern about the “outside” world, many women 
involved themselves in some kind of political activity. Whether they 
worked for a mainstream political party, a civil rights organization, or 
a local women’s group, these women frequently saw their actions as 
an extension of their responsibilities as mothers, wives, and citizens. 
They explained their involvement not just as a way to fill leisure time 
but also as a means to protect their children’s future. Frequently, local 
issues served as the impetus for their movement outside the home. 
Once that initial issue was resolved, however, many were eager to 
remain active. As with earlier generations of American women, these 
“June Cleavers” discovered that family responsibilities and political 
activism were not mutually exclusive.
The Cold War world existed on two levels. The first seemed simple 
to understand. Soviets-communists-Reds were bad; Americans were 
good. Americans who understood this and who fought against every-
thing that looked or sounded remotely communist were good; Ameri-
cans who were willing to tolerate communists or leftists of any variety 
were bad. The American family during the Cold War era consisted of 
father, mother, and children, all living happily in their new suburban 
home and enjoying the fruits of father’s hard labor. Mother flitted 
around the house cleaning and cooking or dabbling in gardening.
The second level was more complicated. The conflict between the 
United States and the Soviets proved difficult to fight and very expen-
sive to maintain. Military engagements such as the Korean War lacked 
clear, decisive outcomes. There were a few Soviet spies, but most 
seemed to have disappeared by the time the FBI got around to looking 
for them. Many Americans enjoyed unprecedented prosperity, which 
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led not only to an increased emphasis on material goods but also to 
the development of new forms of debt. While the economic boom sent 
some Americans scurrying to the suburbs, others used their newfound 
security to launch an aggressive Civil Rights Movement, attacking the 
Jim Crow system in the South and the racist attitudes of white Ameri-
cans across the country. Women of all races and classes absorbed the 
message of the feminine mystique even as their lives seemed to deny 
its existence.
Accepting the simplistic version of the Cold War and manipulating 
the complexities of the evolving Cold War world to their advantage, a 
significant number of women who appeared to epitomize the feminine 
mystique joined the crusade against communism at home and abroad. 
These women took advantage of the free time afforded them by the 
economic prosperity of the time, as well as of pervasive anticommu-
nist attitudes, to justify leaving the suburbs (at least metaphorically) 
to become politically active. Although their individual circumstances 
and motivations varied, they were united in their dedication to root 
out communism and protect the American way of life.
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Who Were These Women?
The Cold War world might have been confusing and frightening, but 
American women eagerly took it upon themselves to calm the worries 
and take up the struggle to protect their loved ones from whatever 
enemies threatened them. Particularly remarkable were the actions 
and commitment of white, conservative, anticommunist women. 
These were the women who, theoretically, believed in the domestic 
ideal and espoused a role for women limited to home and family. Iron-
ically, this very dedication to home and children was what led them 
to political involvement. Following in the footsteps of earlier genera-
tions of conservative women activists and echoing the refrains of right-
wing women around the world, American women saw no contradic-
tion between their involvement outside the home and their continued 
support of domesticity. Although their individual backgrounds and 
c h a p t e r  t w o
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life experiences differed, conservative female anticommunists shared 
a belief that the communist threat was so great that they must defy 
convention and work for its destruction. From their perspective the 
situation was simple—fight communism or risk your children’s lives 
and the American way of life.
These women activists did not spring up in a vacuum, however. 
Their actions resulted not only from the realities of the Cold War 
world in which they lived but also from the convergence of two other 
developing movements. First, these women benefited from the work 
of a significant number of right-wing women who had come before 
them. Working against suffrage; fighting communists, immigrants, 
and radicals during and following World War I; and protesting the 
changes wrought by the New Deal, earlier generations of women had 
laid the foundations on which Cold War women operated. Second, 
just as these women were mounting their campaigns against commu-
nism, conservatives of various persuasions were beginning to work 
together to create a viable political right-wing movement. Both of 
these factors created an atmosphere in which anticommunist women 
could more easily conduct their activities.
Conservative anticommunist women of the 1950s and 1960s 
repeated the refrains made common by their mothers and grand-
mothers, as well as their sisters in other countries. Emphasizing the 
importance of their role as wives and especially as mothers, women 
had fought against woman suffrage, immorality, urbanization, and 
all manner of liberal political reforms. Internationally, women had 
utilized similar rhetoric to explain their participation in fascist move-
ments in Germany, Britain, and Chile. They sang the glories of mothers 
who stayed home and cared for their families even as they themselves 
left home to join the masculine world of politics. They rationalized that 
they were not contradicting themselves because their political activi-
ties were actually an extension of the maternal instincts to care for and 
protect their young. Frequently, they added that since women were, by 
their very nature, more moral than men, it was women’s responsibility 
to do whatever was necessary to preserve the home and family.1
The connections between Cold War anticommunist women and 
their earlier sisters were not limited to similar rationalizations of their 
actions. Most significant, conservative women played a role, ignored 
by many scholars until recently, in the evolution of women’s political 
culture. Obviously, women suffragists, progressive women, and femi-
nists pushed for women to be able to take part in the political process 
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in a formal way. Their female opponents have usually been repre-
sented as the antagonists in this drama, the players who held back 
progress. Such analysis overlooks the reality that conservative women 
were, as historian Jane Jerome Camhi put it, “variations on a trend 
toward activism among women.” Both suffragists and anti-suffragists 
shared many characteristics in terms of background and actions; they 
differed, however, in the solutions they proposed to deal with existing 
problems. Suffragists argued that women’s direct participation in the 
political system would allow them to help alleviate the suffering of the 
poor and eliminate corruption in government; anti-suffragists warned 
that granting women the right to vote would undermine the patriar-
chal order and create more instability and corruption.2 Consequently, 
just as liberal feminists built on the foundations laid by suffragists 
and progressives, conservative anticommunists took advantage of the 
examples of their anti-suffragist sisters.
Anticommunist women also benefited from the birth of a more 
organized and stable conservative movement. For years, men and 
women who believed in classical liberal economics as well as those 
who preached a traditionalist morality had claimed to be “conserva-
tive.” The inherent contradiction between a group that supported 
limited government and people who wanted government to impose 
a moral standard kept the two groups separate and “conservatives” 
politically divided and weak. Anticommunism gave them common 
cause. Classical liberals despised the idea of a planned economy, while 
traditionalists feared the atheism inherent in communist ideology. In 
the face of an overwhelmingly dangerous enemy, conservatives of 
both varieties began to work together to defeat communism as well 
as any policies or politicians they perceived were leading them down 
a leftward path.3 One result of this development was the creation of 
a number of conservative organizations and publications. These peri-
odicals provided interested anticommunist women with a forum in 
which to discuss and promote their ideas.
These three situations—the Cold War, the historical pattern of 
conservative female activism, and the emergence of a viable conser-
vative movement—provided a comfortable setting in which anticom-
munist women could assert themselves. These circumstances still do 
not explain why some women became caught up in anticommunist 
activity while others did not. Were these women housewives-turned-
activists or career agitators who happened to have families? Were they 
forced into the political arena by their fear of communism, or did they 
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use anticommunism as a convenient opening for their political ambi-
tions? The answer was obviously different for different women. Some 
activists, especially those who made something of a career of anticom-
munism, were ambitious women who used their belief in anticommu-
nism as a lever to open opportunities that might not otherwise have 
existed. For other women, fear of communism led them to partici-
pate in political activity they might otherwise have avoided. Whether 
they remained active over a long period or became involved only in 
response to specific short-term fears probably depended on individual 
personalities and circumstances. Even if they went “back home,” their 
limited participation indicated the profound impact anticommunism 
had on society at the time.
An examination of earlier conservative women provides insight 
into potential motivations. Similar to the situation of the anti-suffragists 
and anti–New Deal activists of the 1930s, Cold War women found 
themselves in a transitional phase for their gender. Just as earlier 
women struggled to understand what their new voting power might 
mean for them, women emerging from World War II wondered how 
to reconcile their sometimes new middle-class status with the reality 
of their lives. All the propaganda told them that women stayed home 
and devoted themselves to their families, yet they saw the numbers of 
women who held jobs and participated in activities outside the home. 
In trying to understand exactly where women fit into the scheme of 
things, women found the anticommunist cause comforting. They could 
explore the potential of doing something more than housework while 
justifying it as an extension of their duty to family.4 Like their prede-
cessors, their conservative cause provided them with a safe way of 
confronting other, more complicated issues in their environment. Just 
as the anti-suffragists saw their movement as a way of holding back 
the onslaught of modernization, urbanization, and immigration, Cold 
War women could attack communism rather than face the more diffi-
cult issues of racism, poverty, and the threat of nuclear annihilation. 
The simplicity of the dichotomy between communist and noncom-
munist seemed easier to confront than the reality of whether a black 
family should be allowed to move into their neighborhood. Blaming 
communists for everything removed the gray areas of modern life. 
Conspiracy theories are so popular because they offer simple solu-
tions to complex problems.
Who were these conservative anticommunist women? We can 
begin with a few generalities. Most, though not all, were middle class, 
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married, white, reasonably intelligent, and well educated. Although 
politically active women were spread throughout the country, signifi-
cant pockets of activists formed in the Southwest, which was growing 
tremendously during the postwar years. Many of these new arrivals 
had relocated from areas such as the Midwest or the South, where 
there was a long tradition of conservatism. As might be expected, 
these women’s husbands were part of a growing army of upwardly 
mobile white-collar workers, small businessmen, and professionals 
(doctors, lawyers, engineers) who enjoyed the benefits of an expan-
sive economy. By and large, these men were also conservative—some 
active participants with their wives, others not. Many of the women 
had children, but most of the particularly active women either had 
older kids or no children. A very few had experimented with left-wing 
movements before “seeing the light” and moving to the other side. Few 
had outside jobs; most did conservative work as a hobby—although 
that word is misleading because it implies that they took their political 
activity lightly, which they did not. In fact, some were fairly ambitious 
and found anticommunism a useful path to political office. For others, 
activism grew out of anger over a particular incident and dissipated 
once that situation had been resolved. For others, the anticommunist 
crusade remained a lifelong vocation.5
Identifying these women is easier than discovering their individual 
motivations for becoming activist anticommunists. Why did these 
women become anticommunists and political activists? Although the 
answer varied for each woman, understanding some of the common-
alities provides a more complete analysis of their situation.
The reason women embraced the anticommunist cause appears 
deceptively simple. After all, almost all Americans embraced some 
form of anticommunism. Considering the political speeches, media 
reports, and religious proclamations constantly bombarding the Amer-
ican public with messages about the evils of communism, it would 
have been more peculiar if these women had rejected the concept. The 
women in this study, however, went beyond mere acceptance of the 
evils of communism; they saw it as a serious and immediate threat to 
their country and their way of life. They did not just pay lip service to 
the necessity of wiping out communists abroad; they tended to link the 
Red threat to domestic issues, equating communism with any form of 
liberalism or socialism and decrying federal government regulation in 
any form and on any level. For some of these women, any economic 
or political policy, any cultural practice, any social norm that diverged 
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from what they considered “the American way” could be perceived 
as communistic. Their anticommunism, then, often could not be sepa-
rated from their conservatism. In fact, the two perspectives proved 
mutually reinforcing. The more conservative—either economically or 
morally—the woman, the greater her sense that communism threat-
ened all she held dear. The more she feared communists, the more 
she wanted her government to do all it could to safeguard her way 
of life and the less willing she was to tolerate anything that provided 
an opening for communism. She missed the inherent contradiction 
between her philosophies: she demanded a limited government that 
actively worked to protect her from all forms of communism. She was 
willing to accept government intervention as long as it was connected 
to fighting communism.
The reason so many women embraced this conservative mind-
set has been the subject of recent study by a number of scholars. 
In analyzing right-wing American women, scholars such as Kim 
Nielsen, June Melby Benowitz, and Catherine Rymph have empha-
sized the centrality of gender to discussions of conservative ideolo-
gies and movements.6 Men frequently utilized contemporary assump-
tions about feminine and masculine traits to characterize their cause 
and their opponents. Moreover, protecting the status quo often meant 
maintaining existing gender relationships. For women, who remained 
excluded from exercising formal power even after they won suffrage, 
safeguarding their informal power became extremely important. 
Although, as historian Nielsen put it, women accepted “the right-
ness of patriarchy,” they did not “believe that it implied invisibility 
on the part of women.” In fact, they assumed they had a responsi-
bility to defend the traditional system.7 Often, particularly early in 
the twentieth century, they appropriated the perception that woman 
were morally superior to men to legitimize their involvement in polit-
ical affairs. This connection between morality and political activism 
eventually fell out of favor with progressive women but remained, 
as Rymph argues, a tradition with Republican women and others on 
the Right. If men would not protect the existing order, these women 
asserted their right to do so. They felt the need to defend whatever 
avenues they could find to gain power. Additionally, because women 
remained outsiders to a large extent even after they gained suffrage, 
they had less need to compromise their principles for the sake of 
political expediency. They frequently felt they had nothing to lose by 
sticking to their ideals.8
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With these justifications supporting their beliefs, some women 
found concrete reasons to shift from having anticommunist sympa-
thies to crusading for the cause. The motivators for each woman 
were as varied as the women themselves. Some came from families 
with traditions of political activism; others acted under the influence 
and encouragement of parents or husbands. Religious convictions 
drove some, while others reacted to a traumatic experience by getting 
involved with the fight against communism. Sometimes women joined 
a club in search of something to do and found themselves drawn into 
the political fray.
For women who fought on a local level, the driving force behind 
their involvement was more readily apparent. They believed there 
was a concrete threat to their children, families, and community. They 
felt they had to take action. As will be demonstrated in later chapters, 
women in communities across the country responded to perceived 
dangers from school officials and national and local politicians. 
Usually, the leaders of the anticommunist crusades had been politi-
cally active prior to whatever incident inspired the participation of a 
larger segment of the population. The bulk of women who temporarily 
laid aside their regular duties to attend meetings and demonstrations 
or write letters apparently returned to their normal lives. Historians 
have begun to discover similar examples all over the country. Like 
their more liberal sisters, conservative anticommunist women rose to 
meet a challenge to what they perceived to be a direct threat to their 
well-being.9
The easiest way for women to get involved in a local crusade was 
to join a national organization with local affiliates. These groups had 
the advantage of a set infrastructure, experienced leaders, and an 
established reputation. Participation in such an enterprise educated 
women in various modes of political activity. The General Federation 
of Women’s Clubs and the Minute Women of America are two exam-
ples that represent the spectrum of anticommunist fervor.
The more moderate of the two organizations was the General 
Federation of Women’s Clubs (GFWC), founded in 1890. Since the 
early nineteenth century, a wide variety of clubs had served the 
educational, intellectual, and social needs of middle- and upper-
class women. By the end of the century, however, a number of club 
leaders recognized that without more organization, each individual 
club would be “working on in its own rut . . . and well satisfied with 
small things.” These women founded the GFWC in hopes of creating 
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“a rallying center” for “consultation and comparison of methods,” as 
well as a “common fellowship and central bond of union.”10 Created 
during the Progressive era, the GFWC served as a means for women 
to become involved in the reform movements discussed by politicians 
and journalists. For women with political interests, clubs camouflaged 
female challenges to the masculine world of policy, government, and 
law. Men tended to underestimate the potential power of clubwomen 
and thus let the organizations do as they wished. Women activists 
took advantage of this benign neglect to push various causes and 
find new recruits among fellow club members.11 For women with no 
aspirations beyond being wives and mothers, clubs offered a way to 
expand their concept of “home” and broaden their activities. Raising 
funds for libraries or scholarships or protecting poor children gave 
such women an outlet that did not undermine their vision of who they 
were or what constituted acceptable behavior.12
Although the activities of individual clubs varied, membership in 
the organizations was fairly uniform. Most of the women were white, 
middle-class suburbanites whose husbands supported their families 
very comfortably. There were branches of the GFWC in rural areas, 
but their numbers were much smaller than those among their urban 
sisters. Citing the existence of the National Council of Negro Women, 
members of the GFWC saw no need to break the color line and inte-
grate their clubs. In addition to race, class also distinguished the 
GFWC from other women’s affiliations, such as some religious and 
labor groups. GFWC members, particularly the leadership, tended 
to have more in common with women active in the Business and 
Professional Women’s Organization or the American Association of 
University Women.13 Although the latter groups tended to consist of 
“career” women as opposed to housewives, similar educational and 
class backgrounds linked the groups.
As might be expected, most women’s clubs engaged in commu-
nity service projects that were not specifically political. For example, 
in 1948 the presidents of the New Hampshire clubs listed their accom-
plishments for Doloris Bridges, wife of New Hampshire senator Styles 
Bridges. They had planted trees, prepared hot school lunches, and 
raised money for scholarships, ball fields, and libraries. For many, their 
most political actions involved previewing movies coming to town 
or pressuring the town council about a variety of issues.14 Building 
on their long tradition of reform, many women’s clubs focused on 
community service projects or social service activities. Individual 
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women within these groups might become heavily involved in direct 
political action, but the clubs generally did not endorse or encourage 
partisan activity. During some club meetings, however, before the tea 
and cakes and after the reporting of the minutes, clubwomen listened 
to speeches that challenged them to become more politically aware 
and involved. As the Cold War climate chilled in the years following 
World War II, clubwomen joined the rest of America in becoming 
increasingly concerned about the communist threat at home and 
abroad. For many clubwomen the severity of the danger overshad-
owed their reform and service goals.
As a result, by the 1950s most clubwomen regarded involvement 
in what they called “public affairs” as one of their main functions. 
Proud of what they had accomplished in the fields of education and 
service, members expanded their goals to include “making their home 
towns better places in which to live and to rear their families.” Club-
women approached this goal from several angles. First, they empha-
sized education—not just for their children but also for themselves. 
National leaders encouraged local chapters to host study clubs—what 
they called “the married woman’s university”—publish book lists, 
and invite political speakers to their meetings. They dedicated signifi-
cant portions of their monthly newsletters to informational and edito-
rial pieces on national and international political activity. Whether 
written by club members or guest editorialists, these pieces frequently 
reiterated the common view that communism threatened “not only 
our ideology of government, which provides freedom and economic 
security for our people,” but also “our religious way of life which 
Democracy has as its basic concept.”15 Second, they created a special 
department to deal with international affairs as well as one to deal 
with “Americanism.” National club leaders challenged these divi-
sions to organize the study clubs, bring in pertinent guest speakers, 
and help members sort through the information on the dangers of 
communism they received.
Although the GFWC abhorred communism and worried about 
the threat of socialism at home, the leadership, at least, rejected some 
of the more rabid views of other anticommunist organizations. For 
example, they seemed not to participate in the McCarthy-style witch 
hunts or share the “anything Russian is evil” mind-set exhibited by 
many of their contemporaries. In an interesting continuation of the 
legacy of progressive women such as Jane Addams, they repeat-
edly encouraged their members to learn about other cultures; they 
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also offered support to the United Nations and especially for the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization’s 
(UNESCO’s) educational efforts. The fact that rank-and-file members 
accepted their leaders’ moderate anticommunism was indicated by 
the latters’ continual reelection to office. Obviously, any member who 
felt her club was too liberal would simply leave and find an organiza-
tion more suited to her political leanings.16
Women who wanted a more conservative organization might 
have opted for groups such as the Minute Women of America. 
Founded in 1949 by Suzanne Stevenson, the Minute Women of the 
USA quickly spread across the country. By 1952, Stevenson bragged 
that her original Connecticut-based group had grown to include chap-
ters in twenty-seven states. The platform of the national committee 
was very general. Promising “to preserve, protect and promote the 
Constitution of the United States . . . and the freedom it guaran-
tees to individual citizens,” Minute Women worked to “protect our 
country from Communism, Socialism, Fascism or collectivism in any 
form.” In response to what they perceived to be a malicious news-
paper article, the Minute Women explained in their newsletter that 
their group constituted a “[c]rusade and not an organization.” New 
members paid a small fee and pledged only “to vote in every elec-
tion.” Inspired by Stevenson and the Connecticut group, members of 
local chapters operated autonomously. This allowed women to focus 
on whatever problems seemed to threaten their particular neighbor-
hood. To protect the organization, Minute Women were forbidden to 
“take action as a pressure group. They [were supposed to] act only as 
individuals.”17
Even following these rules, however, Minute Women sometimes 
proved a formidable force. An article in their newsletter calling for 
letters to congressmen, the president, local school board members, or 
religious leaders could generate thousands of pieces of mail seemingly 
overnight. Moreover, because many Minute Women were housewives 
with school-age or older children, they had the time to attend meetings, 
ask questions, and research the backgrounds of individuals or books 
they found problematic. Rapid dissemination of information through 
a national network allowed concerned members to attend meetings 
or write protest letters armed with information.18 The Minute Women 
appeared to act as individuals rather than as an organization, but the 
results of their actions indicated the power of their cooperation and 
coordination.
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In contrast, women active in the mainstream political parties 
wore their affiliation on their sleeves for everyone to see. In fact, in 
the postwar years, women worked very hard to increase their power 
and influence within both major parties. Although at first Democratic 
women seemed to make greater strides in gaining power within their 
organization, the Republicans began to catch up during the postwar 
period. For conservative, anticommunist women who felt much 
more at home with the GOP than with the New Deal Democrats, this 
was a godsend. With strong female leadership, women Republicans 
increased their presence at all levels of the GOP.19
Similar to the party as a whole, however, female Republicans 
argued among themselves about the future of their party, the threat of 
communism in the nation, and the best ways for women to be active 
politically. Building on disagreements existing from the earliest days 
following suffrage, Republican women struggled to define their rela-
tionship with the men in their party. Women working in the Women’s 
Division of the GOP tended to be single career women who argued 
that the best way for women to gain influence and power within 
the party was to cooperate with the existing division of authority. 
They hoped this strategy would lead men to recognize that women 
deserved to be equal partners in party matters. To this end, they 
encouraged the largely middle-class, married members of the Repub-
lican women’s clubs to support whatever candidates the national or 
state parties nominated. Club members usually cooperated, willingly 
doing the party’s grunt work, knocking on doors, making phone calls, 
and mailing fliers.
The situation changed during Eisenhower’s first term in office. 
Women’s Division leaders maintained their stance, but the club-
women had become restive. According to one observer, the increas-
ingly conservative women were frustrated with Eisenhower’s 
moderate brand of Republicanism. Many first became involved in 
political campaigns during the heady McCarthy days, and as one 
right-wing witness explained, they had “lost all their spirit of fight” 
in the face of Eisenhower’s Modern Republicanism. The observer’s 
husband met with the Rock Creek Republican Women’s Club and got 
“a real bang out of” the fact that they had settled for Eisenhower and 
Nixon as speakers when they really wanted to hear Barry Goldwater.20 
In contrast to the professional career women of the Women’s Division, 
the clubwomen did not seek formal power. Instead, they accepted that 
male party leaders would make key policy decisions; the clubwomen 
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assumed, however, that they could decide whether to support those 
policies. When they did, they expected the male leaders to appreciate 
their contributions. When they disagreed with the party leadership, 
they felt it was their duty was to point out what they perceived to be 
errors. They did not depend on the party for a salary or for fulfillment 
of their ambitions. Like other conservative women, then, they felt free 
to follow principle rather than compromise.21
Mainstream political parties were not the only organizations 
confronted by memberships who began to find existing structures and 
perspectives too moderate and confining. When conservative Phyllis 
Schlafly took over as State National Defense chair of the DAR in Illi-
nois in 1957, for example, she used her position to expand her “little 
nucleus of conservatives” by encouraging other members of the orga-
nization to read the “right kind” of literature.22 Another group, All 
American Conferences to Combat Communism, served as a platform 
for groups not specifically tied to anticommunism, such as Business 
and Professional Women (BPW), to voice their position on the Red 
menace. Producing an issue of Freedom’s Facts allowed the BPW women 
to establish their right-wing credentials and warn their membership 
of the specific threat communists posed to women’s groups.23 Even 
the American Association of University Women (AAUW) faced diffi-
culties from members who questioned the motives of their leaders. 
One disgruntled member went so far as to resign from the organiza-
tion and publicly accused the national AAUW office of “aid[ing] the 
Communist conspiracy.”24
In addition, countless smaller groups formed across the country to 
focus on particular problems that concerned their members. Because 
these organizations tended to be local and were often temporary, their 
histories can be only partially reconstructed. Sometimes the exis-
tence of such a collection of women became apparent through others 
discussing them. For example, anticommunist activist Alfred Kohl-
berg wrote to Senator Joe McCarthy about “some ladies . . . who have 
been greatly stirred up lately” and asked McCarthy to address them. 
“Under the sponsorship of the Defenders of the Constitution, Inc.,” 
this group had already begun distributing McCarthy’s speeches at 
their meetings.25
The plethora of women-sponsored and women-run newslet-
ters provides another area for examining women’s motivations and 
beliefs at the grassroots level. Sometimes the sheets published the offi-
cial views of a specific organization; often they appeared to represent 
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the opinion of a single woman who felt compelled to share her views 
with others. The fact that many of the papers were published for at 
least one year indicates a serious commitment to their production. 
For example, Alerted Americans, operated by Helen Corson, was first 
published in 1955 and still existed in 1964. The publications ranged 
from handwritten, typed, or mimeographed sheets to professionally 
printed newspapers. They were produced in all sections of the country 
and were read by unknown numbers of people. Although some of the 
newsletters were financed by their sponsoring organizations, many 
editors of smaller papers accepted advertisements or lamented that 
they operated on a shoestring budget. Some, such as The Farmer’s Voice 
and Alerted Americans, depended on subscriptions and contributions 
for their operating expenses. Florence Fowler Lyons, who produced a 
series of “Reports on UNESCO,” explained to fellow activist Elizabeth 
Brown that she was operating on “the very edge of total economic 
collapse.”26
Among the newsletters was the previously mentioned Freedom 
Facts, published by the All American Conferences to Combat Commu-
nism, headquartered in Washington, D.C. This publication served as 
a platform from which various organizations (such as the BPW) could 
expose the evils of communism. In Pennsylvania, Helen Corson sold 
subscriptions to her Alerted Americans newsletter and had a mailing 
list of around 1,100 in 1958. In Florida, Bette Logan edited The Spirit 
as an outgrowth of Woman’s Right to Know, Inc., an organization of 
unknown size or influence. The Midwest contributed both The Farm-
er’s Voice, the work of Christiana Uhl of Wooster, Ohio, and periodic 
pamphlets from the American Woman’s Party of Detroit, Michigan. 
Mrs. M. Conan of Phoenix, Arizona, drew her own cartoons and sent 
out numerous copies of single-page news sheets titled What Do You 
Think? Meanwhile, New Mexico Women Speak, the work of Mrs. James 
Thorsen and Mrs. Reese P. Fullerton, encouraged readers to send 
“letters setting forth the happenings” in their areas and to buy new 
subscriptions.27
Some of these women included explanations for their efforts. 
Christiana Uhl, who sent out The Farmer’s Voice in the mid- to late 
1950s, explained her motivation for creating a newsletter. Although 
she thought of it as a “hobby,” she also saw it as a “reason to study 
and learn. It is an attempt to share my discoveries with you. It gives 
background facts you can use in understanding the community, the 
state, the nations and our world.” In typical 1950s female fashion, she 
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presented her political crusade as a harmless “hobby” that threat-
ened no one. Others were less demure. The editors of New Mexico 
Women Speak proclaimed their “intent and purpose” to be “to defend 
and protect the Constitution of the united states.” Worried that 
people in New Mexico would “continue to be uninformed about, 
and apathetic to[,] the extent and progress of Communist infiltra-
tion into our government and life,” they took it upon themselves to 
try to “wake up” their state and country. Likewise, The Spirit took a 
strong stand on its purpose. In fact, the editors put their raison d’être 
on the last page of every issue. “We believe,” the editors wrote, “the 
American woman cherishes her Independence and her Liberty. We 
believe she will insist on preserving for her children the heritage of a 
free ameriCa.”28
Similarly, some anticommunist women worked to influence 
national policy. Like local activists, these women came from diverse 
backgrounds and met with varying degrees of success. Additionally, 
although they proudly claimed to be “anticommunist,” the intensity 
of their fear of communism differed, sometimes significantly. They 
also shared a certain anonymity despite their sometimes recognizable 
names.
Anticommunist women active on the national level have been 
neglected by scholars for several overlapping reasons.29 First, many 
were married to famous (or infamous, depending on one’s perspec-
tive) men who cast a large shadow. Many people, including histo-
rians, have assumed that as good wives, they were merely supporting 
their husbands’ careers. From such a perspective, there would appear 
to be nothing to study. Moreover, the wives themselves frequently 
encouraged this impression by frequently referring to their spouses 
or refusing to take credit for their own actions, ideas, and writings. 
Second, with few exceptions, women active on a national level will-
ingly stayed in the background and let the men do the talking and 
take the credit for their work. Some women wanted to run for polit-
ical office and wield the power that went with political positions; 
however, most conservative women chose to influence events from 
behind the scenes. As mere wives of “important men,” women often 
left less detailed and less organized collections of papers for historians 
to examine. Either they or later archivists did not see the need to retain 
their letters and speeches. Finally, since most of these women were 
responsible for running households and raising children, they did not 
have the time or perhaps the inclination to keep a journal explaining 
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their motivations and beliefs. Like many historical actors, their lives 
must be reconstructed backward from speeches, letters, newspaper 
articles, and the words of others. For this reason, the availability of 
source material guided my selection of the important female figures 
of national stature who appear in my study.30
The backgrounds of various women active on the national 
level indicate the variety of experiences that could have led them to 
espouse conservative anticommunism as well as the range of fervor 
with which they approached the cause. Unfortunately, because few 
of these women left introspective diaries, we have no definitive proof 
of what led them to embrace anticommunist activity. Instead, we can 
only surmise their reasoning based on what we can determine about 
their lives. Even that can be challenging, however, since women activ-
ists frequently undervalued their own importance. An examination of 
a few case studies will reveal the possibilities as well as the limitations 
of a historical investigation into the activities of prominent anticom-
munist women.
Of all my examples, Margaret Chase Smith left the fullest records, 
held the most power, and was the most moderate in her beliefs. Ironi-
cally, she also represents a more average American than many of 
the others. Coming from a simple background, nothing in her early 
life seems significant enough to have caused her particularly to fear 
communism. Instead, like most Americans, Smith learned to see 
communism as a serious threat in the years after World War II, based 
on information coming out of Washington. Perhaps because there 
was no dominant psychological or political motivation behind her 
anticommunism, she tended to be more temperate in her views than 
many other prominent anticommunist women.
Born in Skowhegan, Maine, to a working-class family with deep 
roots in the community, Margaret Chase appeared destined for an 
ordinary life. But early on there were hints that something more lay 
beneath the surface. She played a key role in her high school basket-
ball team winning a state championship, in the process discovering 
her addiction not just to victory but also to the thrill of competition. 
The only experience that rivaled the thrill of that victory was her 
senior trip to Washington, D.C. Chase left Maine for the first time and 
realized that there was an exciting world to conquer. This realization 
increased her frustration as she tried her hand at teaching right after 
high school. Bored, lonely, and away from family and friends, she soon 
moved back to Skowhegan and away from the classroom. Instead 
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of remaining a teacher, Chase became a businesswoman. Working 
her way up through various organizations, including the telephone 
company, a newspaper, and a mill, Chase pushed herself to meet the 
challenges presented by her male bosses.31
Like many single working women in the 1920s, Chase enjoyed a 
wide network of female acquaintances, some social and others profes-
sional. Through these social clubs, such as Sorosis, and more serious 
organizations, such as the BPW, Chase learned that she was a good 
leader and that she enjoyed both the responsibility and the challenges 
leadership offered. Her years with the BPW, including one term as 
state president, reintroduced two themes from her high school years: 
the thrill of challenge and the chance to travel beyond Maine. Chase 
learned two crucial skills from her club activities as well: how to defy 
convention without threatening those who were traditional-minded 
and how to recognize the potential political power these organiza-
tions had. Moreover, her years in these organizations taught her some 
political skills and helped her make a statewide name for herself.32
Her private life revealed a proper young lady who managed to 
challenge convention without permanently damaging her reputa-
tion. While still in her teens and working as a switchboard operator, 
she began a relationship with Clyde Smith, one of the wealthiest and 
best-connected men in town. From the beginning, rumors surrounded 
the relationship. Clyde was divorced, twenty-one years older than 
Margaret, and a former state representative and ex-sheriff. Margaret 
was still in high school when she and her parents began taking rides 
with Clyde in his car, a novelty in Skowhegan. Over the next several 
years their relationship continued amid rumors of Clyde seeing 
other women and the couple’s impropriety. In 1930, when Margaret 
was thirty-three, the couple married. She continued working for six 
months and then quit to become a full-time homemaker. Margaret’s 
respect for housewives perhaps originated during the early years of 
her marriage as she struggled to learn to cook and clean and care for 
a husband.33
Smith did not remain a housewife, however. Her husband’s 
political ambitions provided her with the opportunity to continue her 
earlier lessons in the art of politics. As he ran for various state offices 
she traveled with him, learning the ins and outs of campaigning. 
When he won election to the House of Representatives, she became 
his office manager. As her husband’s health declined, she assumed 
more and more of his duties. When he died, she successfully ran for 
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his seat in Congress, a position she held until 1948 when she won elec-
tion to the U.S. Senate. As a senator, Smith used her influence to stand 
firm against communist encroachment abroad without losing sight of 
concerns about civil liberties at home.34
If Smith represents everywoman USA, who had a healthy yet 
controlled concern about communism, Jean Kerr McCarthy repre-
sents the everywoman whose fears turned her into a zealot. Unfor-
tunately, McCarthy left many fewer papers to help us understand the 
source of the intensity of her views. Although her anticommunism 
seemed to predate her introduction to Joe McCarthy, his influence and 
the success of his political campaign against communists cannot be 
discounted as factors in her continuing obsession.
Born in 1924, Jean Fraser Kerr was the only child of Scottish immi-
grants who came to the United States in the early twentieth century. Her 
father was a builder who ran a successful business in the Washington, 
D.C., area. From all indications, Kerr had a normal, happy childhood. 
After high school, she worked for three years in an advertising agency 
before leaving for college. After entering George Washington Univer-
sity (GWU) in 1944, she joined a sorority and participated in various 
extracurricular activities. Both her good looks and her intelligence set 
her apart from her peers. While at GWU and, later, at Northwestern 
University, Kerr won various beauty queen awards. In 1946 her essay 
“The Promotion of Peace among the Nations of the World” won GWU’s 
Alexander Wilbourne Weddell Award. Her classmates described 
her as “bright” but aloof. A little older than the average university 
student, she kept to herself. Although her sorority sisters thought she 
was “a good catch,” she seldom dated. Her intense interest in politics 
led her to work part-time for the Senate War Investigating Committee 
and then for Republican senator Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey.35 In 
1947, while still a student, Kerr stopped by Wisconsin senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s office to visit a friend. According to various stories, he 
tried not only to hire her but also to date her. She declined both invita-
tions until after her graduation in 1948, when she joined his staff as a 
research assistant.36 She also began an on-again/off-again relationship 
with McCarthy that culminated in their marriage in 1954.37
Kerr’s responsibilities in McCarthy’s office quickly expanded 
beyond just research. Joe particularly valued Jean’s writing skills. She 
worked on several booklets he published, including a compilation of 
his most repeated charges titled McCarthyism, the Fight for America.38 
Although she insisted that McCarthy’s preoccupation with the commu-
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nist threat had nothing to do with her, her interest in anticommunism 
certainly reinforced Joe’s attitudes. Always interested in politics, 
Jean was fascinated by the Hiss case and eagerly shared her opinions 
with others. Her knowledge of and dedication to the cause cannot be 
overlooked as a factor in influencing the senator when he began to 
search for a new issue in the fall of 1949. Kerr did not push McCarthy 
into the anticommunist crusade—he did not take up the cause until 
almost a year after she started working for him—but her strong opin-
ions helped keep him aware of the topic. The more he worked for the 
cause, the more power she gained in his office. Although Joe’s oldest 
friends doubted that she forced him into anything he did not want to 
do, they nevertheless acknowledge that her presence contributed to 
the ease with which he moved into the field.39
Like Jean McCarthy, many activist women had husbands who 
reinforced their anticommunist inclinations. In some cases, women 
with latent political ambitions married men who provided them with 
an entrée to the world of politics and encouraged their participa-
tion. These women must have had some buried interests or ambition, 
however, since not all wives of powerful men eagerly and enthusiasti-
cally jumped on the anticommunist bandwagon.
Both Elizabeth Churchill Brown and Doloris Thauwald Bridges 
owed their presence on the national political stage to their husbands. 
Born in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1908, Elizabeth Churchill lived in 
the privileged world of high society. On her father’s side, she was 
descended from pioneer New England families; her mother’s ances-
tors included both English nobility and prominent families of colonial 
Virginia. Her grandfather had been a surgeon major in the Confederate 
Army. Sometime during her youth the family moved to New York, 
where the young Elizabeth enrolled in Rye Seminary before attending 
the Spence School in New York and Oldfields School in Maryland.40 
With her education completed in 1926, Churchill spent her time 
attending balls, visiting friends, and eventually getting a job. During 
many summers she and her mother traveled to Newport, Rhode 
Island, to escape the heat before returning to the city. During the winter 
months, numerous social activities—balls, parties, teas—consumed 
her time. Even as the country settled into the Depression during the 
1930s and unemployment reached epic proportions, Churchill found 
a job as society editor for the New York Evening Journal. Interestingly, 
throughout this period one popular theme for fashionable parties was 
Imperial Russia. Touting the grandeur of Tsarist Russia, these fetes 
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exposed the breadth of the division between the partygoers’ lives and 
those of the majority of Americans.41 In addition, the emphasis on 
pre-communist Russia displayed upper-class Americans’ displeasure 
with the Soviet Union.
In 1939, Elizabeth Churchill married Thomas Stonborough, a 
descendant of the founder of the Austro-Hungarian steel industry. 
Stonborough had a doctorate from the University of Vienna and 
worked for a firm on the New York Stock Exchange. The young couple 
continued to participate in the social scene, including attending dances 
sponsored by Republican organizations. In 1941, however, Stonbor-
ough rented an apartment by himself in New York. The following 
year, Elizabeth Stonborough took a job as the Washington, D.C., repre-
sentative for Town and Country magazine. At some point during this 
time, the couple divorced. Reassuming her maiden name, Churchill 
never publicly mentioned her first marriage.42
Years later, in her prologue to her book about Joe McCarthy, she 
summarized her life. Interestingly, she began not with her childhood 
or her first marriage, which she completely ignored, but with her 
introduction to political life in Washington. She did not acknowledge 
the significant role her upper-class background played in her willing-
ness to fling herself into the conservative anticommunist world.
In her autobiographical prologue, the young, naive Elizabeth 
“Liz” Churchill, actually a thirty-three-year-old divorcée, said she 
decided to move to Washington, D.C., because it “was a city of trees 
and flowers.” The fact that it pulsed with political activity did not 
hurt. The new arrival became a Washington correspondent for, in 
her words, “the hoity-toity Town and Country [sic] magazine.” “The 
shenanigans of high officials and the social didos of their wives” 
provided her with plenty to write about and introduced her to life in 
the nation’s capital. During this time, she later claimed, “the meaning 
of the political intrigues by politicians and statesmen in high places 
and power entirely escaped me.”43 Interestingly, Brown’s autobiog-
raphy evidenced not only her willingness to edit her life story but also 
her skillful manipulation of gendered language and imagery to suit 
her purpose. She could sound as cold and calculating as any school-
master or play an ignorant, flighty little woman with equal ease.
Her life changed when she met the man who would become her 
second husband, Constantine “Connie” Brown. Like Liz, Connie, as 
his friends called him, was a journalist, although he had much more 
experience than she did. He had parlayed a small inheritance into a 
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European education, earning a Ph.D. from the University of Berlin. 
His reports from behind enemy lines during World War I caught the 
attention of American editors, and he became a celebrated foreign 
correspondent. Eventually, he returned to the States and ended up 
writing a syndicated column on political and international events. 
Well respected by people of all ideological stripes, Connie was, in 
Liz’s words, “intimately acquainted . . . with the . . . unrehearsed and 
spontaneous drama” unfolding in Washington. Liz was enthralled, 
and they were married in 1949.44 She found numerous opportunities 
to explore her “new” interest in politics as she served as her husband’s 
secretary, editor, and agent. In addition, she continued her own writing 
career, with numerous articles and several book projects.
Another politically ambitious, although much less successful, 
woman spent her early years halfway across the country. Born in 
St. Paul, Minnesota, in 1916, Doloris Thauwald probably grew up 
in relative comfort as the daughter of a doctor.45 She attended the 
University of Minnesota during the Depression years and gradu-
ated in 1935. Thauwald then joined the growing number of single 
women confronting a depressed job market. The economic turmoil 
of the 1930s created both crisis and opportunity for women seeking 
employment. On the one hand, employers tended to give jobs to men 
who needed, in the accepted view of the day, to support their fami-
lies. On the other hand, desperate times forced many women into 
the role of breadwinner and in some ways encouraged acceptance 
of working women. Moreover, gender segregation in the workplace 
meant employers and male workers were reluctant to take women’s 
jobs.46 Women like Doloris thus continued the trend toward increased 
numbers of women in wage labor. Perhaps through her father’s influ-
ence, she went to work in Midway Hospital in St. Paul for three years 
before going to Washington.
As tensions mounted in Europe and Asia, job opportunities 
abounded in the nation’s capital, and Thauwald joined the swell 
of applicants. American entry into World War II had dramatically 
increased the need for women workers, as the government expanded 
its bureaucracy to prepare to fight the enemies. When the Pentagon 
opened in 1942, officials needed 35,000 office workers; many of 
the jobs were clerical, acceptable work even for young ladies. Pay 
was relatively good, especially compared with salaries back in the 
Midwest. Then there was the prestige of working for the government 
and living in glamorous, if terribly overcrowded, Washington, D.C.47 
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According to an interview conducted years later, Thauwald was not 
certain she wanted to remain in Washington, so she took only short-
term jobs, working for numerous agencies—including the Internal 
Revenue Department, the Communications Commission, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, and the Maritime Commission—before settling 
in as an administrative assistant in the World Trade Division of the 
State Department.48
Despite her success as an independent woman, Thauwald will-
ingly moved into a more traditional role when the opportunity 
presented itself. At a dinner party she met New Hampshire senator 
Styles Bridges, an increasingly powerful man and a very eligible bach-
elor in Washington. Thauwald approached her relationship with the 
senator seriously; before the wedding she “oriented herself” to New 
Hampshire politics and people. Although some Senate wives chose 
to remain behind-the-scenes, immersed in private life, Doloris recog-
nized that marriage to Styles provided the possibility of an active 
political life. She leaped at the chance.49
Although the newlywed Doloris moved into the postwar domestic 
realm, her interest in politics triumphed over her interest in house-
work. Styles clearly expected Doloris to play a role in his political as 
well as his private life, which explains her trip to New Hampshire to 
meet both his family and his constituents. Soon after their marriage 
he gave her books on poultry and dairying, key industries among his 
constituents. Drawing on her previous job experience, he turned to 
her for help with navigating Washington bureaucracy when his aides 
were not around. He encouraged her to read about the issues of the 
day.50 Soon, she felt ready to share her knowledge with other people. 
Very early in her marriage a college club asked her to give a speech. 
With her husband’s encouragement, she accepted the invitation. She 
decided that she would “talk about what [her] husband was doing” 
and set out to do research. She ended up with a “13-page, 45-minute 
speech” that “went over very well.” As she became more comfortable, 
she stopped writing speeches beforehand and just spoke from notes. 
Still, she worked hard to “check [her] facts and figures and be abso-
lutely accurate.”51
In fact, speaking before groups in New Hampshire became one 
of her favorite and most important duties. Organizing her time effi-
ciently, she was careful not to interfere with her husband’s schedule 
or disrupt his routine. She also made it a practice only to speak to 
women’s groups. Feeling it was “overdoing it talking to both [men 
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and women],” she explained to one club president that she found 
mixed audiences a “little disconcerting.”52 The reasons for this appar-
ently self-imposed rule remain murky. By all accounts, Doloris Bridges 
exuded charm and vitality. Various audiences responded well to her 
speeches and applauded her style. Her letters do not indicate that 
she suffered from stage fright. Moreover, other evidence suggests 
that Bridges was no retiring wallflower. She once left an important 
reception because she felt she had been snubbed by the woman in 
charge. Another time she led the fight to return Pentagon funding to a 
charitable agency. Obviously willing to speak with men when it was 
necessary for her cause or when it seemed appropriate, Bridges must 
have felt it was not her place to speak before mixed groups. Perhaps 
she recognized that a growing audience of women needed politically 
knowledgeable women as role models.53
Some women’s motivation for political activism stemmed from 
personal experience. Phyllis Stewart, for example, credited her Roman 
Catholic background and staunchly Republican parents with creating 
a solidly conservative foundation upon which she could build. 
Although they suffered during the Depression after her father lost his 
job, the Stewarts remained adamantly opposed to the New Deal. Her 
family did not actively participate in politics, but conversations around 
the dinner table surely shaped young Phyllis’s views on government. 
After obtaining a Catholic school education, she enrolled in Wash-
ington University for her undergraduate degree before heading to 
Radcliffe for a master’s degree in political science. She hoped to land 
a government job but ended up at the American Enterprise Associa-
tion, a conservative think tank. Her experiences there focused her 
opinions and intensified her tendencies toward right-wing thinking. 
With her newly honed conservative ideals, Stewart moved back to St. 
Louis. She set the pattern for the rest of her life by sharing her ideas 
with others through speeches, newsletters, and, eventually, political 
activism. After she married fellow conservative Fred Schlafly in 1949, 
she moved to Illinois and continued her activities there.54 She first tried 
to work through existing institutions, including the Republican Party. 
In fact, Schlafly played a crucial role in the previously mentioned 
disagreement among women in the GOP. That fight built in intensity 
throughout the 1950s and culminated in Schlafly’s attempt to become 
chair of the National Federation of Republican Women’s Clubs in 
the mid-1960s. Her defeat convinced many conservative women, 
including Schlafly, that they would have to move outside the party 
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and create their own organizations to continue their anticommunist 
work.55
Like Schlafly, Freda Utley was driven to fight communism. Her 
motivation, however, the most clearly articulated and understandable 
of that of any of the women discussed here, came from her personal 
experience with communism. In many ways, Utley’s life mirrored that 
of a number of male activists. Born in Manchester, England, in 1898, 
she explained in her autobiography that she “came to communism 
. . . by a happy childhood, a socialist father, and a Continental educa-
tion.” She attended boarding schools in Switzerland and England, 
absorbing her parents’ left-wing, internationalist values during holi-
days and summer vacations. When her family’s fortune disappeared, 
she found a job but continued her involvement with liberal and 
socialist groups. Utley also found the time and the money to attend the 
London School of Economics, earning a master’s degree. She joined 
the British Communist Party in 1928; married Arcadi Berdichevsky, a 
Russian intellectual; traveled with him to Japan and China; and even-
tually moved with him to the Soviet Union.56 Despite the warnings 
of friends and relatives, Utley believed socialism could achieve great 
things in Moscow.
Her years in the USSR, however, transformed her from a devout 
communist into a dedicated anticommunist. Witnessing firsthand 
the corruption of party officials, the starving masses of workers and 
farmers, and the abandonment of Marxist ideals by government offi-
cials, Utley became increasingly disillusioned with the party. Still, she 
and her husband continued to try to make a life for themselves and 
their young son in Moscow. Utley believed her foreignness (these were 
Popular Front days, and the Soviets wanted to cultivate the British), 
her poor Russian-language skills (which, she explained, “saved me 
from the necessity of making speeches at meetings”), and her estab-
lished credentials as an author protected her, even as Stalin’s purges 
wiped out hundreds of her co-workers.57 Her husband had no such 
protections. In 1936, with no apparent warning, the police arrested 
him as a Trotskyite and sent him to a gulag. She never heard from him 
again. Only years later would she learn that he had been executed in 
1938.58
Frustrated, angry, and fearing for her child’s safety, Utley went 
back to England with her son. To support her small family, she worked 
for the Manchester Guardian as a foreign correspondent in Japan and 
later in China. In 1939 she moved to the United States, where she 
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continued her writing.59 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Utley wrote 
three books analyzing the West’s failures in China; one examining pre– 
and post–World War II Germany; another warning that the Middle 
East was the communists’ next target; and finally her autobiography, 
tracing her shift from socialism to communism to vehement anticom-
munism.60 She continued to work as a freelance writer, a researcher, 
and a guest speaker.
Despite the prolific output from her typewriter, her accepted schol- 
arly credentials, and her proven research abilities, Utley spent most 
of these years living on the edge of bankruptcy. She blamed the un-
popularity of her views for her financial troubles. As she explained 
in her later memoirs, she was a communist before it was popular to 
be one, and she turned anticommunist as the British and Americans 
were allying themselves with the Soviets. By the time other Ameri-
cans began to share her fears of communism, she had been shouting at 
them for almost a decade. Moreover, because she had started out as an 
idealist who believed in socialism and communism on a philosophical 
level, she had little patience with zealots who “confused the quest for 
social justice with Communist treason.”61 Nevertheless, like Margaret 
Chase Smith, Utley did not let her hatred of the Soviets blind her to 
the dangers of rabid anticommunism.
Using the lives of these women activists as examples, a number 
of comparisons can be made. First, with the exception of Brown and 
Utley, all of the women came from middle-class or even working-class 
backgrounds. The Depression hurt the families of Schlafly and Smith, 
but Bridges, McCarthy, and Brown seem to have felt few of its effects. 
Even Schlafly and Smith, however, did not seem to have experienced 
true financial hardship. Utley suffered later in her life as she struggled 
to support her son as a single mother. The fathers of most of these 
women were small businessmen or white-collar workers. Smith’s 
father, a sometimes barber, earned the most sporadic income. As a 
result, Smith’s mother worked at various odd jobs to help support 
the family. The Depression forced Schlafly’s mother into similar 
circumstances.
The women were all well educated; all of them, except Smith, 
attended college. Two, Schlafly and Utley, had graduate degrees. 
Most expressed interest in political issues while in school. Schlafly 
and Utley had degrees in political science, while McCarthy’s was in 
history. Despite her lack of higher education, Smith saw herself as a 
student of life and quickly absorbed whatever information came her 
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way. She gained much of her political knowledge while helping her 
husband run his campaigns and, later, his congressional office.
With the notable exception of Utley, whose parents were avowedly 
left wing, all of these women were raised in families and communities 
with traditionally conservative values. Specific information about the 
political leanings of Brown’s parents is elusive, but their upper-class 
lifestyle, interest in Tsarist Russia, and comfortable bank account all 
fit the image of a traditional Republican couple. Brown’s marriage to 
a conservative European businessman and their involvement with 
the local Republican Party suggest the same. Similarly, there is scant 
evidence concerning Jean McCarthy’s parents except their immigra-
tion records and release papers from the Royal Air Force following her 
father’s service during World War I. Although their immigrant back-
ground might have made them likely to vote Democratic, the father’s 
successful business may have pushed them into the Republican ranks. 
The same need to protect business interests that may have motivated 
Mr. Kerr’s conservatism might also have influenced Bridges’s doctor 
father to adopt right-wing views. Smith, on the surface, appears the 
exception to this rule. Her family struggled the most economically 
and remained blue collar. For her, the key factor might have been the 
traditionally Republican nature of her home state of Maine, as well 
as her mother and grandfather’s Catholicism. An emphasis on reli-
gion certainly played a role in Schlafly’s conservatism. Unlike Smith, 
Schlafly remained active in religious affairs and intertwined her polit-
ical and spiritual beliefs throughout her lifetime.
Although Utley presents a contrast to the other women, her 
transition to conservatism was in many ways equally normal. Like 
fellow former leftist anticommunists Whittaker Chambers and Eliza-
beth Bentley, Utley first joined the Left out of idealism and convic-
tion, only to become disillusioned, bitter, and angry. She experienced 
Soviet communism firsthand and decided that it was not what she 
had expected. Even before her husband was arrested and sent away, 
she had turned against the party. Her reversal was complete by 1950 
when, as a naturalized American citizen, she testified against Owen 
Lattimore before the House Un-American Activities Committee.62
All the women had complicated relationships with the men in 
their lives. McCarthy, Bridges, and Brown were married to powerful, 
important men who gave them access to national audiences and intro-
duced them to national political figures. Evidence indicates that all 
three were politically knowledgeable and ambitious even before they 
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met their husbands. Although they deferred to their husbands, they 
all played crucial roles in maintaining their spouses’ power and posi-
tion. Conversely, Utley and Smith were widows whose husbands had 
played a role in their political education. Although neither remarried, 
both still depended on the advice (in the case of Smith) and financial 
help (in the case of Utley) of different men. Schlafly’s husband was 
also a conservative activist, although he never became as famous as his 
wife. He encouraged and worked with her on numerous occasions.
Finally, all of these women were, in one way or another, politi-
cally ambitious. Smith was the most successful, winning election to 
the House of Representatives and then the Senate. Both Bridges and 
Schlafly campaigned for office but did not win. When Joe McCarthy 
died, some urged Jean to take over his Senate seat. She refused, citing 
her new baby as the reason. She steadfastly clung to her position 
as McCarthy’s widow, however, and continued to try to control his 
legacy and image. Brown and Utley used their writings and speeches 
to educate men and women about the evils of communism.
Despite their different backgrounds and circumstances, anti-
communism enabled all these women to involve themselves in their 
nation’s political life. Although one could classify almost all of them 
as career women, they portrayed themselves, at some point, as wives 
and mothers fighting for an important cause. In their view, they were 
housewives with political interests, despite having careers as well as 
families. Utley and Smith, the two who seemed to violate convention 
the most, rarely admitted at the time that any challenges they faced 
resulted from their gender. Instead, Utley blamed her political views, 
which she argued were always out of sync with the rest of society, 
and Smith cited the fact that she was the only female senator rather 
than the fact that she was a woman. Smith seemed to think that if she 
had been one a few, rather than the sole, female senators, the men 
would have treated her no differently than they treated one another. 
These women’s conservatism would not allow them to admit that 
they wanted more than society allowed. Anticommunist activity 
permitted them to become public figures without disturbing their 
own or anyone else’s worldview. In addition, compared to women 
working for more liberal causes, such as civil rights for minorities 
or the Equal Rights Amendment, these women seemed “safe” to 
conventional-minded Americans. The Cold War, then, did more than 
just terrify some women; it provided them with a respectable way 
out of the house.
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Their backgrounds also prepared them to speak knowledgeably 
about the political and diplomatic ramifications of the Cold War. 
Their education, access to powerful national figures, and experiences 
created the potential for them to contribute to the ongoing debate 
about the communist threat. Their ambition compelled them not to 
remain silent. Only their gender kept them from being recognized as 





Even though women in post–World War II America were largely 
concerned with family and domestic responsibilities, they were soon 
forced to recognize the importance of events throughout the world. 
Soviet domination of Eastern European nations seemed unbreakable, 
while Mao’s victory over the U.S.-backed Nationalists raised new 
worries about the security of Asia. Moreover, the Soviets’ successful 
detonation of an atomic bomb raised the stakes to terrifying levels. 
Confused and frustrated, Americans wondered how their government, 
which had so competently dispatched the Japanese and Germans 
simultaneously, seemed so incapable of stopping the rapid spread of 
communism all over the globe. Anticommunist women thus had little 
choice but to address issues of American foreign policy in an effort to 
defend the United States against the spread of communism.
c h a p t e r  t h r e e
the Feminine View oF Foreign communism
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In turning their attention to foreign policy, anticommunist women 
utilized all the weapons in their arsenal to mount a counterattack. 
Their newsletters alerted their less-aware compatriots of the threats 
events in other countries posed for America and stressed the neces-
sity for the U.S. government to form an effective foreign policy to 
counter these dangers. As guest speakers at luncheons for women’s 
clubs as well as in letters to prominent people, anticommunist women 
lectured about the seriousness of the situation Americans faced, chal-
lenged their audiences to join the struggle, and pressured political 
leaders to take a stronger stand against the Red menace. A number of 
women wrote books explaining the background of the current crisis in 
an attempt to deepen the public’s sense of outrage and broaden their 
understanding of the state of the world.
These women’s efforts helped shape the anticommunist discourse 
as it related to the conduct of American foreign policy. Excluded 
from positions of power within the foreign policy establishment, the 
women nevertheless affected a portion of the public’s understanding 
of the international situation. Many Americans did not have access 
to detailed information about worldwide events. Busy mothers and 
housewives in particular got their news from catching snippets of 
radio broadcasts, skimming newspapers, or gossiping with their 
neighbors. At a club luncheon, however, they listened to speakers 
addressing foreign policy; they might also peruse a newsletter or 
glance at a book suggested by their bridge partners. With this infor-
mation, they made decisions about which politicians to support and 
which causes deserved donations. With a few notable exceptions, 
such as Margaret Chase Smith and Phyllis Schlafly, anticommunist 
women lacked direct access to real political power or a national audi-
ence; still, through their everyday efforts, they played a significant 
role in describing the Cold War for the American people.
Anticommunist women who wanted to influence the U.S. govern-
ment’s decisions concerning events around the world faced an impen-
etrable foreign policy establishment. Labeled the “Imperial Brother-
hood” by historian Robert Dean, the men who dominated the State 
Department during much of the twentieth century shared class as 
well as gender characteristics. They attended the same prep schools 
and Ivy League universities, joined the same clubs, and worked for 
many of the same law firms or corporations. The version of mascu-
linity preached and accepted by this elite emphasized conformity to 
the established order, obedience to those in authority, loyalty to one’s 
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class, and knowledge of that class’s superiority. Applauding athletic 
ability, physical strength, and aggressive spirit on the playing field, 
these men carried the same values into their adult relationships 
and careers. Dean’s research and the earlier work of Richard Barnet 
indicate that these men formed a foreign policy elite that controlled 
many offices in the State Department and made most key decisions 
concerning foreign affairs. Their worldview excluded women except 
as victims, wives, or mothers.1
Denied access to formal power, anticommunist women found 
alternate methods of influencing the national debate over foreign 
policy. Senator Margaret Chase Smith, the woman who held the 
highest political office among the anticommunist women, fought long 
and hard and finally had to obtain considerable support from well-
placed male senators before she won a position on the Armed Services 
Committee.2 In the meantime, she joined numerous other female activ-
ists in giving speeches on foreign affairs. Other women used newslet-
ters or books as a platform to try to encourage Americans to join their 
crusade against communism and to force government policy makers 
to stand tough against the Soviets and the Chinese. Some women 
utilized their positions as wives of powerful men to play a role in inter-
national relations. The correspondence between Elizabeth Churchill 
Brown, wife of journalist Constantine Brown, and Francesca Rhee, 
wife of Syngman Rhee, president of South Korea, provides an inter-
esting example. Mrs. Brown and Mrs. Rhee frequently commented 
on world events and served as conduits of information for and about 
their husbands. At one point, for example, Rhee “wish[ed] a newspa-
perman” would question President Eisenhower about a certain policy 
in hopes of getting Ike to change his stance on the issue. She did not 
want Brown’s husband to do so, perhaps because of their known asso-
ciation, but she thought the question needed to be asked.3 Like count-
less women across the country, Liz Brown took any opportunities that 
presented themselves to educate the public.
Liz was hardly alone. Anticommunists spent much of their time 
presenting their version of the complicated foreign policy situation 
in which the United States found itself. Since few Americans, male 
or female, thoroughly understood what was going on in Europe or 
Asia, most knowledgeable anticommunists attempted to explain 
the key issues in simple terms. The American public might lack the 
knowledge, ability, or desire to discern the intricacies of the Yalta 
Agreement, for example, but they immediately comprehended the 
62
“Women BeWare”
accusation that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt “surrendered to 
Russian imperialism” and gave Eastern Europe to the Soviets.4 Since 
conservatives already thought of FDR as the Antichrist because of 
the New Deal’s social welfare legislation, they readily accepted anti-
communists’ version of Roosevelt’s failures. Similarly, the anticom-
munist argument had appeal for Americans with religious or ethnic 
ties to the peoples of Eastern Europe who had watched in frustrated 
anger as the Iron Curtain cut them off from their compatriots. In a 
widely distributed report prepared for fellow Roman Catholics, John 
F. Cronin explained that the Soviets were bent on world domination 
and intended to take over all of Europe before moving on to Asia and 
Africa. The U.S. government, he concluded, was aiding the commu-
nists by adopting a “do-nothing policy” that gave the Soviets a free 
hand.5 Again, conservative anticommunists found a receptive audi-
ence as they blamed Roosevelt and then Harry Truman for being too 
soft in responding to Soviet aggression.
Anticommunists were further outraged by the U.S. government’s 
response to the situation in Asia. In fact, for some anticommunists, 
particularly those with more conservative leanings, their concerns 
about Asia—especially China—far outweighed their fears about 
Europe. Known as the China Lobby, these men fought to keep the 
situation in Asia before the American public. Time publisher Henry 
Luce, the son of a missionary to China, along with successful importer 
Alfred Kohlberg and California senator William Knowland, whose 
constant refrain won him the title “senator from Formosa,” used their 
influence to build support for Nationalist China generally and for 
Jiang Jieshi personally. These men had the financial means, as well as 
the access to political power and a national audience through various 
publications, to keep pressuring Congress and the White House to 
fight the communists. They constantly reiterated the same message: 
Truman had “lost” China through incompetence at best and through 
deliberate action by communists working in the State Department at 
worst.6
The outbreak of war in Korea added fuel to the anticommunist 
conspiracy fires. According to the anticommunist theory, Truman’s 
wimpy stance toward Mao and Red China had encouraged the North 
Koreans to attack the South. Right-wing columnist George Sokolsky 
argued, “[I]f our far eastern policy was not betrayed, why are we 
fighting in Korea?”7 Truman’s eventual firing of conservative hero 
General Douglas MacArthur further infuriated those on the Right 
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by providing them with proof that Truman did not want to defeat 
communism. MacArthur, after all, agreed with them. In his famous 
(and career-ending) letter to House Minority Leader Joe Martin, 
MacArthur summed up the conservative viewpoint: “[H]ere [in Asia] 
we fight Europe’s war with arms while diplomats still fight with 
words. . . . [T]here is no substitute for victory.”8 (The general echoed 
the anticommunist view that all communists, whether Chinese or 
Korean, still took their orders from Moscow. Hence, the real war 
should be fought in Europe.) Anticommunists across the country 
lambasted Truman for firing the general. Indiana senator William 
Jenner demanded Truman’s impeachment for turning the country 
over to a “secret coterie” of communists, while a Chicago Tribune edito-
rial advised that the nation was being “led by a fool surrounded by 
knaves.”9 Meanwhile, the fighting in Korea continued, frustrating a 
public that could not understand why a military machine that had 
crushed both Germany and Japan could not defeat North Korea. Anti-
communists, especially Republican ones, blamed the situation on the 
Democratic administration’s lack of will and understanding.
Consequently, many anticommunists initially hailed the Repub-
lican Eisenhower’s election, assuming that he would take a stronger 
stand against the communist threat. His military background, polit-
ical instincts, and active campaign against communists in the State 
Department greatly calmed the growing hysteria. Moreover, Eisen-
hower’s ending of the Korean conflict and his skillful handling of 
crises throughout the world reassured the general public that the Cold 
War had become manageable.10 Conservative anticommunists were 
less impressed. Eisenhower’s campaign promise to liberate the captive 
nations of Eastern Europe and his appointment of John Foster Dulles 
as secretary of state heartened the Right momentarily. However, when 
Ike failed to come to the aid of Hungarians challenging Soviet domi-
nation in 1956, conservatives unleashed their anger at and frustration 
with his policies. His willingness to open a dialogue with Moscow 
sent some over the edge. Robert Welch, founder of the John Birch 
Society, went so far as to accuse the president of being a conscious 
agent of the communists.11
Other conflicts emerged between the president and conservative 
anticommunists. One major issue that exploded during Ike’s tenure 
involved the relationship between the U.S. government and the United 
Nations. From its inception, the United Nations had given some 
conservative anticommunists a queasy feeling. Old isolationists such 
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as Ohio senator Robert Taft feared the United Nations would force 
Americans into foreign wars.12 Over the years others, such as writers 
James Burnham and George Sokolsky, found that elements of UN 
policy made them uneasy. Appalled that the United States belonged 
to an organization in which the Soviets had so much influence, many 
worried that they were being led into “one world” government. For 
example, during his term as president of the American Bar Associa-
tion, Frank Holman gave numerous speeches warning that the United 
States was at risk of becoming “a puppet state in a world-wide hege-
mony.”13 Of particular concern were the United Nations Educational, 
Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Declaration 
on Human Rights, both of which contained what the Right perceived 
to be socialistic elements.14 In 1951, anticommunists across the country 
joined conservative Republicans in Congress in supporting the Bricker 
Amendment, a Senate resolution attempting to ensure that the United 
Nations could not make laws binding on U.S. citizens. Eisenhower 
vehemently opposed what he saw as an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on his presidential powers. The amendment was introduced in 
various forms throughout the mid-1950s. Conservative senators came 
close but never achieved the necessary votes to pass it.15
Anticommunist women were very much a part of these arguments. 
Sometimes they sounded eerily like their male counterparts, shocking 
the public with their militancy. In other instances, however, women 
used their gender to add a unique perspective to the ongoing debate. 
Fear of communism compelled these women out of their homes and 
into the public arena to try to educate others about the seriousness 
of the situation. They were determined to convince Americans that 
communism could be stopped only if the people forced the govern-
ment to take a firm stand. Driven by their concerns, they worked to 
frighten, challenge, or cajole other women to join the crusade. In so 
doing, they affected the language and imagery of the larger debate not 
only by feminizing anticommunism by bringing it into the home but 
also through their willingness to adopt a masculine stridency.
Crowning anticommunism with the mantle of patriotic moth-
erhood proved a powerful lure for legitimizing women’s participa-
tion in politics. Instead of using maternalism to argue for pacifism as 
Women Strike for Peace had done, however, anticommunist women 
used motherhood to legitimize their more aggressive stance.16 Their 
biological makeup, some activists explained, provided women with 
knowledge men did not possess but that could—and should—influ-
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ence governments. Because of their special insights, activists believed, 
women would not make the same mistakes men did when dealing 
with their enemies. Women would willingly do whatever was 
necessary to protect their offspring, whether the threat came from a 
foreign nation or ideology or an insidious influence within their own 
communities. They would even guard against women who did not 
carry out their maternal responsibilities as they should. Motherhood, 
like housewifery (discussed more fully in Chapter 4), legitimized 
women’s political involvement in any endeavor that protected their 
offspring.
In 1948, Congresswoman Frances Bolton explained the connec-
tion between motherhood and politics to participants at the Women’s 
Patriotic Conference on National Defense. This meeting, which had 
been held annually since the late 1920s, brought together representa-
tives from various organizations including the Marine Corps League 
Auxiliary, Women of the Army and Navy Legion of Valor, Ladies 
Auxiliary of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Daughters of the United 
States Army, National Women’s Relief Corps Auxiliary to the Grand 
Army of the Republic, and American Gold Mothers. Rejecting the idea 
that women represented a “poor downtrodden minority,” Bolton chal-
lenged women to play an active role in the defense of their country. 
“National defense,” she explained, consisted of more than the tradi-
tionally masculine “soldiers, trained reserves, guns, navies, planes and 
bombs.” Women might lack knowledge of these aspects of defense, but 
they had a “peculiar preparation” for involvement. Women knew, she 
stated, “that all birth is out of darkness through pain.” The birthing 
experience showed that women had the kind of “creative courage” 
necessary to go “down into the dark valley” and save the world. “This 
deep understanding of the meaning of suffering” gave women license 
to move into the male world of politics.17
Other anticommunist activists built on this image of mothers’ 
innate abilities to encourage female participation in their cause. 
Editors of New Mexico Women Speak agreed with Bolton that women 
had “a practical understanding of the worth of the family and the 
community.” As a result, more women had become involved in poli-
tics. They feared, however, that this was not enough. The editors felt 
there was a “great necessity for alarming the women of New Mexico 
of the dangers that beset them as individuals . . . [as well as] their 
state . . . and their country.”18 Leaders of the American Woman’s Party 
agreed that “woman power is mother power.” Since, in their view, 
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there was “no nobler human power” and “no power more just” than 
a mother’s influence, women had a duty to act.19
Their emphasis on a mother’s instinctual need to protect her 
offspring did not mean right-wing anticommunists were pacifists. Like 
earlier generations of conservative women, anticommunists during 
the 1950s and 1960s accepted the necessity of some wars to destroy 
great evils, such as communism and fascism. Moreover, conserva-
tive women tended to blame the communists for tricking gullible 
U.S. political leaders into military conflicts that drained American 
resources and morale. Once the United States was involved in a war, 
however, these women expected the government to do everything 
it could to protect their sons by fighting “to win.” As the victors in 
World War II, Americans should, anticommunists believed, be able 
to defeat easily anyone who challenged them. When victory proved 
more elusive, anticommunist women assumed communists must be 
undermining the war effort.20
Generally, however, female anticommunists focused on many of 
the same issues and used many of the same images utilized by their 
male colleagues to describe the communist threat. Like anticommu-
nist men, women who spoke out against communism tended to use 
dramatic phrases designed to shock and frighten their audiences. 
They obviously perceived communism as the most serious danger 
existing at the time and felt compelled to ensure that their listeners 
or readers understood this fact. Moreover, they hoped their words 
would persuade others to join their crusade against the Red menace.
In contrast to the public perception that women were only inter-
ested in home and family, these women crusaders spoke and wrote 
knowingly about foreign policy issues and expected their frequently 
all-female audiences to be interested in and capable of understanding 
the information. They used the recent past to discuss the state of 
affairs in Europe and Asia. They showed little hesitation in accusing 
U.S. government officials of making mistakes in dealing with both 
allies and enemies. Like their male counterparts, they assumed that 
their research and intelligence gave them every right to question U.S. 
government foreign policy decisions. They willingly waded into the 
fray without limiting their analysis to “womanly” topics.
Women, like many male anticommunists, focused on the atheistic 
basis of communism as the root of its problems. J. Edgar Hoover, for 
instance, said communists had no compass to guide their actions since 
they lacked any foundation in Judeo-Christian values. The absence 
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of core beliefs allowed communists to do whatever they deemed 
necessary to achieve their goals. One of those goals, anticommunists 
feared, was to eliminate religion wherever it existed. Arizonan Mrs. 
M. Conan’s concern over the communist threat drove her to send out 
her own newsletter to spread the word about those “demon-possessed 
persons.” She believed Soviet communists wanted to “control the 
world for Satan,” since they “hate God and all forms of religion.” 
Founded on “hatred and injustice,” the USSR, she claimed, had caused 
much of the suffering in postwar Europe. She included visual repre-
sentations of her beliefs in her newsletter as well. One cartoon showed 
Stalin, his hands bloody, threatening Uncle Sam.21
Others focused on more earthly, but no less immoral, aspects of 
communism. Doloris Bridges, wife of the New Hampshire senator 
and an outspoken anticommunist crusader, for example, constantly 
reiterated communists’ wickedness in her speeches before women’s 
organizations. In one instance she lambasted the Soviet regime as a 
government of “pathological liars” that had proven over the years that 
its members could not be trusted. More shockingly, that same lead-
ership, particularly Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, “close[d] his 
eyes to murder all around him.” Senator Margaret Chase Smith also 
blamed the Soviet and Chinese governments, rather than the people 
of those countries, for the situation. She emphasized that those leaders 
made false promises to their constituents; communists, she explained, 
guaranteed “the Chinese coolee [sic], the Hungarian peasant, the 
starving Rumanian” land reform and an improved lifestyle if they 
adopted communism. These desperate people, she implied, foolishly 
believed their conquerors. She did not want Americans to fall for the 
same tricks.22
Many anticommunist women shared the fear that the American 
people did not recognize the severity of the crisis and so would not 
step up to fight. Smith found it amazing that people criticized her for 
journeying to Moscow so she could see for herself how the Russians 
lived. She was “very glad” she had made the trip, since now she could 
tell Americans from firsthand experience “how lucky” they were not 
to be in Russia. In letters to her numerous correspondents, Elizabeth 
Churchill Brown described the American people as “amorphous” and 
worried that they would sleep through a communist takeover. While 
the rank and file clung to their false sense of security, she wrote, “the 
weak-kneed, the pinkoes and one-worlders” pressured the White 
House to get along with the Soviets. Without an effective counter-
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balance, she worried that the “tides of evil” would overtake the free 
world.23 Helen Corson, another newsletter writer, put it more bluntly: 
“The only way to lick this hidden menace is for all free, God-loving 
people to unite in a strong opposition to them.” Corson cautioned 
her readers that the Reds would stir up trouble between the groups 
arrayed against communists. Without unity, she wrote, the free world 
would be doomed.24
These anticommunist women wanted Americans to lead the unity 
effort and take control of the worldwide anticommunist movement. 
The problem, they explained, was not just a lack of initiative on the 
part of the U.S. government. They also worried about Europeans who 
refused to follow American guidance and so risked being seduced by 
communism. Former ambassador to Italy and Congresswoman Clare 
Boothe Luce wrote General A. C. Wedemeyer in 1947 saying it was 
time for Americans to make up their minds whether to assume “the 
complete leadership of the democratic world or turn Europe and Asia 
over to the Soviets.” The devastation resulting from World War II 
made Europeans vulnerable to communist propaganda. Even though 
Mrs. Conan wrote in her newsletter that “much of Europe’s suffering 
[was] due to Russian plundering,” she fretted that the weak and 
starving people might succumb to Soviet seduction. Doloris Bridges, 
back from a 1947 tour of Europe, told her clubwoman audience about 
the malnutrition and hopelessness she had seen. She recommended 
that a “sensible, self-supporting program” be designed to prevent the 
growth of radicalism and to keep Europe from becoming a drag on the 
U.S. economy. Years later, she still worried about U.S. aid to Europe 
and its effect on the budget at home. She did not want American 
dollars “sent down the drain all over the world” by pouring funds 
into countries harboring communists or adopting socialist policies. 
Journalist Brown agreed. Her concern was less the U.S. economy and 
more the willingness of aid recipients to go their own way. Frequently 
warning her correspondents and readers about the treachery of Amer-
ica’s European allies, she predicted that a “neutralist Europe” would 
work to thaw the Cold War by encouraging talks between Americans 
and the Soviets.25
In addition to blaming American allies for communist victories 
around the world, many of the women found fault with various aspects 
of U.S. foreign policy. Margaret Chase Smith blamed Americans’ 
preoccupation with themselves for their having lost the propaganda 
war around the world. “We can’t get far,” she scolded the women 
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of the Rumford Rotary-Lions club, “by telling the poverty stricken 
people of how wonderful life in America is with cars, homes, tele-
vision sets, refrigerators, washing machines.” Instead, she advocated 
teaching these people how the American system would “actually and 
specifically . . . bring such things to them in their own country.” With 
her Yankee practicality and frugality, Smith assumed that plans to 
bring about a change in living conditions would attract more converts 
than philosophical tracts preaching the wonders of capitalism and 
democracy.26
Others saw the problem in broader terms. Since the earliest days 
of the Cold War, some anticommunists had worried that government 
officials did not truly understand the problem they faced. According 
to these individuals, although American leaders said they were 
fighting the communists, the truth contradicted them. For example, 
the Women Investors Research Institute (WIRI) warned that American 
foreign policy “ignore[d] the very heart of Stalin’s program to conquer 
the world.” WIRI members looked to history to understand current 
Soviet actions. Stalin’s strategy, they declared, was a “combination of 
10th century Russian plans to conquer Eastern Europe and Genghis 
Khan’s plan to rule the world.” Ironically, their perspective mirrored 
that of the men they were chastising. Like many of those working 
within the foreign policy establishment, this group of women saw the 
struggle between the United States and the USSR as a geopolitical/
balance-of-power fight rather than an ideological one.27 In fact, despite 
their maternalist rhetoric, these women thought about the struggle in 
very masculine terms; rather than advocate compromise, they pushed 
the competitive angle. They wanted more, not fewer, guns.
Despite this area of agreement, however, some anticommu-
nist women felt the State Department and, in fact, the entire federal 
government were implicated in the communist victories, particu-
larly in Asia. Echoing the sentiments of the China Lobby, the Minute 
Women printed a letter in their Houston chapter newsletter from Dr. 
Marguerite Atterbury, a missionary in China. In the letter, Atterbury 
described conditions in China before and after the communist victory. 
With nothing but praise for Jiang Jieshi and his government, Atterbury 
lamented the current limitations to his power. She blamed the United 
States for allowing the communists to “push Free China around” by 
continuing to accept “the fiction that the Nationalist Government was 
a culprit in the loss of the Mainland.” In her view, the Americans main-
tained a false story to cover the mistakes they had made in their Asian 
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policy. Other Minute Women took a darker view of the situation. In 
a 1951 statement in response to Truman’s firing of General Douglas 
MacArthur, the Minute Women argued that Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson and British prime minister Clement Atlee had conspired to 
give Eastern Europe and China to Stalin. MacArthur, in their estima-
tion, had been trying to stop this move, which was why he had to be 
removed from the scene.28
Elizabeth Churchill Brown looked higher than the State Depart-
ment for responsibility for America’s failure to stop communist 
encroachment around the world. She blamed President Dwight Eisen-
hower for not providing decisive leadership against the Soviets and 
the Chinese. She lamented that what she labeled his “confusion” had 
spread throughout the White House, the Pentagon, and the National 
Security Council—turning his foreign policy into a mishmash of ideas 
and actions. Some of Ike’s confusion, she wrote, stemmed from his 
reliance on his brother Milton Eisenhower, who Brown saw as a bad 
influence on the president. Milton Eisenhower encouraged his brother 
to talk to the Soviets and had even gone to Moscow to arrange for the 
Soviet premier to visit the United States.29 Many anticommunists saw 
this as the ultimate in hypocrisy and stupidity. How could the govern-
ment claim to be fighting the Soviets with everything it had and allow 
its leader to pay a diplomatic visit? In fact, the trip set off a wave 
of protests and demonstrations against the Eisenhower administra-
tion, including one featuring William F. Buckley Jr., publisher of the 
National Review, that filled Carnegie Hall almost to capacity.30
Some anticommunist women found things to praise about the 
Eisenhower administration. Doloris Bridges, according to a news 
account of one of her talks, “commended the administration for 
moving forces into Lebanon and the standing up in defense of Formosa 
[Taiwan].” In particular, Bridges applauded Ike’s actions in supporting 
Quemoy and Matsu, two islands claimed by Nationalist Chinese and 
attacked by the People’s Republic of China. Without such a reaction, 
much of Asia would eventually “go behind the Bamboo Curtain.” 
Rather than lay all the mistakes on the president’s shoulders, Bridges 
looked accusingly at Congress and its role in not supporting the presi-
dent in his efforts to fight communism at home and abroad.31
Another favorite target of anticommunists was the United 
Nations. Criticism generally fell into two categories, although both 
were related to the same larger issue—surrendering control to a non-
American authority. One theory expounded by Conan in her news-
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letter argued that the United Nations was “only a cloak for Commu-
nism, the most horrible form of slavery ever hatched out of the mind 
of Satan.” Communism’s influence at the United Nations resulted 
from Soviet control of the votes of its satellite peoples. According to 
Florence Dean Post, vice chair of the Minute Women of the USA, the 
Soviets represented over 800 million people, while the United States 
had only 160 million. In addition, she asserted, the Russians could 
usually count on the votes of “undefined nations.” This meant, she 
explained, that the United States would be outvoted at almost every 
turn. Compounding the problem for both Post and Katharine Reynolds 
of the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) was their belief 
that the United Nations was harboring communist spies. Sometimes 
these undercover agents were described as foreign workers who used 
their diplomatic status to send information and technology back to 
the mother country. More shocking for these women, however, were 
the Americans at the United Nations who did not represent the inter-
ests of the United States but instead were working with America’s 
enemies. According to groups like the DAR and the Minute Women, 
some Americans working at the United Nations had failed secu-
rity screenings by the federal government or had “taken the fifth” 
at congressional hearings. Still, the United Nations hired them. No 
wonder the institution could not be trusted, they maintained.32
The other concern many anticommunists voiced about the United 
Nations was what they perceived to be a tendency toward world 
government. Unwilling to relinquish American control over U.S. terri-
tory and citizens, these women feared UN leaders planned to under-
mine federal and state constitutions in the name of international peace. 
Anticommunists who espoused this belief feared the “one-worlders” 
would “seek a gradual approach to world government through the 
United Nations.” Mrs. James Lucas, executive secretary of the DAR, 
explained in testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the 
DAR’s position was that “our national sovereignty is essential to the 
freedom of the American people and the preservation of our constitu-
tional Republic.” She went on to “expose the fallacies inherent in the 
world-government idea.” Chief among these flaws, in her opinion, 
was the idea that the peoples of the world had so much in common 
that they could unite as one. She found this absurd. She also worried 
that a world government would be allowed to tax the American 
people as well as create its own army and set up an international court 
system. Many of the Minute Women joined Lucas and the DAR in 
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their views, and the New York chapter reprinted Lucas’s statement in 
its newsletter.33
Florence Fowler Lyons was another concerned opponent of world 
government. She set her sights on UNESCO as the main culprit in 
trying to bring about world government. In particular, she focused on 
UNESCO’s educational efforts, fearing the group was spreading one-
world propaganda to innocent children without their parents real-
izing what was happening. Lyons spent years examining UNESCO’s 
activities and reports so she could expose anything with which she 
found fault.34
Although Lyons and most other newsletter writers had a limited 
readership, making it difficult to ascertain the true extent of their 
influence on the broader anticommunist movement, the plethora of 
publications and the longevity of some of them indicate that these 
women were, at the least, getting their opinions out to the public. Even 
if they did not change the view of one person, which seems unlikely 
considering that some of the newsletters required subscriptions, their 
writings added to the overall debate on the issues. These activists 
explained the issues of the day in their own words, in language their 
readers would understand. For women who did not have the time or 
the inclination to read through a newspaper or watch the news, these 
brief newsletters might have been their only source of information on 
these topics.
A few women succeeded in helping shape anticommunist dia-
logue on a national level. Freda Utley, Elizabeth Churchill Brown, 
and Phyllis Schlafly are three examples of such writers and activists. 
Although they shared the same basic message—that American polit-
ical leaders had allowed communism to gain strength throughout the 
world—the three women came from divergent backgrounds, wrote 
under different circumstances, and met with varying levels of accep-
tance. Utley, a highly educated, cosmopolitan former communist, used 
her own experiences in the Soviet Union as the foundation to try to 
convince the American public to heed the dangers of communism. As 
a former society columnist and a journalist’s wife, Brown struggled to 
be taken seriously as a political writer. Through her obstinate refusal 
to be silenced and her willingness to almost force people to read her 
book, she succeeded in making her opinions known. Schlafly gained 
more commercial success, perhaps because she was the most politi-




Freda Utley was one of the few women who belonged to a small 
group of former communist intellectuals who helped shape the evolu-
tion of modern conservatism. Along with men such as Whittaker 
Chambers, Max Eastman, and William Henry Chamberlin, Utley 
provided firsthand knowledge of the reality of communism. These 
former leftists did more than tell tales of good and evil; they laid 
an intellectual framework to justify the emerging anticommunism 
of the Right. Their work imbued a political and partisan movement 
with philosophical overtones, tying anticommunism to a conserva-
tive ideology and helping to unite sometimes dissenting factions 
on the Right.35 After all, economic conservatives, traditionalists, and 
right-wing politicians all feared communism’s effect on their world. 
Focusing on the Red menace gave them common ground to overlook 
differences and concentrate on their enemies at home and abroad.36
Although the writings of each of these former communist intel-
lectuals had a specific focus, they all tended to agree on the general 
outline of what they portrayed as America’s disastrous foreign policy. 
In their minds, Europe’s fate had been predetermined before World 
War II ended. FDR and a communist clique in the State Department, 
with the help of General George Marshall, organized their military 
strategy to allow the Soviets to gain control of Eastern Europe. They 
argued that the insistence on the unconditional surrender of Germany, 
the naive view of Stalin’s actions, and tolerance of the Soviet presence 
in Poland were proof of the conspiracy.37 Unfortunately, as they saw it, 
Roosevelt’s death had not ended the troubles. Truman had continued 
the same plan. His containment policy only made things worse.
For her part, Utley concentrated on Asia. Prior to 1941 she had 
written several books and articles on the conflict between Japan and 
China, encouraging American policy makers to take a tough stand 
and expose what she called Japan’s “feet of clay.”38 American policy 
during and especially after the war further frustrated and angered 
Utley. As early as 1946, she warned publisher Clair Boothe Luce that 
“illusions about the Chinese Communist are largely responsible for 
our absurd policy in China.” In her book The China Story, published 
in 1951 with Mao Zedong’s successful seizure of power still fresh 
in Americans’ minds and in the midst of the Korean conflict, Utley 
argued that China had been delivered to the Communists “with what 
amounted to the blessing of the United States Administration.” A 
combination of “ignorance, refusal to face facts, romanticism . . . polit-
ical immaturity or a misguided humanitarianism, and the influence of 
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Communist sympathizers and the careerists who staked their reputa-
tions on a pro-Soviet policy” resulted in the United States selling out 
its ally, Jiang Jieshi, and abandoning the people of Asia to commu-
nism.39 Even after the communists forced Jiang and the Nationalists to 
Formosa, Americans continued, according to Utley, to “nurture illu-
sions about Communism.” Their naïveté led to the conflict in Korea 
and was ultimately leading, she warned, to a potential “third world 
war.”40
Utley released The China Story at an opportune time. The domestic 
Red Scare was in full swing, the war in Korea appeared mired in stale-
mate, and Truman’s dismissal of MacArthur had aroused fierce debate. 
The timing of the publication, combined with her reputation as an 
experienced journalist with solid academic credentials and her experi-
ence as a former communist, helped legitimize both the book and its 
message.41 Utley’s appearance the year before the book was published 
during the Senate’s investigation of Owen Lattimore added to her 
reputation. In reviewing the book for the New York Times, Richard L. 
Walker, a history professor at Yale, pointed out these facts. Although 
troubled by her “bitterness” and willingness “to view events and 
personalities in black and white colors,” he encouraged his readers 
to take up the volume, absorb her “useful information,” and engage 
in the national debate. The Times continued its support later that year 
by listing the book among the 110 volumes chosen as recommended 
“vacation” reading.42
Utley continued her work throughout the decade even as the 
public became less obsessed with the communist menace. Her later 
books resulted from extensive reading as well as research conducted 
during personal visits to the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East. 
She feared that Americans had not learned from their earlier mistakes 
and would allow communism to take advantage of crises around the 
world. In her Preface to Will the Middle East Go West, she explained 
that although she “did not presume to know all of the answers,” she 
did “hope” the “tentative suggestions” she made in the course of the 
book would “help to build a wise United States policy, serving the 
interests of both America and the free world.” She feared that Ameri-
cans would foolishly let the Middle East slip under Soviet control, as 
they had with Europe when they ignored her earlier warnings. Almost 
ten years earlier she had expressed a similar sentiment at the end of 
her book on Germany. She was “convinced” that “once the Amer-
ican people are made aware of the facts [concerning the treatment of 
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postwar Germany] which have for so long been withheld from them,” 
facts she exposed in her book, they would “impel a radical change in 
United States policy.”43
Determined to expose the errors she found in U.S. foreign policy, 
Utley dedicated herself to anticommunist work. In addition to her 
books, she wrote speeches for Joe McCarthy and worked briefly for the 
Office of Strategic Services and later for the McCarren Subcommittee 
on Investigations.44 She recognized that in doing so, she was giving 
up the “material interests” she could have gained from her “brains, 
knowledge and literary ability.”45 Convinced of her high intelligence 
and powerful analytical skills, she believed wholeheartedly in her 
cause and never questioned her right to engage in a traditionally male 
preserve. Moreover, her books were written for both the male and 
female public, although she particularly hoped to influence the men 
in power. No evidence indicates that Utley in any way considered her 
gender a limiting factor in her work. She appeared to assume that she 
could engage the male foreign policy establishment as an equal and 
even influence the decisions that emerged from this elite group.
In contrast, Elizabeth Churchill Brown approached the situation 
from a completely different set of circumstances, and her work directly 
addressed gender issues. Two factors in particular worked against 
Brown’s efforts to publish the same basic message Utley preached: 
the changed status of the Cold War both at home and abroad, and 
Brown’s personal background. Because of these difficulties, Brown 
found herself in need of a tool to pry open a space for herself in the 
anticommunist world. She used her gender as a crowbar.
Brown began work on her book on U.S. foreign policy in 1954 
just as the Cold War entered a new phase. The Republican Dwight 
Eisenhower was elected president in 1952, Joseph Stalin died in 1953, 
and the war in Korea was over. After the tensions of the early 1950s, 
the American public gladly put itself and its foreign policy in Ike’s 
hands. There were crises, certainly. But when the Soviets demolished 
the Hungarian rebels or the Chinese bombed the Nationalist-held 
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, public alarm was momentary. There 
were too many other things to distract them: the booming economy, 
the plethora of consumer goods, rising racial tensions. The Cold War 
became something Americans learned to live with.46
Additionally, the mid-1950s witnessed the birth of modern conser-
vatism. Fueled by lingering resentment over twelve years of New 
Deal politics, conservatives, especially within the Republican Party, 
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pushed for greater access to political power. Anticommunism helped 
those economic conservatives find common ground with tradition-
alists who feared all the social and cultural changes of the postwar 
years. Seeing the opportunity to bring these groups together, William 
F. Buckley Jr. and others such as writer/philosophers Willi Schlamm 
and Frank Meyer created a new publication, the National Review, to 
give voice to all varieties of what they considered legitimate conser-
vatism. They wanted to rid conservatism of its more lunatic elements 
to justify the Right’s demands for national power. In particular, they 
moved away from anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories.47
Caught up in her own anticommunist work, Brown did not recog-
nize that the public’s attitudes had changed anymore than she could 
see how her personal situation limited her potential as an author. As 
noted in Chapter 2, Brown’s journalistic training had been limited to 
the society pages. Only her marriage to journalist Constantine Brown 
brought her into contact with the movers and shakers in Washington, 
DC. She lacked not only Utley’s academic credentials but the former 
communist’s experiences as well. Brown might have been well trav-
eled, but she had not lived through Stalin’s purges or been in Asia 
during the war. Even critics who might disagree with Utley’s conclu-
sions could not overlook the reality of her firsthand knowledge. Brown 
started with no such advantage.
In many ways, she had more in common with the newsletter 
editors than she did with Utley. Like them, she was a housewife who 
engaged in political work between household chores. She took her 
commitment to anticommunism as seriously as they did. Similar to 
women like Florence Fowler Lyons, she put in many hours doing 
research from government reports, published memoirs, and congres-
sional hearings. As discussed in more depth in Chapter 4, she devoted 
much time and effort to encouraging other women to get involved in 
the fight against communism.
In 1954, Brown tried to combine her research with her desire to 
increase women’s participation in the movement. She sent conserva-
tive publisher Henry Regnery a manuscript proposal for what she 
thought would be a unique and important contribution to anticom-
munist literature. As she explained in her letter, in her view, intelli-
gent women interested in important issues had no time to learn about 
them because of household responsibilities. Cooking, cleaning, and 
caring for their families were important, but these jobs left little time 
to expand their knowledge of the threat of communism. They had 
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“time only for the headlines,” not for editorials or detailed analyses. 
Assuming that most of the women she was writing to were mothers, 
she recognized that their foremost concern was that their sons might 
be called upon to fight and die in another war. They wanted to know 
what was going on in the world but dreaded men’s condescending 
attitude if they asked too many questions. In Brown’s view, women 
needed to discuss these issues with other women who would treat 
them with respect.48
Brown promised to tell other women “the truth” about politics 
because she was one of them. Explaining that she had not paid atten-
tion to politics until she started reading her new husband’s newspaper 
columns, she put herself on the same level as her readers. She might 
live in Washington, DC, and be married to a famous journalist, but 
inside, she told them, she was as ignorant of events as they were. For 
example, she had questions concerning the U.S. government’s actions 
during and after World War II. Despite the men who “maligned” her 
curiosity and encouraged her to let “the menfolks take care of running 
the world,” she sought answers. Even then, she refused to play the 
men’s game. Since she was not a “military strategist” but a woman, 
she “look[ed] at things like women do.” She asked “questions no 
intelligent man would ask.” Although her husband thought her suspi-
cions about the Roosevelt administration resulted from her “being 
emotional, ‘just like a woman,’ ” she persisted in pursuing them.49
Brown carried this attitude into The Enemy at His Back, published 
in 1955. The first paragraph of her Introduction set the tone for the 
book: “This book is the result of a woman’s curiosity. It is not the work 
of a student of history nor even the work of a student. Neither is it 
written for students but rather for ordinary people like myself who 
would like to know ‘who killed Cock Robin?’ ”50 She then proceeded 
to lay out her argument in a straightforward manner that would 
have been easy for anyone for follow. Rather than rely on academic 
or diplomatic jargon, Brown quoted herself, wondering, “Why do we 
have to kiss [the Soviets] on the mouth?” Her colloquial language and 
inclusion of personal narrative echoed the style of the newsletters of 
various women’s groups.51
Her argument, however, followed much the same line as Utley’s. 
In the book, she examined the actions and words of key American 
leaders involved in decision making in the Pacific theater during 
and after World War II. She concluded that General George Marshall 
and President Franklin Roosevelt had deliberately prolonged the 
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war against Japan because it suited Soviet purposes. Without actu-
ally calling them communist agents, she questioned their reliance on 
advisers of doubtful loyalty. According to her analysis, these same 
advisers rushed America into demobilization, leaving the rest of the 
world defenseless against encroaching communist forces. She also 
concluded that these same men had prevented General MacArthur 
from winning the war in Korea by unduly restraining his actions. The 
American people, in her view, had been betrayed.52
Brown’s book and her interactions with various editors exposed 
much about her way of dealing with her position as an anticommu-
nist woman. On the one hand, she accepted certain stereotypes about 
women: they were “different” from men, they were housewives, their 
connections to world affairs were related to their family interest. On 
the other hand, she used those assumptions to justify her book: she 
could talk to other women in ways men could not. She also turned 
her assumptions against men: she could see things men could not 
because she looked at the situation from a different angle. Flashes of 
defiance appeared in her cutting remarks about “menfolks” running 
the world. Most important, she insisted, her book told the “story that 
ought to be told to other women” and was not a fluffy, watered-down 
version of world affairs. It was a hard-core indictment of American 
policy makers. Despite her emphasis on writing a book for women, 
her conclusions were very similar to those of most right-wing men.
Further, Brown did not approach publication as a retiring “lady.” 
She had been working on the manuscript for over a year, corre-
sponding with Henry Regnery, who was both a personal friend of 
the family and one of the nation’s leading conservative publishers. 
By early 1955 she had sent Regnery the manuscript. After three and a 
half months, he returned it with a polite refusal. He did not think her 
book would “lend itself to” distribution in bookstores. He thought she 
should turn the manuscript into a series of pamphlets that would be 
useful to the new organizations “springing up around the country.” 
As a businessman, Regnery based his decisions on the need to make a 
profit; obviously, he did not believe Brown’s book would be a commer-
cial success.53
Since the book did go on to sell a reasonable number of copies, 
Regnery’s stated reason for not publishing it seems disingenuous. In 
particular, his suggestion that she publish the material in pamphlet 
form rather than reorganize it (which her next publisher required) 
indicated that Regnery saw Brown as the wife of an author rather than 
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an author herself. Regnery proposed that an organization such as the 
Minute Women might provide a market for such a pamphlet series.
Brown did not let Regnery’s decision discourage her. She sent the 
book to Devin Garrity at Devin-Adair, who made favorable comments 
and helpful suggestions. By August 1955 she had not only a publisher 
but also a distributor. Interestingly, Liz did not blame Regnery for 
his actions even though she told him he had been “mean” to her. His 
cruel rejection of her manuscript, she explained to him and to another 
friend, was not his fault. She did not think anyone at Regnery’s press 
had actually read her manuscript. Consistently conspiratorial, she 
believed “Henry has some one in his outfit who does him no good.” 
Like the political leaders in her book, Regnery was the victim of bad 
advisers who could not spot valuable material (i.e., her manuscript) 
when they read it.54
The Enemy at His Back received good, if not outstanding, reviews 
from the conservative press, and Liz earned congratulations from 
fellow right-wingers. The New York Herald Tribune’s reviewer thought 
she had done a “creditable” job of proving her point. One Chicago 
paper’s reviewer thought she had raised interesting and impor-
tant questions that needed answering. Arizona senator Barry Gold-
water had a favorable review of the book read into the Congressional 
Record.55
Even after she had finished the book and found a publisher, 
Brown remained very much involved in its distribution and publicity. 
She took control of the situation after publication to make certain 
reviewers and influential people received copies of the book. She 
personally sent copies to 100 “very wealthy men,” expecting them to 
send her the purchase price, and then she had to scramble to receive 
payment from them. Checking to see if reviewers received their copies 
consumed much of her time and that of her assistant. Her efforts in 
this regard showed how knowledgeable she was about political influ-
ence and publishing; she knew the book would be worthless if not 
properly reviewed and publicized. More revealing, however, was her 
complete faith that the book would receive favorable reviews. Unlike 
many writers, she appeared to have no doubts as to the value and 
importance of her work.56
Unquestionably, however, Brown had to work much harder than 
Utley to promote her views. By the mid-1950s, the story Brown told 
was familiar to the conservative faithful. She did not provide her 
readers with any new material, even though her language might have 
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held more appeal to a female readership. As previously mentioned, 
much of the American public had become less obsessed with the 
topics she discussed. The New York Times did not review Brown’s 
book. In fact, it was only reviewed in conservative publications. In 
contrast, Utley’s later book repeated a similar message but focused 
on the Middle East, a new player in the Cold War game, and was 
reviewed by the Times.57
Dedicated anticommunists like Brown became even more frus-
trated as the public’s attitude continued to mellow. Communism had 
not ceased to be an enemy ideology for most Americans, but they had 
learned to live with that enemy as long as there was no immediate 
threat. Concerns about Fidel Castro in Cuba and of nuclear fallout 
forced the abstract image of Soviet or Chinese soldiers invading 
American soil to the background. Politicians continued to call up the 
Red menace in campaign speeches and Red-baited their opponents if 
they thought it would help their campaigns, but the frequency and 
intensity of those accusations had changed.58 Voters and the public 
in general seemed more worried about race riots and right-wing 
extremism than about the communist threat.
Elizabeth Churchill Brown found this nonchalance about commu-
nism absurd and dangerous. She predicted to her publisher friend 
Henry Regnery in October 1963 that “within the next two or three 
years, the ring will be visibly closing around us. . . . Our military will 
be disaffected, demoralized, and torn within themselves. We’ll be 
disarmed and old Uncle Nikita will be calling the shots.” A month 
later, after President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, Brown again 
saw the Soviets’ hand at work. According to her rather convoluted 
logic, Castro had ordered Lee Harvey Oswald to kill JFK, and Soviets 
had then killed Oswald to protect the conspiracy. Now, she explained 
to Francesca Rhee, the culprits feared that if Americans learned that 
communists were behind the murder, everyone would become anti-
communist, which would undermine peaceful coexistence and world 
peace. She believed some “infiltrated red in the ranks of conserva-
tives” might do something drastic to distract America from the truth.59 
Brown’s zealousness better suited the nation’s paranoid mood of the 
McCarthy era of the early 1950s. By the early to mid-1960s the nation, 
while still anticommunist, was less convinced of the reality of conspir-
acies against American freedoms.
Brown was not alone in her frustration with the American public 
or in her continuing efforts to fight communism. In fact, by the early 
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1960s, even as Americans returned the Democrats to the White House, 
a grassroots movement was gathering momentum to move the country 
to the right. Utilizing Republican women’s clubs and other local orga-
nizations, a small band of conservative Republicans was plotting to 
win the GOP presidential nomination for one of its own: Arizona 
senator Barry Goldwater. More moderate Republicans underestimated 
the determination, ability, and numbers of right-wingers and so were 
caught off guard. Their last-minute efforts to deprive Goldwater of 
the nomination backfired, and the Right had its candidate.60
Playing a key supporting role in Goldwater’s early campaign was 
longtime activist Phyllis Schlafly. A dedicated anticommunist, Schlafly 
liked Goldwater’s demand for a stronger defense against the Soviets 
and for less socialism at home. She had voiced similar complaints 
throughout the 1950s, during her unsuccessful campaign for Congress 
in 1952 and in her work with the DAR and the Federation of Repub-
lican Women’s Clubs. Like Brown and Utley, she refused to give up on 
her mission to educate the American public about the dangerous state 
of the world. She saw Goldwater’s 1964 campaign as an opportunity 
to reinvigorate the fight against communism. Schlafly signed on.61
She did much more than ring doorbells, however. As historian 
Donald Critchlow pointed out in his recent biography, Schlafly had 
always believed in the importance of translating “the ideas of intellec-
tuals and anticommunist authors” for grassroots consumption. One 
of her continuing projects over the years was developing “A Reading 
List for Americans,” which included congressional reports as well as 
intellectual tomes and popular nonfiction, such as Whitaker Cham-
bers’s Witness.62 Consequently, when Schlafly joined the Goldwater 
campaign, she decided that she could be most useful by writing a 
book that would explain to the public the obstacles conservatives had 
faced within their own party.63
The result was A Choice Not an Echo, which she wrote and 
privately published in 1964. The book focused on exposing “the king-
makers” who, she claimed, ran the GOP and prevented conserva-
tives from having any input. These men had been undermining the 
party and America for much of the twentieth century. She devoted 
one of her longest chapters to an analysis of U.S. foreign policy. Enti-
tled “Who’s Looney Now?” the chapter listed “Defeats around the 
World,” including Vietnam—which was, she wrote, “slipping fast into 
Communist clutches”—as well as “Communist Agents in the State 
Department and the CIA.” She pulled few punches, named names, 
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and accused President Lyndon Johnson and his aides of ignoring 
America’s anticommunist friends and “lavish[ing] millions of dollars 
. . . and every possible hospitality” on pro-communists.64
Written in a colloquial, simple style reminiscent of Brown’s book 
and the various newsletters, A Choice Not an Echo became a sensation. 
Schlafly had chosen to publish the book privately to speed up produc-
tion and allow her to control distribution. Using her own mailing lists, 
compiled over the years from her associations with various right-wing 
organizations, Schlafly promoted the book widely. She offered bulk 
discounts and sold close to 2 million copies in the first six months of 
publication. By November, she had sold 3.5 million copies.65 According 
to a New York Times review, the book was “in such demand that copies 
could not be obtained in many places along the East Coast.”66 The 
book was particularly important during the California primary. The 
margin separating Goldwater from his main rival, New York governor 
Nelson Rockefeller, was extremely narrow. Targeting districts where 
Rockefeller was strong, Goldwater workers distributed hundreds of 
copies of Choice. When Goldwater won the primary, his staff gave 
Schlafly’s book much of the credit.67
Later that same year, Schlafly repeated the pattern with a book 
written with Retired Rear Admiral Chester Ward. The Gravediggers 
brought Utley and Brown’s message up to the present day. According 
to Schlafly and Ward, Roosevelt and his aides had set the dangerous 
precedent of handing the Soviets everything they needed to conquer 
the world. Their successors had continued in the same vein. Khrush-
chev, the authors explained, promised to “bury” the West, and “Amer-
ican gravediggers” were shoveling the dirt. Echoing her predecessors, 
Schlafly did not claim these Americans were communists. Instead, 
they were “card-carrying liberals.”68 She accused the Johnson admin-
istration of undermining America’s defense by encouraging disarma-
ment and leaving America vulnerable. She also went after Hollywood 
for producing movies such as On the Beach and Fail-Safe that presented 
falsehoods as facts, serving only to frighten the public.69
Although Schlafly mentioned communism’s impact on the family, 
she did not directly address women in her books. Rather, like Utley, 
she appeared to assume that women would be as interested and as 
knowledgeable as men but would not need or want “special handling.” 
Again, like Utley, she did not refer directly to her gender, further proof 
that anticommunist women did not allow their gender to inhibit their 
right to participate in the foreign policy dialogue of the era.
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None of the activists could entirely escape the prejudices of their 
times, however. Despite the obvious knowledge of international 
events exhibited by these anticommunist women, the vast majority 
of the public still believed foreign affairs and anticommunism were 
primarily issues for male consideration. Talk of missile strength, 
combat strategies, and weaponry seemed to fit more naturally into 
a man’s sphere. For women, it was an uphill battle to be accepted in 
such a world. Freda Utley, who had written extensively about Russia 
and China, complained to editor Clare Boothe Luce that she had 
more difficulty getting her material published than John Hershey, a 
better-known male author who wrote about similar subjects.70 During 
Schlafly’s 1952 congressional campaign, her opponent suggested she 
go back home and take care of her children.71 Brown, of course, recog-
nized that women might need some remedial education on foreign 
policy, but she did not let that fact deter her efforts to publish her 
book.
The world might still accept the stereotype that foreign policy was 
a man’s game, but women anticommunists knew better. Female anti-
communists during this period focused on many of the same issues 
and used many of the same images utilized by their male colleagues 
to describe the communist threat. Like anticommunist men, women 
who spoke out against communism tended to use dramatic phrases 
designed to shock and frighten their audiences.
Women activists played a significant role in defining the relation-
ship of U.S. foreign policy to the threat of communism. At least two 
such women took it upon themselves to translate foreign affairs issues 
for all Americans, male and female alike. Freda Utley was convinced 
that as a former communist, her experiences abroad, especially in 
Russia and China, qualified her to write authoritatively about the 
dangers these communist states posed to the United States. Phyllis 
Schlafly, less cosmopolitan than Utley but supremely confident of her 
ability to write in a style that could reach the masses, published with 
the goal of informing her fellow citizens about U.S. foreign policy and 
the necessity of putting Goldwater in the White House. Most women, 
however, undertook the task of alerting other women—their neigh-
bors and friends—through newsletters, speeches, and books about the 
nature of the communist threat overseas and the effect it would have 
on their lives at home.
Liz Brown stands out from this large group of anticommunist 
women because of her conviction that she could write in a manner 
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that would allow busy American housewives and mothers to learn 
about the implications of U.S. foreign policy in the battle against 
communism. Nevertheless, other women, although perhaps lacking 
Liz’s connections in the world of publishing, undertook the same 
role in their clubs and organizations or by writing newsletters and 
pamphlets. No matter the method of communication utilized or the 
level of fame achieved, all of these women were convinced that Amer-
ican foreign policy must be designed to halt the Red menace and that 
only by arousing the housewives and mothers of America could such 
a policy be developed.
The work of these women, in effect, transformed the male preserve 
of foreign affairs into an arena in which both sexes were expected 
to participate. Anticommunist women did not view their actions as 
unprecedented or irregular. Their hatred of communism blinded 
them to the larger implications of their actions, namely that they were 
stepping out of the role of the little homemaker into the rough-and-
tumble arena of foreign policy debate. Concerned that not all Ameri-
cans, especially women, seemed to understand the seriousness of the 
situation in foreign affairs, they were committed to sounding the alert 
and educating the population. By undertaking this task, they were 
fulfilling their patriotic duty to help defend the United States from its 
communist enemies worldwide; at the same time they were helping 





Not content just to talk about the evils of communism, conservative 
anticommunist women across the country participated in various 
efforts to rid America of the evil forces that lurked within the nation’s 
borders. Some women acted in ways that defied conventional limits 
regarding female behavior. Others took a more traditional route. 
They joined clubs; they wrote letters, newsletters, books, and arti-
cles; they gave speeches and organized demonstrations. They even 
ran for public office. They seemed not to think twice about whether 
women should participate in the anticommunist crusade. In fact, the 
opposite appeared to be the case. Underlying the activities of most 
of these women was an urgent sense of responsibility. Joining the 
fight against communism seemed one more duty of good wives and 
mothers. If, in the process of combating this enemy, they ended up 
c h a p t e r  f o u r
the red threat on the domestic scene
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expanding their overall political participation, that was a consequence 
most of them had not consciously anticipated or, for the most part, 
desired. They were just fulfilling what one Texas clubwoman called 
woman’s “special mission.” Women, she explained, were called “to 
do battle, continuously and evermore, with any power or influence 
which threatens the unity and perpetuity of this first of society’s insti-
tutions—the family in its home.”1
Many right-wing anticommunist women translated their concern 
about the communist threat into worry about practical issues. Rather 
than focus exclusively on spies within the government leaking mili-
tary secrets to the Russians, conservative women frequently concen-
trated on the impact communist agents had on community organi-
zations such as school boards, libraries, and health care facilities. In 
addition, many women served as their families’ money managers and 
thus fretted about the Red influence on the economy as it related to 
their household budgets. In contrast, male anticommunists tended to 
look at the big picture, especially in regard to economic matters, rather 
than focus on bread-and-butter issues.
Actually, anticommunists in general tended to focus so intently 
on the menace of communism that they ignored the changing reali-
ties around them. Economic turmoil immediately after World War II, 
followed by unprecedented prosperity intermixed with periods of reces-
sion, confused people who had experienced the Great Depression. The 
plethora of consumer goods available enticed more women, eager to 
purchase those goods, into the workforce at the same time “everyone” 
assumed women were content to stay at home. Prosperity also fueled 
a rising Civil Rights Movement. Even the government seemed to 
acknowledge that changes needed to be made in this area of domestic 
policy. The 1954 Supreme Court verdict in Brown v. Board of Education, 
Topeka, Kansas introduced a potential new level of federal involvement 
in local affairs. Similarly, President Dwight Eisenhower’s failure to 
“undo” the New Deal meant the government would continue to grow.2 
Conservative to begin with, anticommunists would have disliked 
increased federal intervention and challenges to the social structure 
under any circumstances. The continued emphasis on the communist 
threat provided anticommunists with a simplistic way to understand 
the transformation of the world around them. Anything they disliked 
or found frightening could be blamed on the communist presence.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the American public became aware 
of the supposed danger of communism in the United States from a 
87
Women Arise
variety of sources and events. Former communists, such as Whittaker 
Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, who had found Jesus or grown 
disillusioned with the cause identified their previous associates and 
exposed the existence of a spy network within the United States. 
Responding to these allegations, members of the House and Senate 
held open hearings and called hundreds of witnesses. The resulting 
trials of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Alger Hiss, and the Hollywood 
Ten seemed to confirm that a real problem existed. Further legiti-
mizing this fear, President Harry Truman created a Loyalty Review 
Panel to check the backgrounds of all government employees. His 
attempt to wrest control of the spy issue from his political enemies 
seriously backfired, as Republicans used his own committee to prove 
the depth of the problem.3
Republicans succeeded in using the issue of domestic subversion 
as a springboard to political power. Wisconsin senator Joe McCarthy 
proved particularly adept at attacking Democrats and anyone else 
who opposed him, smearing them with the Red label. By the time 
Eisenhower won control of the White House, McCarthy had become 
a household name, and McCarthyism had come to symbolize a disre-
gard for civil liberties in the quest to root out communism. Ike, who 
intensely disliked McCarthy and his methods, even allowed John 
Foster Dulles, his secretary of state, to purge overseas libraries of 
“un-American” material. Eisenhower also, however, worked behind 
the scenes to undermine McCarthy and the more extreme forms of 
anticommunism.4
By the mid-1950s, the intensity of the Red Scare had begun to 
dissipate. The end of the Korean War, the death of Stalin, the election 
of a Republican president, and the televised Army-McCarthy hearings 
combined to weaken the anticommunist hysteria of the early 1950s. 
The cause did not disappear entirely, however. Politicians continued 
to find it useful to imply that their opponents were “pink around the 
edges” well into the 1960s.
While government officials concentrated on communism’s politi- 
cal ramifications, many anticommunist crusaders were more con-
cerned about its impact on their organizations, institutions, and way 
of life. In particular, true believers worried that Reds had already infil-
trated community groups, influenced education, and undermined the 
free enterprise system.5 In his best-selling book Masters of Deceit, J. 
Edgar Hoover encouraged Americans to be vigilant in searching out 
communists in everyday life. “Concealed communists are found in 
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all fields,” he explained. Because “they are difficult to identify,” he 
warned, they “can operate freely” anywhere. He included frightening 
scenarios of a professor lecturing to his class or study group, all the 
while “subtly engender[ing them] with communist doctrine.”6 Busi-
nessmen took the opportunity to caution the American public about 
accepting unionism at face value. Seizing the moment, businesses 
launched an extensive propaganda campaign to teach employees and 
the community at large about the value of capitalism. For example, in 
the early 1950s the American Economic Foundation and the National 
Association of Manufacturers launched a major campaign in public 
schools. Modifying programs originally designed for employees, the 
groups taught high schoolers “How Our Business System Operates” 
and “How We Live in America.” In this way, businesses emphasized 
the connection between economic and political freedom.7
These educational programs were necessary, according to anticom-
munists, because Americans just did not seem to “get it.” Frustrated 
by what they perceived as the public’s ignorance of the continuing 
dangers of communism, they spent much time and effort trying to 
counteract the apathy. In Wisconsin, for example, anticommunists 
staged a much-publicized mock communist takeover of a town to 
show what would happen without proper vigilance. On both national 
and local levels, people organized parades, marches, and informational 
“schools” to rally public support for their cause. Anticommunists 
promoted vigilance by investigating local officials, church leaders, and 
librarians. They believed that even the slightest leftist tint could even-
tually bleed over until it had turned the whole community Red.8
For women anticommunists, domestic subversion posed a special 
challenge. Since they were supposed to worry about threats to the 
home and family, women assumed they should be involved in the 
hunt for spies and fellow travelers. Female anticommunists particu-
larly saw threats to the local community as deserving their attention. 
Most male anticommunists agreed as long as women continued to 
frame their concerns in a feminine way. Men assumed that women 
anticommunists would be happy and satisfied doing the mundane 
and necessary work of fighting their domestic enemies. Most activists 
assumed a man would serve as a spokesperson and even the leader of 
a mixed-gender group.
Women did not hesitate, however, to voice their sometimes very 
strong opinions on the subject. Mrs. M. Conan, an inveterate news-
letter writer, put the matter bluntly. “America,” she wrote in 1947, 
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“is overrun with Russian spies.” She warned that while the presi-
dent had knowingly appointed men with “Communistic leanings to 
most responsible positions,” his secretary of the treasury was handing 
currency plates to the Soviets. Democrats remained the focus of many 
anticommunist women who believed Republicans tended to be more 
aware of the sneaky nature of communists and their fellow travelers. 
Doloris Bridges resented Democrats who, she said, claimed to be 
anticommunists while they harbored all sorts of radical leftists. She 
cautioned her audiences not to be deceived by the mere appearance 
of anticommunism; communists, she implied, were not above infil-
trating a good American anticommunist group and trying to destroy 
it from within. Slightly less than two years later, in another news-
letter, a different, unnamed author went a step further. She warned 
that the entire two-party system had been undermined. Republicans, 
she stated, had become “dominated by the same evil forces” as the 
Democrats.9
Anticommunist women continued to voice concerns about 
communism throughout the 1950s even as others lost interest in the 
cause. Trying to shame men into action, members of the American 
Woman’s Party announced that “women have been forced to take 
the lead, in self-defense, after waiting for some group of men to act” 
against the Red threat within America. Their phrasing both reinforced 
the existing stereotype that men should be in charge and justified their 
breaking those limits. If the men would not take care of the situation, 
the women had no choice but to take over the fight. Similarly, New 
Mexico Women Speak, a privately published newsletter, warned that 
“AmericA is DoomeD Unless AmericAn PeoPle WAke UP!” The editors 
admitted that discussing communism had come to “be regarded as 
a sort of treason to a peace-loving community.” Nevertheless, they 
believed it was imperative for all citizens to arm themselves with 
knowledge of the reality of the situation. Doloris Bridges took the 
issue a step further, stating that “subversive activities” had “engen-
dered” the “growing lack of respect for those in authority.” “Dimin-
ishing the stature of Congress” as well as respect for American polit-
ical institutions, she informed the Keene Woman’s Club in 1956, was a 
“favorite tool of the subversives.” If Americans did not prove vigilant, 
she implied, communists could easily undermine the American way 
of life.10
Many of these women feared it was already too late: communism-
socialism had gained the foothold it needed to destroy America. The 
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Minute Women certainly believed this was true. They stated in one 
newsletter that Americans had “advanced so far down the road to 
Socialism” that they did not see how we could “reverse our course.” 
Finding the American practice of sending foreign aid to anticommu-
nist crusaders abroad while letting communism “take root in our own 
country” hypocritical and foolish, the women warned that “the future 
looks dark.” Florence Dean Post, in a review of fellow anticommunist 
Jo Hindman’s book Terrible 1313, echoed those sentiments. Tracing 
the pattern back to the Wilson administration, Hindman warned that 
Americans had already been pushed far down the road toward collec-
tivism. Hindman postulated that communists had sneakily fought to 
undermine political institutions from the federal level down through 
local governments.11
Who was to blame for this mess? Hindman divided responsi-
bility evenly among all branches of the government. Executives of 
the American Woman’s Party accused politicians in general of “blun-
dering into socialism.” Doloris Bridges criticized both the Supreme 
Court and Congress for playing a role in weakening the fight against 
communism at home. She acknowledged that Americans had learned 
to accept increased government regulation because of the “threat of 
totalitarian Communism.” In a commencement address to students at 
New England College, she warned that unless Americans “plan[ned] 
skillfully,” they would “plan freedom into the ash can.” Helen Payson 
Corson, a dedicated writer of letters to the editor and political infor-
mation officer of Eastern Montgomery County [Pennsylvania] Repub-
lican Women, also found fault with congressional leaders who failed 
to see the danger in incremental losses of freedom. She argued that 
everyone had to protect their rights.12 These activist women chal-
lenged the American public, particularly women, to get involved and 
elect “persons of honesty and high integrity” to office. They believed 
this was the only way to keep creeping socialism at bay.13
In fact, one of the most consistent refrains among anticommunist 
women (besides “communism is evil”) was their encouragement of 
women to join their crusade. All women, anticommunists empha-
sized, needed to take action immediately; it was their responsibility 
to get involved. The Minute Women claimed that “it” (communist 
takeover) could “happen here” if Americans were too “smug.” The 
current level of resistance, they admonished, was “too little and many 
times too late.” “Wake up, women of America” they warned before 
offering the hope that “there may still be time, but none to spare!” 
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Doloris Bridges echoed this concern as she told her female audiences 
that they should “be constantly on guard” lest they allow themselves 
to be duped by enemies abroad or at home. Warning that there was “a 
constant subversive movement in this country,” Bridges encouraged 
the women she spoke with to “keep informed” about world events. 
Members of the American Woman’s Party (AWP), generally more 
vitriolic, repeated the mantra. Without immediate intervention by 
right-minded women, Americans risked “blundering into socialism.” 
Refusing to “give up what we prize the most,” members of AWP 
invited all women to join them in the quest to protect the “freedom, 
liberty and independence of these United States.”14
Some female anticommunists blamed men for the danger in which 
Americans found themselves. As mentioned, AWP writers explained 
that women had taken the lead because they were tired of waiting 
for men to act. “The blunders of politicians,” they wrote, had led to 
the current state of affairs, adding that “stupidity is no excuse.” The 
AWP asked men to “work with us” if they wanted their rights “as 
free men” returned to them. In frustration, Elizabeth Churchill Brown 
sometimes agreed with the AWP. As she struggled to fight commu-
nist influences throughout the United States, she was astounded by 
how “ineficient [sic] some of the business men’s groups are.” She 
wrote one of her favorite correspondents that “many of the rich men 
are so utterly stupid when it comes to politics and the Communist 
conspiracy.” Brown spread her scorn around. A few years later, she 
wrote the same woman complaining about “our armed forces men” 
who were not “junta minded” enough for her.15
Although the AWP and others implied that women must take up 
the slack from delinquent men, other female anticommunists argued 
that women had a duty to join the crusade against communism no 
matter what the circumstances. Congresswoman Bolton explained that 
“just being a woman [was] a responsibility” that necessitated involve-
ment in the larger society. The editors of New Mexico Women Speak 
chided all women, who, they claimed, had “more time on their hands 
today than ever before,” for squandering this opportunity. “Are you 
doing something constructive for America?” they wondered. (Obvi-
ously, they assumed their readers were middle-class housewives rather 
than poor or working women who did not have the luxury of excess 
time.) Margaret Chase Smith told members of the American Woman’s 
Association that women were vitally important to the body politic. 
Unfortunately, she added, three major barriers discouraged women 
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from being politically active: “(1) underestimation and lack of realiza-
tion of their latent power, (2) indifference to public life because of their 
admirable, understandable and traditional roles of homemakers, and 
(3) the opposition of men to women in public offices.” Women had to 
overcome these obstacles to protect the American way of life. During 
this dangerous time, women as well as men needed to be vigilant in 
protecting their beloved communities from destruction.16
Taking their cue from earlier generations of activists, anticommu-
nists found that one way to overcome the barriers Smith listed was to 
incorporate women’s role as homemaker into their call to participa-
tion. Earlier in the century, Jane Addams and other Progressive-era 
women reformers had argued that the male world of politics needed 
skills and talents only women possessed: an innate sense of morality 
combined with the ability to “clean things up.” These women used 
their knowledge of domestic chores to improve the living conditions 
of their neighbors around settlement houses and cloaked their chal-
lenges to government officials in feminine promises of “sweeping 
away corruption.” Both the abstract and the concrete housekeeping 
provided women with a nonthreatening route to political activism.17
Postwar anticommunists utilized both the metaphorical and the 
real image of housework as a way to draw women into their move-
ment. Turning housework into a political act showed women that they 
could participate in the fight against communism without leaving their 
homes and families. For example, in an article written for Ladies Home 
Journal, Margaret Chase Smith asked women if they were “willing to 
get out [their] political broom and sweep clean?” Another activist, 
Leona Scannell, suggested that women lend a “hand to clean up this 
mess.” The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) encouraged 
women to dust their homes as a way to protect their families from the 
dangers of fallout.18 In all three instances, the boring, everyday chores of 
keeping house became invested with a greater significance. Sweeping, 
dusting, and general cleaning were transformed into political activi-
ties that would safeguard families from more than germs. Anticom-
munists used metaphors they knew women would understand and 
to which women could relate. At the same time, they implied subtle 
comparisons with the image of communist women who supposedly 
did not keep clean houses or do their own housework. Perhaps most 
important, the activists encouraged women to participate in their 




The best example of this glorification of housework can be seen in 
the actions of the FCDA. Created after World War II by the Truman 
administration, the FCDA was determined to turn the family into the 
frontline of defense against the communist menace. Many of the plans 
the FCDA made revolved around the housewife. She was the protector 
of the home; she was the one who stocked the pantry; she kept the 
house free of dirt, germs, and clutter; most important, she was the 
emotional center of the family, the spiritual leader. She would prove 
vital in helping individuals, the family, and the community survive 
a nuclear attack. To that end, FCDA officials worked hard to promote 
what historian Laura McEnaney called “atomic housewifery” through 
pamphlets, lectures, and magazine articles. According to this message, 
cleaning clutter would prepare the home for immediate evacuation, 
while dusting would free the home of possible radiation. Stocking the 
pantry and creating pleasant menus ensured that family members would 
thrive even if they had to live in a bomb shelter for a few days.19
Recognizing that he needed the cooperation of women, the pres-
ident appointed a woman, Katherine Howard, to head the FCDA’s 
women’s division and enlisted the aid of the General Federation of 
Women’s Clubs (GFWC). Government officials got more than they 
bargained for, however, as FCDA planners tried to turn theory into 
reality. Clubwomen, having read the propaganda and heard the 
speeches of Howard and others, assumed that they should be involved 
in planning the next stages of development of a civil defense plan. 
When FCDA administrators appeared to ignore them, club presidents 
organized their memberships into letter-writing brigades, putting 
enough pressure on the administration to force a meeting. The FCDA 
and its parent organization, the National Security Resources Board, 
appointed a woman to serve as a liaison to the clubs and called a 
general information meeting to inform them of their actions and plans. 
According to McEnaney, this was not what the clubwomen wanted, 
and they demanded more input into FCDA policies. When that did 
not happen, they met on their own to devise their own recommenda-
tions. They refused, in McEnaney’s words, to allow “themselves and 
their contributions [to be] marginalized.”20
Similarly, anticommunist leaders emphasized the importance of 
the housewives’ economic role, both as a means of fighting socialistic 
influences and as an indication of their power within their homes. 
Everyone, the anticommunists seemed to assume, knew the house-
wife’s most important role was managing the household budget. 
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Her abilities could make or break a family. Senator Smith, among 
numerous others, applauded this skill and challenged the govern-
ment to follow the housewife’s example. In her Ladies Home Journal 
article, Smith explained that “it would be wonderful if the budget of 
the Government could more nearly resemble the housewife’s strict 
household budget.” Her comment put complicated economic matters 
in terms almost every woman could understand.21 Smith also implied 
that even a simple housewife had the requisite knowledge to protest 
action taken by the government.
Similarly, activists used women’s role as mothers to draw them into 
political participation. Just as those on the Left brought their children 
to peace rallies or exploited a grieving mother’s pain to build support 
for their cause, anticommunists played on the guilt and sympathy 
of mothers to entice women into their movement.22 Anticommunists 
argued that mothers were the foundation of a strong America. Several 
organizations created pamphlets purporting to speak for the chil-
dren. One, produced by “Democrat and Republican Women United 
for MacArthur for President,” featured a somber mother cradling her 
child under the words “Our Country Needs Its Mother.” Another took 
this tactic further. The Maryland Chapter of the Minute Women of the 
U.S.A. sponsored a pamphlet titled “What Kind of Country Are You 
Leaving Us?” Written in the voice of a child, the text chastised readers 
for not doing more to preserve America. “We are smart enough,” the 
imaginary children chided, “to see what you are doing to the country 
in which we must grow up and support our family.” The pamphlet 
ended by asking, “aren’t you ashamed!” The obvious solution was to 
get involved in the fight.23
Anticommunist activists proudly boasted of mothers who had 
already taken the plunge. New York state representative Katharine 
St. George applauded the wives and mothers working to fight “the 
enemies at home and abroad.” At the same time, she encouraged them 
to continue to “explain to those in your immediate circles” the severity 
of the situation. “You are the ones,” she challenged them, “who can 
do so much to influence” your families and friends to stand up for 
America in its time of trouble.24
Further reinforcing mothers’ centrality to the cause, activists 
linked mothers’ “failures” to the weakening of the community and the 
spread of communism. In particular, they looked to working mothers 
as a group vulnerable to the Red influence. The Minute Women edito-
rialized that “of course, they [communists and fellow travelers] want 
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us [women] to go to work so they can take over the indoctrination of 
our children—making them into one-worlders and zombies.” Even 
if children were not fully converted to communism, the absence of 
their working mothers would weaken society by encouraging juve-
nile delinquency. Frances Bolton saw the problem as much more 
insidious. Working mothers constituted only part of the problem. 
She felt there was too much emphasis on material goods and getting 
everything done quickly. Women had gotten away from the old ways, 
such as breastfeeding, and this had led to feeblemindedness and other 
forms of mental illness—weaknesses that made people vulnerable to 
communist influence.25
Mothers who lacked knowledge of the evils of communism were a 
particular concern for activists. They represented at least two problem 
areas. First, as Doloris Bridges put it, “how much respect would chil-
dren have for an uninformed, inactive mother?” In the battle for chil-
dren’s souls, the mother must lead the charge. If she failed to earn the 
respect of her own offspring, how could she hope to protect them from 
the dangers lurking behind communist propaganda? Second, women 
uneducated in the ways of communism were susceptible to Red lies. 
Especially during periods of hostility, mothers without facts might fall 
for a communist ploy as exemplified by the poem “To the Mothers 
of America.” According to the conservative newsletter Freedom Facts, 
the poem, published during the Korean conflict by the “commu-
nist press,” played on maternal fears with lines such as “O from 
whose living breast he fed, Look! Your only son is dead!” Obviously, 
according to anticommunists, the communists hoped the mothers of 
America would be so upset that they would demand an immediate 
cease-fire, allowing the forces of evil to win. Anticommunists hoped 
that by exposing the subliminal message behind the sentiment, they 
could protect American women from falling victim to the ploy.26
In their use of the images of housewife and mother, activists 
worked to convince women that they had not just the duty but also 
the necessary skills to participate in the crusade against commu-
nism. A woman who thought of herself as “only a housewife” might 
be reluctant to join the struggle, arguing that she lacked the time or 
the ability to do anything of value. Anticommunists would counter 
that she possessed two powerful weapons that required little time 
away from her family. The first was her pen. As earlier generations 
of conservative women activists had found, letter writing gave 
women committed to remaining in the domestic sphere a means of 
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contributing their ideas and support to various causes. Women’s orga-
nizations hammered home the importance of this tool. In a 1953 news-
letter, the Minute Women leadership scolded any member who was 
not “writing at least two letters a week for the principles you believe 
in.” They had little tolerance for “citizens who believe in our form of 
government and want to keep it, but expect someone else to speak out 
for them.” Another women’s newsletter echoed the sentiments: “mrs. 
AmericA . . . WhAt is yoUr oPinion? Write, wire, Your Voice in Congress 
mUst be heArD!”27
Elizabeth Churchill Brown was one activist who not only practiced 
letter writing but worked to convince other women of its value. Liz 
Brown wrote to everyone, from local and national politicians to world 
leaders to housewives, seeking advice on how to become active in the 
anticommunist cause. Recognizing that she risked “being labeled as a 
‘letter writing mama,’ ” she forged ahead anyway, offering her mostly 
unsolicited advice and opinions on national and international issues.28 
She wrote the publisher of Scripps-Howard Newspapers a “disagree-
able” (her term) letter to ask him if it was his papers’ policy “to ridi-
cule anyone attempting to expose the Communist conspiracy and 
defend their country.” She used her typewriter to lecture numerous 
congressmen and senators on their shortcomings in regard to the anti-
communist cause. For example, she chastised John Marshall Butler for 
his actions following the 1950 Maryland campaign. Throughout 1963 
and 1964, as Barry Goldwater prepared to run as the Republican presi-
dential nominee, Liz wrote him at least six times, giving him advice 
on how to approach his campaign. Goldwater answered her letters 
personally, despite the fact that she told him not to take the time to 
write while he was in the midst of the campaign.29
Although Goldwater answered Brown’s letters, he never followed 
any of her suggestions or even acknowledged their validity. Other 
correspondents ignored her no matter how many times she wrote. No 
doubt, Brown irritated many people with her letters, but most, after 
all, were politicians who had to keep their constituents happy. But 
their attitude toward her was different than the one they displayed 
toward other constituents. Butler did not have to see her; he could 
have ignored her or written a standard reply. Goldwater did not have 
to answer her mail personally. Obviously, these men felt they owed 
her some level of respect. Whatever the reason, many of Brown’s 
correspondents tolerated and humored her in a paternalistic manner. 
What was most apparent, however, was the limited amount of influ-
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ence she and her letters actually had on their political decisions and 
actions.30
In her article “Women’s Place Is Under the Dome,” which appeared 
in Human Events in 1958, Liz urged women to educate themselves about 
the “ ‘great game of politics’ which must be played in the Capital,” to 
learn about the issues before Congress, and, most important, to write 
letters. Supremely confident that letters could affect policy makers, 
Liz encouraged women to organize their groups around this enter-
prise. By asking their representatives for information and sending 
back their own views, the women’s club members and legislators’ 
offices would learn about one another. Eventually, the “members of 
Congress will come to have a real respect for the work and the opin-
ions of the club as a whole, to say nothing of its influence back home.” 
She prodded women to push their involvement further by personally 
lobbying legislators to vote the conservative line. Challenging them, 
Liz announced that it was “up to the women of America” to defeat the 
“men in the Kremlin.” “Now” [italics hers], she demanded, was “the 
time for all good women to come to the aid of their country.”31
The women of the country seemed to respond. So many readers 
wrote to Human Events offering to subsidize distribution of the article 
to women’s organizations that the editors published a public notice 
about the costs and the efforts. Editor Frank Hanighen had orders 
for 6,000 reprints the first week; less than a month later, the number 
had climbed to 21,000. Other organizations and news journals took 
notice and asked Liz to do similar or follow-up features. Liz gloried 
in her success. She accepted speaking engagements and started 
thinking about founding her own group to channel the energy she 
had unleashed. Most important from her perspective, she believed 
all this support was “a good sign” for the future of the conservative 
movement because, as she wrote a friend, “I truly believe that on them 
[women] rests the hope of the world.”32
The second weapon women could wield without much effort was 
their vote. Voting correctly, activists argued, was the most obvious and 
easiest way for women to work against communism. Margaret Chase 
Smith informed readers of Ladies Home Journal that “failing to vote” 
was “un-American” because it indicated a “refusal to fight for and 
protect the American way of life, the American home and the Amer-
ican family.” Both the GFWC and the Minute Women emphasized the 
importance of voting. Following the 1952 elections, Minute Women 
president Dorothy Frankton wrote her constituents, praising them 
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for what they had accomplished during the campaign. She cautioned 
them, however, not to rest on their laurels. Having elected men whom 
they believed understood the dangers of communism, Minute Women 
now needed to “redouble” their efforts to make sure the new officials 
did their jobs. “Alert, patriotic women can be a determining force in 
the future of America if they will but take the time to make their wishes 
known,” she wrote. The vitriolic American Woman’s Party stated the 
notion more bluntly: “Men have ruled for 2000 years and will surely 
now give the American women a chance. . . . We will do well to let this 
just and kind power have full sway in this crucial hour when it is so 
desperately needed.”33
Leaders of women’s organizations were not the only ones to recog-
nize the potential power of the female electorate. During the 1950s and 
1960s, journalists, politicians, and activists frequently pointed out that 
women constituted a large voting bloc that could potentially control 
the outcome of an election. One ad claimed that “from 1948 to 1956, 
the number of women who exercised their right to vote increased 
by almost 40%.” In 1960, a Time author stated that women formed 
“the largest single element in the American electorate.” In 1966, while 
running for Congress, Doloris Bridges pointed out that 52 percent of 
all eligible voters were women. Female politicians and leaders often 
used such statistics to show women that they could make a difference. 
To encourage clubwomen, housewives, and mothers to exercise their 
franchise, activists pulled out the numbers to prove their point.34 They 
also took their voting responsibilities very seriously. Texas women, 
for example, garnered praise from their governor for their “untiring 
efforts” in helping turn out a record number of Texas voters in the 
1952 election.35
In addition to voting, women also felt more welcomed by the 
political parties. As discussed in Chapter 2, shifting economic and 
demographic circumstances following World War II created a large 
number of middle-class housewives with time on their hands.36 The 
Republican Party especially benefited from this female infiltration. 
According to historian Jo Freeman, “[P]artisan differences in class, 
education, and religion created a much bigger pool of women avail-
able to the Republican party than to the Democrats.” The traditionally 
working-class nature of the Democratic Party meant there were fewer 
Democratic women with the leisure time, educational background, 
and cultural impetus to volunteer for the party. As a result of their 
larger numbers, Republican women tended to be more organized and 
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therefore more successful at getting other Republican women to the 
polls. This helped the party on election day and continually replen-
ished the supply of new volunteers.37
The crusade against communism both helped to sustain and 
benefited from this pool of Republican women. Although most Amer-
icans professed to be anticommunists, the most zealous opponents of 
leftist ideas called the GOP their home. Moreover, because the danger 
from communism seemed so great, everyone, including those previ-
ously excused from political activities, was now expected to join the 
fray. This meant women could and should participate more fully in all 
aspects of party functions, since, to Republicans’ way of thinking, that 
would guarantee more soldiers for the fight. Activist anticommunist 
women thus found themselves appreciated and encouraged by their 
Republican colleagues. In addition, women dedicated to the crusade 
against communism welcomed the abilities and experience of Repub-
lican women volunteers who did not need to be educated about their 
right to participate in the political system. The relationship between 
the Republican Party and activist anticommunist women proved to be 
something of a vicious circle, with one spurring the other on to further 
action.
The increasing number of women involved in the political system 
encouraged female activists to believe it was time for women to 
take the ultimate step and run for office themselves. Representative 
Frances Bolton, one of only seven women who held a national office, 
told the audience at the Women’s Patriotic Conference on National 
Defense that women around the world were beginning to force their 
way into government. “Where,” she wondered, “are you all?” “Very 
much embarrassed” to learn about the greater number of female 
representatives in various European governments, Bolton challenged 
American women to “take the responsibility of tomorrow’s world.” 
Bolton’s colleague, Margaret Chase Smith, agreed that women needed 
to get involved, but she advised taking things slowly. She cautioned 
that women’s progress into the political realm required “unlimited 
courage and patient perseverance” on the part of female challengers. 
“It is true of any work or profession outside the home,” she explained, 
“that woman must be at least twice as good as a man in actual perfor-
mance to get anywhere.”38 She believed women were up to the chal-
lenge, but she wanted them to know what they were up against.
Smith understood firsthand the challenges confronting women 
trying to break into national politics. Following her husband’s death 
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in 1940, she decided to run for his congressional seat. In fact, because 
of the timing, Margaret ended up having to run in three elections in 
her first year in office. First, she had to win a special election to fill her 
husband’s vacant term; a month later she had to run in the Republican 
primary for election to her own term; two months after that she faced 
her Democratic opponent in the general election.39 Eight years later, 
increasingly frustrated with her inability to advance in the House 
power structure, Smith took the unprecedented step of running for 
the Senate. No woman had ever won election to the Senate in her own 
right without first having been appointed to succeed her husband. 
Nevertheless, Smith became the first woman to win election in 
1948.40
During her Senate years, as the Cold War raged around the world, 
Smith struggled to establish herself as a moderate but firm anticom-
munist. She could not, however, escape the prevailing gender stereo-
types. In 1950, when Smith issued her Declaration of Conscience, 
she insisted that it attacked McCarthy’s tactics and not the principle 
of anticommunism. Her explanations fell on deaf ears. The speech 
earned her the enmity of more rabid right-wingers and allowed her 
political enemies to use her gender against her. For example, Elizabeth 
Churchill Brown, using conventional male rhetoric, wrote an article 
in The American Mercury that mocked Smith’s supposed tendency to 
have her “feelings hurt” too easily. As one of her biographers pointed 
out, Smith’s colleagues even attributed their inability to pigeonhole 
her ideologically to her gender. Everyone knew it was a woman’s 
prerogative to change her mind, after all. Following her own princi-
ples rather than the party line, Smith frustrated old-line conservatives 
with her willingness to support social welfare programs, while her 
dedication to large defense budgets worried liberals.41
Smith was not the only woman candidate who struggled against 
gender stereotypes during the Cold War. Styles Bridges’s death in 1961 
presented his wife, Doloris, with a unique opportunity. Doloris clearly 
wanted, and to a certain extent expected, New Hampshire governor 
Wesley Powell to appoint her to fill Styles’s vacant seat.42 When Powell 
appointed someone else, she decided to run against the new appointee 
in the upcoming election.43 Bridges spent much of her time convincing 
people with contradictory notions that she deserved the job because 
she had the right experience and that they should vote for her because 
she was Styles’s widow. Combining her own employment in govern-
ment service with her years with Styles, Doloris claimed to have 
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twenty-five years’ experience in Washington. Moreover, as Bridges’s 
wife, Doloris carried “his respected name, which opens doors to those 
who can help our State and Nation.” Many people acknowledged that 
Doloris “had been the Senator’s closest confidante during most of his 
Washington career,” making her claims that she knew what he would 
or would not have done seem justified. Reporters pointed out that she 
was “considered politically astute.”44
She was astute enough to associate herself continually with her 
husband’s name, record, and philosophy. In fact, Doloris’s platform 
closely resembled many of Styles’s views. Echoing Styles’s assertion 
that the fight against communism constituted a “third world war,” 
Doloris warned her constituents that America faced “the greatest chal-
lenge in its history—a fight with godless communism.” In dramatic 
tones, Doloris again attacked John F. Kennedy’s anticommunist 
stance. “This is your money, not his private fortune,” she told audi-
ences, complaining that the United Nations was doling the money out 
to countries that had “consistently voted against us.” Moreover, the 
money was also going—“hold your breath, girls,” she warned—“to 
Cuba!”45
Bridges’s gender also proved problematic for some of her constit-
uents and colleagues. Although many people seemed to agree in prin-
ciple with one supporter who believed the “women of New Hamp-
shire” constituted the “solid backbone of the Republican Party,” they 
frequently had a difficult time adjusting to the reality of a woman 
running for office. They could not seem to get away from traditional 
stereotypes about women. Some newspaper editorials conceded that 
Bridges was “the most attractive of the candidates” but found her 
qualifications for the Senate “grossly” inadequate. Other reporters 
could not escape the image of women candidates strictly as wives. 
Columnist Drew Pearson’s article “The Influence of Women in U.S. 
Politics” characterized the women he mentioned as spoilers who 
threatened the power of several influential politicians. Marriage, he 
seemed to conclude, is the only way “women [should] influence poli-
tics and presidents.”46
Newspaper publisher William Loeb, Bridges’s most fervent backer, 
seemed also to have a difficult time dealing with her gender. Early in 
the campaign he wrote to Margaret Chase Smith asking for advice. He 
explained to the senator that he had never had “the occasion to help 
a woman candidate for the Senate.” Smith did help in a limited way. 
She met privately with Bridges and offered “suggestions and advice” 
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for dealing with her situation. Loeb, however, could not forget that 
Bridges was a woman, commenting at various times that she should 
“trim her claws” or “keep her chemise on,” comments he obviously 
would not have made about a man. He also worried about her appear-
ance, advising her to be “a little more dowdy” so as not to appear 
threatening to other women or sexually enticing to men. Declaring 
that the shorter skirts women were wearing were “ugly,” he warned 
Bridges that they were too distracting to men, who would think of 
her as “Legs Bridges,” something that “certainly wouldn’t help the 
campaign!” Still, he recognized that Bridges’s feminine charms could 
be an asset, especially when she spoke to important men who “liked 
women.”47
When Doloris did not win her election, she did not give up on poli-
tics. Instead, she went on the offensive, demanding a recount of votes 
and charging her opponent with improper election practices.48 In 1966 
she again ran for the Republican nomination to the Senate. Interest-
ingly, in stark contrast to her 1962 campaign, this time she consciously 
used her gender. At a time when many middle- and upper-class white 
women were beginning to consider themselves oppressed, Bridges 
cited oppression of women in attacking her enemies. In the same year a 
group of liberal women created the National Organization for Women, 
Doloris attacked Lyndon Johnson’s Democratic administration for its 
“callous disregard for women.” Her willingness to shift with the times 
did not accomplish her goal. She still lost the nomination.49
What is perhaps most interesting about these anticommunist 
women was not that they faced considerable problems running for 
office during the Cold War but that they kept trying. Although they 
recognized that they faced an uphill battle, they believed in their abili-
ties and their right to do what they felt needed to be done. Phyllis 
Schlafly, another unsuccessful office seeker, explained it well in a 
letter to publisher Henry Regnery: “I apologize for the long delay, but 
I am sure you understand that I was busy trying to save the Repub-
lican Party.” These women felt compelled to enter political races to 
save their party and their country from what they perceived to be 
imminent danger. They understood the odds but willingly faced them 
anyway.50
Whereas some women such as Smith, Bridges, and Schlafly 
braved the national political scene, practical issues inspired others to 
get involved. In particular, economic concerns motivated many. Mrs. 
Warren J. Le Vangin wrote to the editors of Newsweek in response to an 
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article on Margaret Chase Smith, commending them for presenting her 
“intelligent and common-sensed opinion.” Smith was “an ex-house-
wife,” who understood how frustrated women were with paying 
“more for items (from potatoes to sheets) than these items are worth.”51 
From landlords to farmers to housewives, women across America 
complained about the state of the economy. The Minute Women listed 
the desire for “economy and efficiency in government” as one of their 
basic principles.52 Many Republican women spoke in general of the 
need for fair taxes (or no taxes), protection of free enterprise, and limi-
tations on the rights of unions. They saw a direct connection between 
what they perceived to be increased socialism in government and 
poor performance in the economy. Thus, any economic problems they 
experienced could be blamed on communist forces.
Rather than discuss the economy in general, many newsletters and 
speechwriters focused on specific examples appropriate to their audi-
ences. Mrs. M. Conan declared President Truman “most inhuman” 
for his willingness to continue rent control. Giving the normal pattern 
of criticism an unusual twist, Conan portrayed landlords affected by 
Truman’s policies as orphans and widows.53 Later in the year, her 
attention shifted to even more sinister plots. Since, she explained, the 
Soviets were “preparing for war,” Americans needed to stop “strip-
ping” the country by destroying food and to increase production to 
stockpile food in preparation for the coming invasion. She had partic-
ularly harsh words for the “grower-hogs” who “would rather destroy 
their stuff than sell for lower prices.” Obviously, in her worldview, 
farmers were not part of the victimized class of landowners.54
Interestingly, government intervention in local and family matters 
also bothered successful chicken farmer Christiana Uhl, producer of 
The Farmer’s Voice, a newsletter she ran as a “hobby.” Determined 
to discover what was “happening to our freeDoms which God gave 
us,” Uhl used her newsletter to discuss agricultural legislation, taxes, 
profit margins, and the price of farm products. She was particularly 
concerned about the increased regulation farmers faced. She saw this 
as part of a larger problem involving government waste of taxpayers’ 
money. In fact, she frequently published stories designed to show the 
evils of government taxation. In November 1958, she reported the 
actions of women in response to the government’s seizure of a farm-
er’s tractors for his failure to comply with government policy. The 
women “held up a bed sheet with lettering done with lip stick reading 
‘This is Communism in Action.’ ” Justifying the women’s protest, she 
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explained that “Social Security and the Wheat law are both Marxist 
laws which do not belong in a Christian Civilization.”55
In another story, Uhl implied that government agencies were under 
the influence of foreign powers and specifically threatened women. 
Titling the story “Six Men Try to Scare Women,” Uhl described Social 
Security officials, “some apparently foreigners,” who had threatened 
to jail an Amish farmer for failure to pay a sixty-seven-dollar debt. 
According to the account, the “snarling” men “became angry and 
milled around the house most of the day” until they “way-laid” the 
farmer and grabbed his horse. These stories frightened readers by 
purporting to show evidence that communism had made inroads into 
the U.S. government. The incidents described showed readers that the 
threat from communism-socialism was not just an abstract ideolog-
ical-political question for intellectuals and politicians; it was a danger 
to their very livelihood.56
More than just farmers needed to be afraid, according to these anti-
communist women. Doloris Bridges told a newspaper reporter that 
housewives were struggling to make ends meet. “Respectable, proud, 
working Americans” could not afford the “fantastic food prices,” 
she explained; meat had become a luxury in which they could not 
indulge. Why was this happening? The U.S. government, according to 
Bridges, had become more concerned about the welfare of the rest of 
the world than with that of its own citizens. She argued that dedicated 
Americans deserved to be “the first consideration.” Helen Corson also 
indicted the government for the economic problems Americans faced. 
She broadened the scope of the danger, however, by showing upper-
middle-class professionals how they were affected. In a speech to the 
Conshohocken Rotary Club, she blamed inflation and taxes for taking 
money out of the pockets of hardworking Americans. “Extravagances 
and waste in Federal Government” intensified the situation. Both 
women implied that the real culprit in the economic difficulties regular 
Americans faced was the leftward swing of government policy. A 
return to “true American principles,” always vaguely defined, would 
solve the problems.57
Warnings about the economic situation continued through the 
1960s. Doloris Bridges, in her 1966 Senate campaign, explained that 
“the government may not have to worry about balancing its budget, 
but housewives do. . . . They know bread and butter costs are getting 
out of hand.”58 Taking advantage of the periods of recession and infla-
tion that undermined the overall prosperity of those years, anticom-
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munist women hammered away at their audiences’ worries, always 
connecting the problems with leftist policies. This proved an effective 
strategy for a number of reasons. Speaking to people who had expe-
rienced the Great Depression, the women found an audience easily 
incited by threats of an impending economic crisis. In addition, the 
focus on monetary issues made their arguments appealing to women 
across the socioeconomic spectrum. Both working-class and suburban 
women worried about the stability of their living situations; middle-
class women wanted to “keep up with the Joneses,” and working-class 
women desired middle-class status. Poor women, who desperately 
needed economic assistance, were beyond the scope of the anticom-
munists’ concern. In addition, many of the activists were fiscal conser-
vatives who disliked the New Deal and resented Eisenhower’s contin-
uation of its policies throughout the 1950s.
Finally, speaking of issues such as grocery shopping and house-
hold budgeting made the anticommunists’ argument more accessible, 
especially to female audiences. Women who might otherwise not 
have cared about communism or creeping socialism paid attention 
to discussions of their economic future. A worldwide international 
conspiracy probably interested them less than their own struggle to 
maintain a household. If someone had an explanation for why this 
seemed so much harder than it had been for earlier generations, some 
women felt they should listen. The home was their domain.
The trick for politicians was to turn that worry and frustration 
into action. Smith, Bridges, and members of the American Woman’s 
Party expected and hoped women would put their practical wisdom 
to use for the good of the country. As Smith repeatedly told audi-
ences, “[T]here has been too little of the home in the Government and 
too much government in the home” (italics hers). The way to fix the 
problem was for women to become more actively involved in politics. 
The leaders of the American Woman’s Party agreed. Men, they wrote 
into their platform, would “profit by woman’s acceptance of her 
political responsibilities.”59 Again, the argument worked two ways. 
Inciting women to political action based on their experience with 
household budgeting did more than gather votes for those politicians; 
it also reinforced the idea that women could and should get involved 
in politics without abdicating their positions as wives and mothers. 
Everyone, it seemed, would be well served.
Businessmen of America, who also recognized the power women 
held over the purse strings, vigorously supported this plan. In the 
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1950s world, men earned the money and women spent it. Since many 
purchases revolved around the family and the home, most men and 
women saw this consumer role as an extension of housewifely duties. 
An advertisement for S&H Green Stamps explained that “[l]ike every 
other American woman [your wife] is constantly on the alert for any 
idea, product or service that will improve her family’s well-being.” The 
ad further stated that a woman’s “interest in good government [was] a 
reflection of her concern for her family.” Being a good consumer, then, 
meant that women made their families’ lives more comfortable while 
also protecting them from the evils of the world. J. Warren Kinsman, a 
manager for DuPont, bluntly told his female audience that they were 
“managers of destiny . . . perfectly positioned to fight socialism.” They 
could do this by teaching their children “the values of individualism 
and of personal freedom.” They could teach these lessons even as 
they shopped. Once again, the housewife’s importance as both home 
manager and political activist was intertwined.60
In addition to fears about communist influence on the economy, 
anticommunist women were particularly worried that the U.S. public 
education system provided an opening for communism to seize hold 
of the United States. They believed young children’s minds were 
vulnerable to communist lies and manipulation. Youngsters must 
be protected from anything or anyone who might confuse them and 
make them question the American way of life. Many conservatives 
feared the schools’ growing influence on their children. They looked 
nostalgically back to the days of “the little red schoolhouse” without 
seeing the limitations of that era. Ignoring the class and racial biases 
of those “golden days” (most of which continued to exist), they talked 
of the importance of parental control over their children. They feared 
that a publicly funded and controlled education system would indoc-
trinate their children with “progressive” ideas, which parents did 
not like. Conservatives feared sex education would be in and school 
prayer would be out. Communists and progressives, anticommunists 
warned, could use classroom time to undermine American principles 
by turning children into little socialist automatons.61
As a result, anticommunists attacked public education from 
numerous angles. Starting at the top, some anticommunists scrutinized 
school board members to ascertain their loyalty to U.S. principles. In 
cities such as Houston, Texas, school board elections turned into bitter 
battles over “creeping socialism,” since the board made crucial finan-
cial decisions that determined the tenor of the entire school system. In 
107
Women Arise
1952, the election of four school board members almost eclipsed the 
presidential election in generating voter interest. Although compli-
cated by other factors such as the division of power within the school 
administration and pressure from local business leaders who wanted 
to retain their influence over the board, Red Scare issues dominated 
the campaign. Conservatives accused liberals of allowing “progres-
sive educational” ideas into the schools and contaminating Houston 
children with anti-American rhetoric. They also worried that liberals 
welcomed federal monies, and thus federal interference, in what 
conservatives believed should be local educational policy. Liberals 
pointed out the dangers of blind loyalty and overzealous patrio-
tism, all the while trying to defend their reputations and protect the 
school’s curriculum from too much censorship. In the end, the people 
of Houston elected two conservatives and two liberals to the vacant 
seats. As historian Don Carleton explained in his book on the subject, 
the results indicated that Houston’s grassroots population seemed 
less affected by the Red Scare than did the power elite who manipu-
lated it to their benefit.62
The following year tensions escalated as anticommunists, with the 
Minute Women in the lead, succeeded in ousting Deputy School Super-
intendent George Ebey. Ebey proved the perfect target for anticom-
munists in Houston. A graduate of Columbia University’s Teachers’ 
College, Ebey was, in anticommunists’ view, therefore connected to 
the “progressive education” taught there. A New Deal Democrat, he 
had supported Roosevelt throughout the 1930s. A believer in racial 
equality, he had insisted that the California chapter of the American 
Veterans’ Committee, which he chaired, sponsor a “racial and religious 
cooperation week” and lobby for an end to discrimination in public 
housing. Ebey’s background set off countless alarm bells among anti-
communist Houstonians, including the Minute Women. He appeared 
to represent everything they hated in the postwar world, everything 
they believed threatened their way of life. He would teach, they feared, 
liberal, communistic ideas to their children and force good white chil-
dren to go to school with black youngsters. Furthermore, he was an 
outsider, from New York and California of all places, who would not 
understand the Texas way of doing things. From their perspective, he 
had to be eliminated.
Working with other right-wing forces in Houston, the Minute 
Women investigated Ebey’s career before he moved to Texas and scru-
tinized his every action once he settled in the Lone Star State. Not 
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surprisingly, since they were willing to accept innuendo and hearsay 
as truth, they found what they were looking for. Ebey did believe in 
racial integration in the schools (although he never promoted that idea 
in Houston), he did try to introduce new ideas into the school system, 
and he had been a New Deal Democrat. The Minute Women grabbed 
their pens and mounted an intensive letter-writing campaign to news-
paper editors, legislators, and, especially, school board members. 
When the board met to vote on Ebey’s contract renewal, the Minute 
Women were there en masse ready to clap or boo as warranted. Under 
intense pressure, the board decided not to renew Ebey’s contract. 
With considerable help from the Minute Women, Red Scare forces 
succeeded in running an able administrator out of town.63
Even as the Red Scare ebbed and Americans appeared less 
consumed by threats of the communist menace, conservative anti-
communist men and women continued their crusade. For example, 
in 1961 a group of anticommunists in southern California organized 
a recall election of a school board trustee they found objectionable. 
The trouble had begun when the man in question invited a member 
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to speak in his back-
yard. Recognizing that the ACLU did not condone the activities of 
many anticommunist investigations, including McCarthy’s, anticom-
munists saw this as evidence of the trustee’s own leftist ideas. Orga-
nizing a grassroots campaign, they succeeded in forcing his ouster. 
Women again played an essential role in this effort. They held infor-
mational meetings in their homes, went door to door with petitions, 
and prepared numerous handbills to distribute. Although their names 
did not appear in newspapers as spokespersons, their participation 
proved crucial.64
Other anticommunists turned their attention to the teachers and 
librarians who influenced what children heard and read. Teachers 
found themselves under intense scrutiny as parents and community 
members worried that educators might use their influence to intro-
duce “dangerous” ideas to their pupils. For many anticommunists, 
any book, lecture, or curriculum that criticized the United States in any 
way or that portrayed the Soviets or Chinese in a positive light was 
subversive. Teachers who refused to kowtow to external or internal 
examinations of their backgrounds or classes frequently paid a steep 
price. In New York City alone, 400 teachers lost their jobs during the 
1950s as a result of security issues. Dismissals occurred throughout the 
country, in areas from Philadelphia to Los Angeles. University profes-
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sors as well felt the pressure to follow the American line unquestion-
ingly or risk losing their tenure.65
Librarians also came under close watch. Controversy divided a 
quiet Pennsylvania community when a Quaker-controlled library 
refused to fire a librarian who had appeared before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Internal Security. Mary Knowles, the librarian in question, 
first appeared before the committee in 1953. FBI mole Herbert Phil-
brick identified Knowles as a party member who had been secretary 
of a school assumed to be associated with communism. After Knowles 
took the Fifth Amendment during her hearing, her current employer, 
the Merrill Memorial Library in Massachusetts, fired her. The library 
committee that operated the William Jeannes Memorial Library in 
Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, hired her, first on a temporary and 
later on a permanent basis. Despite considerable controversy, the 
library committee refused to fire her. For its stand, the library received 
a $5,000 grant from the Fund for the Republic. Because of disagree-
ments within the community, the money remained in an escrow 
account for years. Eventually, the Senate committee recalled Knowles; 
again, she refused to name names. This time they cited her for contempt 
of Congress, and a judge sentenced her to 120 days in jail.66
Throughout the controversy, anticommunist women worked 
actively to force her dismissal. Mrs. Philip Corson, as she signed 
her materials, led the way. As part of her “Citizens for Philbrick” 
campaign, she sent out flyers and pamphlets explaining the story 
again and again to the citizens of her community, as well as to inter-
ested parties around the country. She almost always emphasized that 
the majority of both the Quaker community, which had sponsored the 
library, and the larger group of non-Quakers living in the area did not 
support Knowles. Although she understood that the original hiring of 
this “5th Amendment User” had resulted from committee members’ 
ignorance of “communist double dealing and trickery,” she neverthe-
less believed they had been “unwittingly reckless and unmindful of 
the public welfare” in allowing Knowles to continue in the position. 
She followed a two-prong strategy to eliminate Knowles. First, she 
sent copies of letters, newspaper editorials, and pamphlets to a wide 
range of people who belonged to the conservative group Alerted 
Americans. She encouraged the members to read the material before 
passing it on to someone else.67
Her second line of attack involved a letter-writing campaign. Not 
trusting her readers to write the letters themselves, she made it easy 
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for them. She wrote the note and left a blank place for them to sign. 
She even included a dotted line showing them where to detach the 
letter and send it off. The letters would eventually wind up in places 
ranging from the office of the Society of Friends in Plymouth Meeting 
to the attorney general of the United States. When Knowles was 
sentenced to jail, Corson wrote to the local paper. Even though she 
had achieved her goal, Corson issued a warning about all the talk of 
“so-called ‘civil liberties or rights.’ ” This false concern, she explained, 
was “secretly directed” by the communists “with the deliberate inten-
tion of creating dissension and strife” among Americans.68
If anticommunists were worried about librarians and teachers, it 
followed that they would also investigate the reading material avail-
able to young people and their elders. Recognizing the potential of 
the written word to challenge people’s perspective, many anticom-
munists rid libraries of any book that did not follow their narrow view 
of acceptable material. As one activist put it, “Books Are to be feared! 
They have caused revolutions in both past and recent history.”69 Books 
promoting communism and socialism obviously came under attack. 
Anticommunists wanted to expunge from libraries anything written 
by someone they suspected of leftist leanings as well as books that 
encouraged questioning of American policy or challenged the “grand 
narrative” of U.S. history. Novels and monographs that cast Christi-
anity in a bad light were also declared off-limits. Book banners scanned 
libraries across the country and throughout the world. Joe McCarthy 
held hearings to investigate the Overseas Library Program and sent 
two of his most trusted aides to examine the contents of American-
sponsored libraries in Europe. Roy Cohn and David Schine visited 
libraries and searched for objectionable books, which McCarthy then 
pressured the State Department to remove from the shelves. Across 
the country, other would-be investigators followed his example.70
In Marin County, California, a housewife led a crusade to rid the 
local school of books she and other anticommunists found objection-
able. Discovering that the book list circulated by English teachers at 
Drake High School contained some authors she found suspicious, 
Anne Smart sprang into action. She began by more closely examining 
the list. She found twenty-four authors who had been named by state 
or federal agencies as communists or members of communist-front 
organizations. To analyze the situation further, she visited the school 
library to see if she could check out the books. In the process, she 
randomly pulled off the shelves other books that shocked her further. 
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She went “looking for anti-government material” and found “filth 
and immorality.” Because she believed it would be a waste of time to 
contact the school board directly, she made her accusations public in a 
letter to the local newspaper. When the school board still did not act, 
she contacted the local district attorney who presented the matter to 
the Marin County grand jury. The jury did not act on the case to her 
satisfaction, so she decided “that a little public noise might be helpful.” 
Consequently, she sent copies of her own newsletter, the Leader Sheet, 
to over 200 community leaders.71
Smart’s strategy worked, although she was not completely satis-
fied with the result. The grand jury heard the case and issued a report. 
The Special School Committee of the grand jury accepted that most 
of the books on Smart’s list had little scholastic value and “were defi-
nitely placed in our school libraries to plant seeds of communism in the 
minds of our children.” Although Smart found the committee’s agree-
ment with her gratifying, the recommendation to “kick the respon-
sibility upstairs” frustrated her. The jury decided that the blame for 
the situation rested beyond the school board at the state level, where 
the reading lists for all the schools were decided. The school trustees 
further infuriated her by allowing some of the books to remain on the 
list. She was determined, however, to continue the fight. She felt it 
was her responsibility to make the elected officials do their jobs and 
prevent communism from taking hold.72
Several years later she was still searching for the source of the 
list. She remained chagrined that her “hard earned tax money” was 
being spent so that children could have “the privilege of reading 
filthy obscene books.” She wanted to “teach our boys and girls . . . 
what our American culture is all about and then present the best in 
foreign culture.” Smart and others like her across the country saw no 
good coming from denigrating anything about America. Doing so, in 
their view, would only open the door to seeds of doubt and then to 
communism.73
Finally, some anticommunists looked on a broader level at national 
organizations and the media, which they felt led parents and children 
astray. Distrusting outsiders in general, anticommunist activists feared 
the national boards of even such homey institutions as the PTA had been 
subverted by communistic ideas. Numerous newsletters throughout 
the 1950s and early 1960s warned parents of the dangers hidden in the 
bulletins and directives issued by the PTA’s National Congress. One 
appalled parent argued that some of the material distributed by the 
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PTA would turn readers into “suitable citizen[s] for atheistic Commu-
nism’s world government.” Another activist called the PTA informa-
tion kits “Brainwash Study groups” and applauded her community’s 
ability to ignore the “[r]ules laid down by the National Congress.” 
Others charged that the national PTA officers’ “unorthodox and high-
handed management . . . Socialist orientation in domestic and foreign 
affairs, and the hypocrisy of hiding PTA’s political motives under the 
caption ‘child welfare’ ” threatened to ruin the entire organization.74
To counter this threat, anticommunist leaders encouraged parents, 
and members of the community in general, to become more actively 
involved in their schools. Bella Dodd, a “truly reformed communist,” 
according to Helen Corson of Alerted Americans, warned members of 
the Barren Hill, Pennsylvania, PTA that “Communists have infiltrated 
education at all levels.” The solution, she told the parents, was to rely 
more on “local common sense than on advice from the top.” In other 
words, parents had to be responsible for their children’s education and 
guard against insidious influences even in the classroom. The Minute 
Women agreed. In their national newsletter they reprinted an article by 
John Crippen, praising his town’s success in avoiding struggles with 
the school board. He explained that the parents “met frequently with 
our educators”; thus, all were of the same mind-set. He announced 
that “the National Education Association and many of its departments 
stand indicted in the court of public opinion.” He implied that only 
the efforts of individuals acting within their communities could stall 
the spread of socialism.75 Audrey Plowden, a contributor to The Spirit, 
also agreed. She encouraged parents to “start your own educational 
program at home.” This would “counteract or neutralize the liberal 
education” promulgated by the public schools and turn children into 
mini-anticommunist crusaders. “Consider the odds,” she wrote. “One 
teacher, 10 informed conservatives. . . . Start today to turn the tide 
through the leaders of tomorrow, our children.”76
Worries about the state of education troubled both male and female 
anticommunists. Both genders participated in efforts to retain control 
of their children’s education and to keep progressive and commu-
nistic ideas away from the schools. Sometimes men organized and 
led the crusades; sometimes women did. Women played a crucial role 
in the education struggles in Houston, Los Angeles, and other areas. 
Their strength could be measured by the level of fear they aroused. In 
both cities, conservative groups succeeded in unseating school offi-
cials accused of having leftist ties. These victories galvanized activists 
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to make further attacks on teachers, newspapers, and local politicians. 
No one in Houston or Los Angeles doubted that these women had 
power. Similarly, no one seemed to doubt that they had any right to 
be involved in this issue.
Obviously, then, female anticommunists actively participated in 
the battle against the encroachment of communism at home. Believing 
wholeheartedly in the cause, they searched for any evidence that 
communists might be making headway in undermining the American 
way of life. They appeared not to recognize any areas as off-limits to 
their investigation. Like their male colleagues, they looked for Red 
influences in politics, economics, education, entertainment, and the 
arts. They might have deferred to men as spokespersons or leaders, 
but they also assumed that their own actions played an important role 
in protecting their homes and families.
Male anticommunists seemed to appreciate women’s efforts for 
the cause. They welcomed female help in letter writing, organizing 
petitions, hosting fund-raisers and educational meetings, showing up 
at protests and demonstrations, and performing clerical duties. They 
sometimes condescendingly acknowledged that women’s participa-
tion was essential to keep the communists away. Usually, they praised 
women’s actions but described the women themselves as housewives 
or household managers or mothers. In some ways, they appeared 
to treat women as one more tool to be used in the crusade against 
communism.
What neither the men nor the women seemed to see was that 
women’s actions shaped the way anticommunism was perceived by 
the general public. Through their newsletters, club memberships, 
rallies, and letter drives, anticommunist women succeeded in edu-
cating and then mobilizing large numbers of previously inactive citi-
zens. Their persistence transformed suburban housewives into polit-
ical operatives. They might have willingly deferred to male politicians 
on occasion, but in their everyday activities women made the key 
decisions. Club presidents and advisory boards decided on speakers 
and projects; individual women mounted campaigns and led letter 
drives to remove individuals they found suspicious. They might have 
appeared to accept the domestic ideal, but their actions redefined it at 
every turn.
In encouraging women to join their political effort, activist 
women utilized anticommunist rhetoric to explain many of the social 
challenges of the day. It was far easier for many middle-class white 
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Americans to think of the emerging Civil Rights Movement in terms 
of communist subversion than to acknowledge the persistence of 
racism. The ramifications of middle-class women choosing to work to 
increase their families’ consumption of material goods appeared too 
frightening and far-reaching for a society that professed to hold to an 
ideal of female domesticity. It was better to blame the communists for 
seducing women into the workforce. Fearful of an education system 
that might invite students to challenge the existing value structure, 
Americans saw the Red menace rather than intellectual enlightenment. 
Conservative Republicans in particular found this strategy useful in 
their quest to gain political power. Democrats and even moderate 
Republicans, they argued, were, perhaps unconsciously, allowing 
communistic-socialistic influences to transform the U.S. government 
from its Christian, democratic roots into a sinister clone of the Soviet 
Union. Obviously, right-wingers emphasized, these fellow travelers 
must be stopped.
Using anticommunism to further a broader right-wing agenda 
proved an effective tool for conservative anticommunist women. 
Since the American public saw communism as a great evil, they 
accepted women’s participation in the fight to stop it. If, then, commu-
nism posed not just a political challenge but a social one as well, this 
expanded the area of women’s political involvement. Women could 
become more embedded in the political system in ways that seemed 
“normal” to the vast majority of the public. Additionally, women’s 
efforts helped expose the U.S. electorate to the goals and rhetoric of 
the broader conservative movement. Women became key players in 
the evolution of the Right.
115
“Manly Men and the little WoMan”
“Manly Men and the little WoMan”
Gendered images underlay much anticommunist rhetoric, rein-
forcing the idealized social structure advocated by conservatives and 
providing potent language for attacking their opposition. A strong 
man supporting and protecting his family and the little woman 
contentedly caring for her children and home represented a social 
order most Americans found desirable. Anticommunists, however, 
imbued those images with political meaning. In their scenario, the 
happy family members symbolized perfection of the American way 
of life and proved the superiority of democratic, capitalistic, Chris-
tian Americans over the communistic, totalitarian, atheistic Soviets 
and Chinese. At the same time that they reflected all that was good 
about America, they also served as a bulwark protecting Americans 
from the evil in the world. As a result, these images not only had to 
c h a p t e r  f i v e
Gender and anticommunism
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be recognized as the ideal, but they had to be reinforced continu-
ally to preserve the American system. If any part of these safeguards 
weakened, anticommunists warned, the communists would have an 
opening through which to poison the rest of America.
Gendered images could also serve as an effective method of 
attacking anticommunists’ domestic political opponents. Although 
Democrats also utilized gendered symbols to undercut their enemies, 
conservative Republican anticommunists perfected the art. For these 
right-wingers, gendered language was a natural by-product of their 
political ideology. Traditionalist conservatives had always empha-
sized the importance of a stable family in which women were submis-
sive to their husbands, free enterprise advocates desired a limited 
federal government that stayed out of local affairs and family matters, 
and anticommunists warned that free love instead of marriage would 
follow a communist takeover of society. Consequently, anticommunist 
activists moved easily from using gendered imagery and language in 
their battle against communism to utilizing the same tactics against 
their Democratic adversaries.
The shifting realities of the postwar world provided anticommu-
nists with fertile ground to plant the seeds of their concerns. Various 
historians have pointed out that the trauma of the Depression and 
World War II undermined traditional familial and gender relation-
ships, creating anxiety as people adjusted to their new roles. At war’s 
end, a tremendous desire to reverse the changes of the previous 
decades encouraged an emphasis on domesticity among both men 
and women. Not surprisingly, although men and women worked hard 
to maintain the illusion that they were living up to these domestic 
images, they violated the rules at every turn. Many men found their 
new jobs boring and resented the pressure to conform. Women, even 
middle-class women, joined the workforce or occupied themselves 
outside the home with volunteer work.1
The apparent sexualization of U.S. society further upset the 
middle class. Suddenly, it seemed sex was everywhere: in the movies 
(Marilyn Monroe’s sex kitten characters), in books (Peyton Place, for 
example), in music (Elvis Presley’s gyrating hips). And it was not just 
“normal” sex. The government’s attempt to purge gays and lesbians 
from holding office had the unintended consequence of causing people 
to talk about homosexuality in the open. Alfred Kinsey’s reports on 
human sexuality, published in 1948 (Sexual Behavior in the Human Male) 
and 1953 (Sexual Behavior in the Human Female), exposed the truth that 
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Americans were sexually active and adventurous. Refusing to accept 
the reality of a transformed social order, many people emphasized the 
importance of the heterosexual, nuclear family. A lack of conformity to 
that ideal, anticommunists warned, could lead to all sorts of problem-
atic behaviors, including experimenting with radical ideas.2
Confusing the situation further, some experts argued that too 
much domesticity could also be bad. In particular, some “authorities” 
followed the lead of Philip Wylie, who in his book Generation of Vipers 
blamed society’s problems on what he termed “momism.” Although 
the book was originally published in the early 1940s, the shifting 
gender roles of the postwar years gave Wylie’s theories new validity. 
Wylie and his cohorts argued that mothers were smothering their 
sons, raising boys to be weak physically and mentally. This would 
explain why there were so many homosexuals and why American men 
seemed so weak and willing to conform. In anticommunists’ view this 
constituted a real danger, since such men would easily succumb to the 
temptation of communism.3
An emphasis on the right balance of domestic ideals and social 
conformity, combined with the fear that both homosexuals and 
communists seemed to be increasing in numbers and influence, 
created what historian K.A. Cuordileone called a “crisis in American 
masculinity.” The image of the rugged American male conquering the 
frontier single-handedly had given way to “the man in the gray flannel 
suit” doing the bidding of his wife and boss. Reinforcing this concern 
about weakening masculinity, Alfred Kinsey’s Sexual Behavior in the 
Human Male reported that one in three men acknowledged having 
had at least one homosexual encounter. The confusion resulting from 
the mixed messages men (and women) received about their true role 
in society intensified the fear that America was under attack from all 
manner of perversion.4 Anticommunists eagerly exploited this fear 
to build support for their struggle against communist infiltration by 
emphasizing that “real” men knew their place in the world and were 
determined to fight to preserve it.
Women continually heard the message that their place in the home 
was vitally important not just for their families but for all of society. 
Even as men challenged women to participate in the political system, 
they reemphasized the importance of women staying in their proper 
role as homemakers. The men failed to recognize that by inviting 
women to join the anticommunist cause, they were undermining the 
very vision of American life they were desperately trying to protect. 
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FBI director J. Edgar Hoover stressed the role women as homemakers 
and mothers—a very important career—should play in fighting 
communism. In 1956 he told attendees at the annual convention of 
the National Council of Catholic Women that women constituted “the 
basic source for pressures for peace and security” in America. He 
encouraged them to “make their contribution by raising their voices 
to preserve the American way of life.”5 Similar to the Republican 
Mothers of the early republic, women, some men argued, could best 
serve their country by teaching and supporting their husbands and 
sons.
Much of their ability to play such a role, some male anticom-
munists explained, resulted from the fact that women were guided 
by their emotions rather than their intellect. Writer and philosopher 
Russell Kirk stated the problem for women explicitly. Women, he 
wrote in The Intelligent Women’s Guide to Conservatism, were naturally 
conservative in part because they knew society was “a spiritual thing, 
founded upon love.” He hoped his book would help conservative 
women “defend with their minds what they already sense through 
their hearts.” In other words, women should use their dedication to 
tradition, morality, and family to improve humanity as a whole. To 
that end, he had written his book as “simply” as he could so women 
could understand and use the information.6 Once again, the image 
conservative anticommunists presented was one of a woman who 
was not as smart as a man but whose natural affinity for home and 
family could and should be used to work against the evil that existed 
in society.
Other anticommunists emphasized the threat communism posed 
to the important relationship among women, the home, and the 
American way of life. The Reverend Billy Graham warned in a 1948 
sermon that communists wanted to “destroy the American home.” 
Since “a nation is only as strong as her homes,” that would spell the 
end of the United States. Maine senator Owen Brewster agreed that 
women had to do whatever was necessary to protect their homes and 
their way of life.7 The authors of Good Citizen, a pamphlet designed 
to accompany the Freedom Train—a mobile exhibit of U.S. political 
artifacts aimed at promoting patriotism—obviously thought so. They 
depicted “the home as [the] cradle of Republican virtue” and placed 
women squarely in the middle of it. American women, the authors 
reassured readers, would not be tempted by such dangerous ideas as 
abandoning home and family for a career, as communist women had 
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done. The housewife contentedly surrounded by the latest gadgets 
became a powerful symbol of America’s superiority.8
Richard Nixon’s performance in Moscow in 1959 epitomized the 
use of the housewife as Cold War weapon. During a debate with Nixon 
in a model kitchen, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed 
the superiority of the Soviet system by comparing U.S. and Russian 
homes. Mocking the American claim that families could buy a new 
home every twenty years, Khrushchev boasted that Russians did not 
need to change dwellings because they constructed their homes to 
last: “We build for our children and grandchildren.” Nixon, the anti-
communist, could see no better existence for women than keeping a 
perfect house and pointed out the different appliances available to 
aid the American housewife by lessening her workload. Khrushchev, 
the communist, convinced that women should not be accomplices 
in creating successful consumer industries based on free enterprise, 
dismissed him with the remark, “We don’t think of women in terms of 
capitalism. We think better of them.” The rest of the argument devel-
oped along similar lines, with the two men trying to confine their 
competition to the family home rather than broadening it to include 
the nuclear arms race.9
Nixon continued the same theme that evening in the address 
that opened the first U.S. Exhibition to be held in Moscow. Hoping 
to capture the hearts and minds or at least the eyes of the Russian 
masses, as well as the votes of Americans tuning in to the broadcast, 
Nixon bragged about the number of U.S. families who owned their 
own homes, televisions, and radios. He went on and on about the 
amount of goods the “average American family” could buy in a year. 
Obviously, these facts indicated, at least to Nixon and the listening 
American audience, that capitalism—which provided families with 
such an abundance of goods—was vastly superior to communism, 
which did not. What the Soviet audience, much less the Soviet masses, 
thought about such a claim was not recorded.10 Americans, however, 
clearly understood that as long as women could stay at home, caring 
for their families and using all the new equipment available to them, 
the American way of life was secure. Any change in that routine would 
undermine the entire structure of the country.
This image of domestic—and fully equipped—bliss contrasted 
sharply with the anticommunist version of life under communism. 
In a world under Red control, Americans would be forced to adopt 
a type of cooperative lifestyle that upset Americans committed to 
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individualism. For example, in one issue of The Spirit, the “women’s 
magazine men read,” the editors reviewed a book by Charles Seely, 
who had, according to the editors, “impressive qualifications to speak 
to and for the Defenders of Liberty.” A retired naval commander and 
American Legion member, Seely wrote Russia and the Battle of Liber-
ation to describe the “new Russian system” in which husband and 
wife share the housework or have someone else do it: “Meals may be 
obtained from the central kitchen, or may be prepared in the family 
apartment, but patronage of the central kitchen is encouraged.” The 
editors sarcastically interjected comments about the “new way of 
describing communal living.” Even Seely’s description of mothers 
having paid time off to nurse their infants at their jobs warranted a 
mocking “[t]hat’s nice” from the editors.11
Another anticommunist newsletter reported on the Congress of 
American Women (CAW), a left-wing organization, and warned that 
it threatened to disrupt women’s lives. The group noted with horror 
CAW’s call to set up cooperative units to “ ‘free the housewife from 
isolation,’ [and] to set up cooperative child care committees, coopera-
tive sewing, and canning committees on a neighborhood basis.” At a 
time when American society treasured the image of a doting mother 
giving her all to her children and husband, this group activity reeked 
of laziness, boded ill for the children, and raised questions about what 
women were doing in their spare time.12
Anticommunists warned that communism would lure women 
away from their husbands, children, and domestic responsibilities 
and into the working world of men. A pamphlet prepared by the U.S.-
backed International Confederation of Free Trade Unions explained 
that Soviet women were labeled “selfish,” “unproductive,” and lazy if 
they chose to stay home and care for their children.13 Francesca Rhee, 
wife of President Syngman Rhee of South Korea, had one explana-
tion for why this was the case: women had to work because all the 
men were in the army. Others, however, saw more devious motives. 
The women had chosen careers over motherhood, an idea shocking 
in itself. Worse, however, was the notion that the Soviet and Chinese 
governments forced women to assume jobs traditionally labeled 
“man’s work.” The communists deceptively called this equality and 
freedom for women. Catherine Caradja, an exiled Romanian princess, 
patiently explained to her American audience that “[t]he equality for 
women in a Russian controlled state is an absolute equality. . . . [T]he 
women . . . do not have any protection customarily reserved for the 
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female sex by nature or by any of the gallant traditions.” The Minute 
Women of the USA used plainer images: “Does anyone think for a 
minute that the Russian women under Soviet Rule want to dig ditches 
and work on the railroad? Could the separation from family and the 
indignities and hardships of communal living in Red China be by 
choice on the part of the women?” Obviously, the Minute Women 
thought they could not. Making things worse was the knowledge that 
the Soviets forced these women to work to increase their chances of 
successfully taking over the world.14
Communists’ emphasis on working women shocked American 
women for a number of reasons and attracted new adherents to the 
anticommunist cause. The idea of women being compelled to join 
the workforce appalled white middle-class men and women, who 
cherished women’s “freedom” from the world of paid labor. Anti-
communists argued that although communists said they were giving 
women equality with men and freeing them from enslavement to 
their husbands, the truth was far different. Desperate for workers 
after the devastating losses during World War II, the Soviet govern-
ment had called upon women “to fill the gap” in achieving industrial 
and agricultural recovery. In short, anticommunists liked to explain, 
“Soviet women have been freed from ‘slavery’ to husbands, but they 
have been plunged . . . into a slavery to the state.” The organiza-
tion of Business and Professional Women, in particular, pointed out 
that “this emancipation” had resulted in only a few female “minor 
executives.” Most women laborers performed more menial and back-
breaking tasks such as “bricklaying, hod carrying [sic], and street 
sweeping.”15
Second, anticommunists emphasized the kind of work communist 
women were supposedly forced to perform. They usually described 
women engaged in hard, physical, monotonous drudgery such as 
digging ditches, cleaning streets, or working in factories or on farms. 
In the United States, immigrants, minorities, and working-class men 
and women took care of these tasks. Even the possibility that middle-
class white women might be thrust into the gutters to pick up trash or 
driven onto the assembly line was enough to give many U.S. women 
nightmares. In other words, it was less the notion of women working 
than the kinds of jobs communist women supposedly held that horri-
fied Americans.
When all else failed, anticommunists appealed to women’s vanity. 
If societal and economic arguments did not convince their audiences 
122
“Manly Men and the little WoMan”
that communism was harmful for women, some anticommunists fell 
back on traditional gender stereotypes. One newsletter produced 
under the auspices of Business and Professional Women explained that 
the “real expose of the communist attitude toward women’s equality 
. . . comes in the field of fashion.” The authors detailed that Russian 
women were so busy tending their families, their jobs, and party 
responsibilities that they did not have time to make themselves look 
feminine. In fact, the party discouraged “excessive grooming,” since 
it might take time away from women’s other duties. “The result,” the 
newsletter concluded in dismay, was “that styles are designed more to 
prepare women for masculine work than to make them attractive.” In 
fact, anticommunists emphasized, communist women risked losing 
whatever true femininity they had left. One historian noted the way 
U.S. News and World Report described women living under Soviet rule. 
Moscow, the author claimed, was a “city of women—hardworking 
women who show few of the physical charms of women in the West. 
Most couples stroll together in the parks after dark, but you see many 
more young women [stride] along the streets purposefully, as though 
marching to a Communist Party meeting.” Usually portrayed as ugly 
and mannish, communist women seemed always to be working in a 
dismal factory job.16
Having emphasized how de-feminizing communism could be, 
anticommunists pointed to the example of Ana Pauker, the foreign 
minister of Rumania and, according to Time’s editors, the “most 
powerful woman alive.” The magazine’s cover portrait of Pauker 
reinforced the masculine nature of communist women. Stout and 
stern, with steely eyes and a firm chin, she appeared angry, uncompro-
mising, and cold.17 Stories about her past spread through anticommu-
nist circles. The most infamous rumor was that this “brazen Commu-
nist turned her husband up to the dreaded Communist secret police 
and laughed as she watched him put to a cruel death.” Other anticom-
munists focused on her ambition and greed. After she gained office 
in Rumania, the story went, she allowed her people to starve while 
she indulged her own appetites. The antithesis of a maternal figure, 
Pauker became for anticommunists the example they needed to show 
how communism destroyed women and thus the family. Everything 
a woman was supposed to be, Pauker was not. She was cruel rather 
than kind, she was greedy rather than giving, and she had assumed 
a position of political power that was obviously beyond her abilities. 
Her true nature was fully exposed when the author revealed that she 
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had “followed the Russian armies into Rumania during the second 
World War.” After all, what kind of women were camp followers?18
Ironically, anticommunists could have used the reality of Pauker’s 
life (rather than rumor and innuendo) to emphasize their vision of 
communism’s impact on women. Pauker did have many characteris-
tics Americans associated with masculinity. She was intelligent, fiercely 
loyal to her beliefs, and ambitious. She left her children in a state-run 
home while she pursued her party duties. Imprisoned on numerous 
occasions for her political work, she was shot while trying to escape. In 
fact, contrary to persistent rumors, she was in prison when the Soviets 
rounded up her husband and exterminated him. Upon learning of 
his supposedly “traitorous activities,” she was stunned. Rather than 
collapse in grief and dismay, as Americans would have expected, 
however, Pauker took it like a man and continued working with the 
party that had murdered her husband. Her loyalty paid off, as she 
worked her way up the bureaucratic ladder until, in 1947, she became 
the most powerful woman in Rumania.19 The New York Times called 
her “the intellectual leader of the Rumanian Communist party and a 
key strategist in the government campaign to fix Rumania’s place in 
the Russian orbit.” Like many of her comrades, however, her reign of 
power was short-lived. By 1952 she had been arrested, imprisoned, 
and ostracized. She adamantly maintained her innocence against 
charges of “deviationism” until her death in 1960.20
Thus, based on the reality of her atypically powerful position, 
the word of disgruntled Rumanian exiles, and the investigations of 
at least one congressional committee, anticommunists turned Ana 
Pauker into a prime example of communism’s effects on women. 
Pauker was a mannish-looking woman who, according to American 
standards, seemed to display none of the “normal” feminine virtues of 
kindness, humility, and softness. Both an exiled general and a former 
princess toured the anticommunist speech circuit, continually rein-
forcing Pauker’s image as a dangerous leader. Her party affiliation, 
anticommunists explained, had stripped her of whatever femininity 
she had once possessed and turned her into just another communist 
dictator.21 For anticommunists, Pauker represented a prime example 
of the evils communism visited upon women: it had destroyed her 
womanly virtues and turned her into a ruthless communist robot.
Just as dangerous, anticommunists argued, were American 
women who allowed themselves to be tricked into believing Red lies. 
Anticommunists feared that unless women understood the dangers 
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of communism, they could be taken in by the slick lies and seduc-
tive tones of communist manipulators. Particularly vulnerable, they 
believed, was the “jaded society woman . . . looking for something 
different.” Enticed by the novelty, she had no real political and ideo-
logical motives for joining the party, and next year she would move on 
to something else. In the meantime, however, she would have “parted 
with a heap of folding money” that could be used for evil purposes.22
Muriel Draper was a fine example of such a case. According to the 
National Republic Lettergram, an anticommunist newsletter, this Amer-
ican woman, “well known in artistic circles as a pianist, a lecturer of 
sorts, and . . . at times . . . as a ‘patron of the arts,’ ” had become “bored 
and disgruntled” when her family lost some of its money. “Suddenly 
deprived of opportunities for the satisfaction of ego, condemned to the 
‘relative barrenness of life’ in the United States—shorn of her position, 
her importance, and significantly of her audience, artistic cliques—
she turned elsewhere for an outlet—to the pro-Soviet artistic circles in 
New York City.” The implication is clear: Draper was a weak woman, 
obviously without a husband or children to care for. All of her needs 
would have been fulfilled if she had just stayed in her proper place. 
Perhaps, they seemed to be saying, if she had been a real American 
woman, one who knew the meaning of housework, one who had a 
family of her own, she would not have fallen prey to the communists, 
who were using her for “their own shrewdly calculated, conspirato-
rial purposes.”23
As with Pauker, the truth of Draper’s life differed significantly 
from part of the anticommunists’ version. She did come from money, 
and she and her husband were “patrons of the arts” during their 
years in London. That lifestyle ended abruptly, however, because of 
her husband’s gambling and alcohol problems. Taking matters into 
her own hands, Draper divorced her husband and moved back to the 
United States. Forced to support her children, she found work as an 
interior designer and freelance writer. She returned to her interest in 
the arts as soon as she was financially able. She also became increas-
ingly politically active. Although she never joined the Communist 
Party, she greatly admired the Soviet experiment during its early 
years. During World War II, she served as chair of the woman’s divi-
sion of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. As such, 
she helped organize exchanges of information on women’s hygiene, 
child care, and maternal health. Following the war, she participated 
in the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF) meeting 
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in 1945. Subsequently, she helped found the Congress of American 
Women (CAW), the American branch of WIDF. Far from the lazy, rich 
woman playing at politics as described by anticommunists, Draper was 
a serious, hardworking single mother who fought for women all over 
the world. Her real story, however, played less well to middle-class 
and working women than the version in which her work with WIDF 
and CAW paved the way for communism to take over America.24
If, according to anticommunists, communism turned women 
such as Pauker and Draper into manly, unfeminine women, the 
Red disease would also, they warned, transform their male counter-
parts into “girly men.” In other words, men also had to meet certain 
gendered expectations. Prominent anticommunists such as Senator 
Joe McCarthy frequently characterized male communists in very 
feminine terms and described themselves as ultra-masculine. For 
example, McCarthy and his cohort accused Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, a favorite target, of fighting the communists by sending 
them “perfumed notes in a perfumed Harvard accent.” Such “powder 
puff diplomacy” would not begin to defeat the enemy. McCarthy 
explained to a Texas American Legion branch that “you can’t fight 
Communism with a silk handkerchief, in a delicate fashion.”25 
McCarthy almost always mentioned an article of Acheson’s clothing 
whenever he talked about him. By referring to the secretary’s “striped 
pants” or “silk handkerchief,” McCarthy treated Acheson the way 
the media treated women.26 (No matter how prominent the woman, 
the press always commented on her clothing before stating anything 
else.) Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson was another 
favorite target. Anticommunists frequently used gendered character-
istics to undermine Stevenson’s legitimacy with the American public. 
According to historian Cuordileone, conservative anticommunists 
mocked Stevenson’s name (calling him Adelaide), his vocabulary (he 
used “teacup words”), and his voice (at various times they said he 
“trilled” or “giggled”). Such insinuations did not help Stevenson in 
his presidential ambitions.27
These gendered characterizations took on added force because 
anticommunists increasingly equated homosexuality with commu-
nism. The merging of homosexuality with ideological radicalism 
resulted from the convergence of several factors. Defined as perverted 
and diseased, even by professionals, homosexuals spent much of their 
time hiding their true identities from their families and co-workers. 
The public assumed this double life made them especially vulnerable 
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to blackmail by communists looking for pawns. In addition, homo-
sexuals’ ability to blend into heterosexual society made them seem 
even more capable of deceit; they were already fooling most of the 
people in their lives. Most important, according to scholar Barbara 
Epstein’s study of the scandal magazines of the time, Americans 
equated homosexuality with communism because both were “spread 
through seduction.” Both groups played on innocence, particularly 
that of young men, and lured their victims into their web of perver-
sion. Once he had tasted the forbidden nectar, a young man “lost the 
will to resist.” Thus, both communists and homosexuals preyed on 
the weak and innocent to spread their message covertly throughout 
an unsuspecting society.28
Numerous groups and individuals reinforced the connection 
between sexual and ideological radicalism. Leading the way, the 
Senate issued a report in December 1950 warning of the danger of 
homosexual civil servants who lacked the moral backbone to stand up 
for American values. Others jumped on the bandwagon. According to 
GOP chair Guy Gabrielson, “sexual perverts . . . have infiltrated our 
government.” Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska told one jour-
nalist that homosexuals and communists were practically the same. 
J. Edgar Hoover characterized those who joined the Communist Party 
as “maladjusted” and “neurotic” seekers of sexual pleasure.29 The 
Lavender Scare, the government purge of homosexuals from federal 
offices, succeeded in ways the Red Scare never did. Although the 
FBI found few actual Soviet spies, it was able to force hundreds of 
men out of government service on suspicion of homosexual behavior. 
Because these dismissals were usually listed as “security risks,” it 
validated the anticommunists’ claim that Washington was riddled 
with evil and that they were successfully eliminating the problem. It 
did not matter to them if the evil was Red or Lavender.30 Moreover, for 
politicians, equating homosexuality with communism provided the 
added bonus of expanding their base of support. Even those uninter-
ested in foreign policy or who refused to worry about domestic spies 
might be outraged at the thought of sexual “perverts” running the 
government.
On the surface, utilizing gendered images suited anticommunists’ 
purposes perfectly. It allowed them to build support for their cause, 
to question the Democrats’ motives and actions, and to set themselves 
up as saviors of American values. In particular, it gave anticommunist 
women, portraying themselves as defenders of home and family, firm 
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ground on which to address international, national, and local affairs 
since few people questioned a woman’s right to be involved in such 
matters. Nevertheless, the use of gendered language posed complica-
tions for anticommunist conservatives. Reliance on dedicated female 
political workers might provide political candidates and politicians 
with reliable, intelligent, and committed assistants while undercut-
ting the anticommunist ideological adherence to the women’s place 
in the domestic sphere. Female anticommunists could be particularly 
vulnerable to male counterparts who used gendered language to deni-
grate women’s political positions or contributions. Finally, the political 
opposition, specifically individual members of the Democratic Party, 
could call on these gendered images to attack their conservative, anti-
communist, and Republican opponents.
Three case studies demonstrate the use of gendered images and 
language in specific incidents relating to the anticommunist polit-
ical campaign. The first concerns Joe McCarthy, his wife, Jean, and 
the controversy associated with the Maryland senatorial campaign 
in 1950; the second details Margaret Chase Smith’s Declaration of 
Conscience and the resulting firestorm; the last revolves around a brief 
statement by Doloris Bridges during the 1960 presidential campaign. 
Each case involved an important political challenge to committed 
anticommunist crusaders and the use of gendered language in either 
the attack or the defense of the anticommunist position. In each case 
the individual woman became almost incidental to the creation of 
the properly gendered images that clearly defined the result of the 
battle.
Joe and Jean McCarthy epitomized the gendered images anti-
communists preached. As a former boxer and Marine, McCarthy 
emphasized that it might take “lumberjack tactics” to rid the world of 
communism, and he, for one, was not afraid to use such tactics.31 Anti-
communist women helped reinforce McCarthy’s provocative image. 
Although they sometimes mentioned his weaknesses or flaws in his 
approach to fighting communism, they more often described him in 
very flattering terms. Sometimes, the description fit the romanticized 
picture McCarthy’s people tried to create for him. Doloris Bridges 
emphasized that he was a “Marine who was decorated for heroism 
in World War II,” yet he was “soft-spoken . . . and respected by his 
colleagues.” She could be describing most women’s dream lover. 
Elizabeth Churchill Brown saw him in more maternal terms; he was, 
she wrote in an unpublished book, “as friendly and awkward as a 
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St. Bernard puppy.” In other words, he was someone who saved the 
lost and was no threat to the innocent. Both women admitted that he 
might be a little overzealous in his quest to root out communism, but 
they did not believe that diminished the good work he did.32 These 
characterizations, however, did nothing to disturb the 1950s order of 
gender relations. Whether regarded as a lover or a friendly puppy, Joe 
McCarthy was still very much in charge, while Bridges and Brown 
dutifully played supporting roles. Thus, the women around McCarthy 
protected his reputation as a vigorous, heterosexual male.
Interestingly, Joe needed their support. The man who freely ques-
tioned his opponents’ sexuality faced gossip concerning his own. As 
he became more prominent, the rumors about his sexuality intensi-
fied. Journalist Drew Pearson, a bitter McCarthy foe, kept a file of 
accusations and names of McCarthy’s supposed homosexual partners. 
People all over the country sent Pearson leads on alleged witnesses 
and incidents. Although Pearson never published the list himself, he 
occasionally showed it to people who would leak word to the press. 
At one point Hank Greenspan, another journalist and McCarthy hater, 
used the material to write an article for The Las Vegas Sun. Implying 
that the senator’s bachelor ways were merely “window dressing,” 
Greenspan stated outright that “Sen. Joe McCarthy has often engaged 
in homosexual activities.”33
McCarthy’s association with Roy Cohn and David Schine added 
credibility to the accusations. Cohn and Schine traveled all over 
Europe together, supposedly investigating U.S. embassy libraries but 
also generating numerous rumors about the exact nature of their rela-
tionship. Their rude behavior and extravagant bills scandalized both 
Europeans and Americans. The relationship between the two helped 
lead to the Army-McCarthy hearings. When McCarthy attacked the 
army for harboring communists, the military establishment countered 
with accusations that Cohn had requested special favors for Schine, an 
army private. Connecticut senator William Benton, who led a “Stop-
Joe” movement in Wisconsin, wrote an associate that “these Cohn-
Schine-McCarthy rumors are everywhere.” McCarthy never consid-
ered dropping his association with the two, despite all the problems 
they caused.34
McCarthy and his associates did what they could to counteract the 
gossip and the presumed harm Joe’s alleged homosexuality would do 
to his carefully crafted image as a powerful male senator. He pointedly 
referred to the “crackpots” who spread lies about him. He told the 
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American Society of Newspaper Editors that “the Reds, their minions 
and the egg-sucking phony liberals” were responsible for the personal 
vilification he had suffered.35 His speeches almost always included 
allusions to his masculinity, especially highlighting his military 
experience and his brief boxing career. Friends from Wisconsin and 
supporters in Washington pointedly characterized Joe as a swinging 
bachelor who always had a pretty woman on his arm.36
Increasingly in the early 1950s, that pretty woman was Jean Fraser 
Kerr, who worked in his office. They dated off and on after they met 
in 1947. Although they came from different backgrounds, they shared 
a love of politics and a devotion to the anticommunist cause. From 
all indications, their relationship was stormy; both were opinionated, 
strong-willed, and ambitious. Stories about their pursuit of one another 
at various times, as well as their arguments and breakups, achieved 
legendary proportions around the McCarthy office. Although there 
were rumors that Joe saw other women, he always came back to Jean. 
After five years of this pattern, friends, aides, and the press wondered 
why the two did not marry, especially since they appeared to be in 
love with one another.37 McCarthy also had compelling reasons for 
getting married. Aside from the obvious political benefit of having a 
wife, a wedding would end, once and for all, rumors of Joe’s homo-
sexuality—or at least McCarthyites hoped it would.
Jean did more than shield her husband from gossip and innu-
endo. Like many other anticommunist women, Jean straddled the line 
between political activism and being a “normal” wife and mother. 
Throughout her relationship with Joe, she worked as hard as he did for 
the cause of anticommunism. She justified her participation, however, 
not just in terms of the imminent danger communism posed but more 
immediately in terms of helping her husband. In many ways, Jean 
personified the anticommunist woman who broke the stereotypical 
rules of feminine behavior, all the while maintaining the facade of a 
traditional wifely role. She even used her position as McCarthy’s wife 
to retain her place in the movement after his death. In fact, it became 
her second career.38
Jean’s willingness to assume a subordinate role and to help Joe 
maintain the gendered image anticommunists attached to men echoed 
the efforts of many anticommunist women of the time and reinforced 
those existing stereotypes. Such “normalcy” brought comfort to 
people frightened by the changes around them. Her actions seemed 
to prove that women who participated in the anticommunist crusade 
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were still women, despite their political activity. Just as her marriage 
to Joe quashed rumors of his homosexuality, so her acceptance of a 
behind-the-scenes role made her political work seem normal.39
Gender issues in McCarthy’s case, however, extended beyond the 
nature of his sexuality. Joe seemed to prefer utilizing committed, anti-
communist females as political operatives when it suited his purposes. 
Of course, these women should have been at home tending to the 
needs of their families, but, as we have seen, dedicated anticommunist 
women were frequently in the public sphere defending America from 
the threat of communism. In one instance, the 1950 Senate election 
in Maryland, McCarthy’s use of women was particularly effective in 
bringing about the defeat of a perceived weak link in the fight against 
the communist menace. However, in the investigation of McCarthy’s 
tactics following the election, the Senate investigators’ attitude and 
demeanor toward these women and McCarthy’s defense of them 
demonstrated the various ways gendered language could be utilized 
in pursuing a political goal.
McCarthy’s interest in the 1950 Maryland senatorial campaign 
originated from his antipathy for Millard Tydings, the Democratic 
incumbent in the race. Tydings had chaired the committee that had 
investigated McCarthy’s earliest accusations that communists had 
infiltrated the federal government. The committee ultimately rejected 
McCarthy’s indictments, leading the Wisconsin senator to claim that 
a Democratic whitewash had taken place and revealing Tydings to 
be less than a staunch anticommunist. McCarthy was determined to 
unseat Tydings in November. Caught between the pre- and postwar 
worlds, Tydings faced an uphill battle for reelection. Internal divi-
sions within the state Democratic Party, lingering resentment about 
a recently imposed sales tax that threatened consumers’ newfound 
prosperity, and a “blacklash” against Tydings’s typical southern white 
responses to civil rights legislation put him in a difficult spot that was 
only made worse by the continuing hostilities in Korea. Tydings’s 
opponent in the race was the newcomer John Marshall Butler, a 
McCarthy protégé.40
Numerous women played critical roles in McCarthy’s battle 
to assure Tydings’s defeat. One of Joe’s Maryland contacts, a rich 
Republican woman, suggested Butler as a potential, viable opponent. 
From there, McCarthy consulted Ruth McCormick Miller, editor of 
the Washington Times-Herald, who, through the auspices of another 
woman, Bertha Adkins of the Republican National Committee, intro-
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duced Butler to Jon M. Jonkel, a public relations expert. Jonkel ended 
up serving as Butler’s campaign manager and chief speechwriter. 
Facilitating these arrangements was Ruth Miller. Her office served as 
the original meeting place for many of the participants in the plan to 
unseat Tydings.41 Additionally, Miller raised considerable funds for 
Butler and personally contributed money during both the primary 
and general campaigns.42
Miller’s most controversial efforts for the campaign were centered 
around the much-discussed tabloid From the Record. At McCarthy’s 
request, Miller allowed her presses to be used to publish this four-
page newsletter quickly and relatively cheaply. Her staff worked on 
it, and her future husband, Garvin Tankersley, put together the infa-
mous composite picture that showed Tydings apparently in intimate 
conversation with Communist Party chief Earl Browder. Although 
Miller claimed to have had no direct part in composing or creating the 
tabloid, she was crucial to its eventual publication and distribution.43
Playing an even more critical role in the senator’s scheme was 
Jean Kerr, McCarthy’s administrative assistant, speechwriter, and 
future wife. In many ways, Jean’s role in the campaign sparked the 
most controversy, both because of her attitude and because it tied Joe 
so intimately to the Butler camp. Jean, by her own admission, worked 
very hard for Butler’s election. She provided his staff with an endless 
source of anti-Tydings material; she wrote a campaign biography 
of Butler; she carried money from McCarthy’s office and facilitated 
raising funds from his supporters; she worked on the tabloid, perhaps 
even writing some of the copy; and she helped orchestrate a postcard 
campaign to contact voters right before the election.44
In addition to these more prominent women, countless others 
were involved in key areas of the race. Running the office with Jonkel 
was Catherine Van Dyke, who began as a volunteer and ended up 
virtually second in command at Butler headquarters. Although, like 
Jonkel, she had no previous political experience, she learned so quickly 
and so well that she received job offers both before and after elec-
tion day.45 Wilma Lee similarly volunteered and learned her job as she 
went along. The wife of an associate of Joe McCarthy’s, Lee accepted 
responsibility for running the postcard campaign after her husband 
suggested her for the job. Her responsibilities included assembling a 
large number of volunteers, organizing their efforts, providing them 
with supplies, and gathering their finished products. Since Butler 
headquarters thought this was an important project, they devoted 
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a significant amount of money and effort to it. Thus, hundreds of 
women participated in the Butler campaign and shared the credit for 
his ultimate victory.46
When Tydings lost the election, he complained to the Senate that 
McCarthy had unethically, if not illegally, caused his defeat through his 
unwarranted intervention in the campaign. The Senate Subcommittee 
on Privileges and Elections, controlled by the Democratic majority, 
began an investigation and called many of the key participants in 
the election to testify. Interestingly, the men on the subcommittee as 
well as McCarthy’s supporters reacted to the women’s participation 
in much the same way. Primarily and most pervasively, they ignored 
evidence of the women’s valuable political skills and activities and 
acted as if they were simply employed in “typical” female roles. For 
example, almost all witnesses referred to Kerr and Van Dyke as secre-
taries, when neither had ever served in that capacity. Van Dyke could 
not even type.47
Equally enlightening were the committee’s responses to the testi-
mony of Van Dyke and Kerr. Tremendously loyal to their bosses and 
their cause, both women approached the committee with a certain 
animosity. Committee members, who as Democrats were less ideo-
logically wedded to the gendered images held by anticommunists, 
nevertheless treated the women with a level of restraint, courtesy, 
and tolerance that facilitated their ability to hide behind the facade of 
traditional female behavior. For example, after opening her testimony 
with a rather lengthy statement, Van Dyke chided committee counsel 
Edward McDermott for asking questions she claimed she had already 
answered. He pointed out that nothing in her remarks addressed his 
particular point. He continued, “I do not wish to quarrel with you. 
Let’s just visit back and forth about this matter.” Furthermore, McDer-
mott did not challenge Van Dyke when she denied allegations made 
by other witnesses that she had knowingly violated election laws by 
failing to record contributions. Rather, he merely accepted that she 
thought the record was “incorrect” and went on to something else.48 
Van Dyke denied involvement in the alleged crimes and challenged 
the committee’s political authority. Nevertheless, she had stayed 
within accepted parameters of female behavior, and the committee 
responded in traditional ways. Van Dyke played the retired school 
marm, chiding the sheriff, and McDermott responded by shushing 
her. All in all, he was very gentle with her. As a male Senate staffer, he 
did not want to affront Van Dyke’s female sensibilities with confronta-
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tional challenges when all that was necessary from a relatively unim-
portant female political operative was a “visit.”
The committee was less tolerant of Kerr. A dedicated believer in 
the evils of communism in general and of Tydings in particular, Kerr 
used her time before the committee to mount an offense as well as a 
defense. She attacked Tydings’s record, repeatedly insinuating that he 
was “pink around the edges.” Questioned about the validity of the 
tabloid From the Record and the authenticity of the composite picture 
of Tydings and Browder, Kerr vigorously defended both. She claimed 
they could have shown “much more damaging” evidence of Tydings’s 
treachery. She challenged Oklahoma senator A. S. “Mike” Monroney’s 
description of the tabloid as a “fabrication” and argued strenuously 
with Missouri senator Thomas C. Hennings about the “truth” shown 
in the picture. She even mocked Hennings’s own reelection campaign, 
stating that he and his opponent “pretty much complimented each 
other up and down the State.” Hennings’s frustration and dismay with 
her responses was obvious. When Jean argued that the tabloid could 
have painted a much more sinister picture, Hennings asked her who 
was the “sissy in this crowd who did not want the whole story [about 
Tydings] told”?49 Hennings’s comment both reinforced the stereotype 
of tough guy anticommunists and tried to strip Jean of her femininity, 
since she obviously was not the “sissy.”50
From an anticommunist woman’s perspective, Jean was doing 
what she had to do to fight evil. While committee members saw a 
woman who did not fit their stereotypical image of females, confronting 
male senators as peers, Jean saw herself as continuing in her normal 
pattern of fighting communism. Just as the editors of the American 
Woman’s Party newsletter and Elizabeth Churchill Brown had chided 
men for shirking their responsibilities, Jean chastised members of the 
committee for questioning her actions in the name of standing up to 
communism. Just as Brown and Schlafly willingly employed harsh 
language usually reserved for men, Jean adopted a belligerent atti-
tude toward both Tydings and the committee.
Her performance, however, had mangled the gendered image of 
anticommunist women, even publicly active female anticommunists 
such as Catherine Van Dyke. She was not acting like a proper lady. She 
argued, she fought, she mocked, she refused to back down. Perhaps 
most shocking, she proudly supported what the senators perceived to 
be unethical, if not illegal, behavior. In fact, she boldly stated that she 
had wanted harsher treatment of Tydings. When Hennings pushed, 
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she pushed back. He got angry with her but did not seem to know 
what to do when she not would retreat from her stance or appear 
apologetic. Ultimately, he had met his match, and he stopped ques-
tioning her. It was left to Margaret Chase Smith, the only woman on 
the committee, to calm the situation by returning Jean to her proper 
feminine role. Reminding everyone that Jean had an injured hip and 
would need to be protected from the press as she left the room, Smith 
restored Jean’s feminine vulnerability and reinforced her status as a 
“good little woman.” Nevertheless, the senators on the committee 
had clearly failed either to bully Jean into submission or denigrate her 
responses to irrelevancy.
The committee members used Jean’s involvement to tie Joe to the 
Butler campaign. In their final report, they stated that in participating 
in the Maryland race, she had “acted at his request.” This statement 
contradicted Kerr’s testimony. She had stated that she “was very, very 
much interested in the Maryland campaign and . . . had given the 
Butler headquarters research material that . . . [she] had assumed he 
would be using in speeches.” McCarthy might have approved and 
encouraged her, but Kerr acted of her own volition. That fact negated 
one crucial piece of evidence in the war against McCarthy. It was far 
better to assume that Jean, both as a woman and as an assistant in 
Joe’s office, could not and would not have acted except under his 
direct order.51
Jean’s actions in the campaign, her testimony before the com-
mittee, and the reactions of both her supporters and her detractors 
exemplified the complexity of the situation surrounding anticommu-
nist women. From all indications, Jean was an avid anticommunist 
and a willing participant in the Butler campaign. Although Joe might 
have instigated the involvement of those in his office, her zealous-
ness in working for Tydings’s defeat went beyond routine duty. Jean 
wanted to take action. As an anticommunist woman, she felt she had 
not only the right but also the responsibility to defeat Tydings. Her 
behavior before the committee reinforced this version of her actions. 
She was proud of what she had done to further the anticommunist 
cause. In the end, Jean Kerr had destroyed the stereotypical image of 
the female political operative and even the gendered image anticom-
munist women preferred in defense of America’s greatest opponent of 
the communist menace: Joe McCarthy.
The language of male committee members reflected their basic 
assumptions about women. Throughout the hearings, men on both 
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sides of the table referred to women, no matter how old or capable, 
as “girls.” This language, while demeaning of women’s role in the 
campaign, was not always used with political purpose, as it often 
reflected both colloquial usage and general stereotypes of female 
employees. Sometimes, this choice of nouns made the women seem 
less like young females and more like pieces of office equipment. 
McCarthy aide Don Surine dictated his statement to “the girl”; he then 
instructed “the girl” to make photostats of the statement, and then 
“the girl” got Butler’s address—all this despite the fact that he proved 
in his later testimony that he knew the names of all the women stenog-
raphers in the office.52 Surine appeared almost enlightened, however, 
compared to Jon Jonkel, the campaign manager. When questioned 
about the paid staff in his office, he admitted that he had trouble with 
the part-time stenographer’s name (he could not remember the exact 
pronunciation or spelling of her last name). The campaign later hired 
a second stenographer. He could not remember her name either, so 
he simply called her “cupcake.” Jonkel also could not figure out the 
responsibilities of his staff: he said Catherine Van Dyke, the woman 
who was his second in command, was a “taker-carer of almost anything 
that required any follow-through.”53 Playing down her political influ-
ence, he turned her into a glorified secretary.
In contrast, McCarthy, who had encouraged his female supporters 
in their actions on his behalf, employed with clear political purpose 
the same gendered language as his opponents to undermine the 
committee. McCarthy used the committee’s treatment of Kerr as an 
excuse to go after its members. “What I resent most in this report is 
the reference to a little girl who works in my office [emphasis added],” 
he ranted. “There are a lot of small, evil-minded people in this town, 
who are trying [to] smear this girl just because she works for me.” In 
the tradition of 1950s westerns, Joe turned himself into Gary Cooper 
protecting Grace Kelly from the evil gunslingers. How could anyone 
believe this “child,” in his words, was capable of doing the things they 
insinuated she had done?54
McCarthy was probably unaware of the ideological contradictions 
embedded in the Tydings affair. Like many anticommunist men, Joe 
accepted the support of his female compatriots. He willingly allowed 
them—in fact, encouraged them—to do the grunt work that needed 
to be done to achieve what he saw as the higher purpose—defeating 
Tydings. In many ways, however, he treated his female associates 
just like Surine and Jonkel did. His “girls” were one more piece of 
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equipment to be used in the crusade. He was clever enough to realize 
that he could employ the gendered language so integral to the anti-
communist message to pursue his own agenda. However, it was only 
a small step from gendered language to actually turning Jean into the 
child he had portrayed as threatened by the committee. He seemed 
not to recognize that his words diminished her as an anticommunist 
crusader, at the very time she was proving to be an admirable defender 
of him and his cause.
The response to Margaret Chase Smith’s Declaration of Conscience 
offers another example of the complex relationship between anticom-
munism and the language and image of gender. Although Smith tended 
to be more moderate than many of her fellow anticommunists, like 
most of her colleagues on the Hill she believed communism was evil 
and “must be rooted out.” She worried that the Democratic adminis-
tration was not doing enough about the problem. She explained to one 
constituent that she was “disturbed with the smug complacency that 
exists towards the growing threat of communism.”55 To counter that 
apparent indifference, she recommended that various steps be taken to 
mount an offensive against the enemy. At one point, for example, she 
“proposed the creation of a non-partisan commission to investigate 
communism in government.” She also introduced legislation to outlaw 
the Communist Party in March 1953; opposition from the Eisenhower 
administration, however, killed her bill in committee. When a colleague 
introduced a new internal security bill, Smith helped attach and steer 
through the floor debate an amendment outlawing the Communist 
Party. Recognizing the controversial nature of such an action, Smith 
defended her position in letters to her constituents and through her 
newspaper column. “Why talk about the evils of communism,” she 
asked, “if we are not willing to outlaw its sponsors?” The Communist 
Party, she argued, was not just a political party that deserved constitu-
tional protection. It was instead an organization that sought “to over-
throw our government by the use of violence and force and certainly 
by subversion.”56 She considered the danger very real.
Smith’s dedication to anticommunism involved a brief verbal 
altercation with Khrushchev himself. In response to her perception 
of President John F. Kennedy’s attempts to slow the growth of the 
nuclear arsenal, Smith gave a rare speech on the Senate floor casti-
gating the Kennedy administration for downgrading the U.S. nuclear 
deterrent. She accused the president of doing exactly what the Soviets 
wanted, since the Reds could possibly win a conventional war with 
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the United States. Questioning his courage, she condensed his move 
into simple terms: “In short, we have the nuclear capability, but not the 
nuclear credibility.”57 As reported in Time magazine, Nikita Khrush-
chev responded “shrilly’ to Smith:
Who can remain calm and indifferent to such provocative statements 
made in the United States senate by this woman, blinded by savage 
hatred toward the community of Socialist countries? . . . It is hard to 
believe how a woman, if she is not the devil in disguise, can make 
such a malicious man-hating appeal. She should understand that in 
the fire of nuclear war millions of people would perish, including 
her own children, if she has any. Even the wildest of animals, a 
tigress even, worries about her cubs, licks and pities them.
Time commented, “Back home in Maine, Senator Smith, a childless 
widow, shrugged off the blast.”58
Smith’s steadfast anticommunism did not blind her to the way 
some abused the issue for personal and political purposes. Concerned 
that investigations into anticommunist activities should be conducted 
as impartially and fairly as possible, she suggested that former Presi-
dent Herbert Hoover lead a new nonpolitical commission. She advo-
cated letting the Constitution be the guiding principle in the investi-
gation, lest the “American concept that a man is innocent until proven 
guilty” be “perverted” into its opposite.59 In particular, she was 
increasingly appalled by McCarthy’s behavior. Initially shocked by his 
accusations, she waited and waited for proof of his charges. She was 
disappointed that it never arrived. When his statements increased in 
number and his aim spread widely across the political spectrum, she 
waited for someone to do something to stop him. Knowing she was 
just a freshman senator and a woman, she felt certain that someone 
with more experience and power should and would challenge him. 
Democrats waited for the Republicans to rein him in; Republicans 
relished his attacks on the Truman administration and looked the 
other way at his abuses of his position.60
Smith finally decided something had to be done.61 After consulting 
with a select group of senators she felt she could trust, she wrote her 
“Declaration of Conscience,” which she read on the Senate floor on 
1 June 1950. Announcing that she wanted to speak about a “serious 
national condition,” she articulated her concern that America was 
headed for “national suicide and the end of everything that we Amer-
icans hold dear.” She spoke, she explained, as a Republican, a woman, 
a senator, and an American. Chastising legislators for abusing their 
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privileges and ignoring their responsibilities to the Constitution and 
the American people, she called on her colleagues to “do some soul-
searching” and examine their behavior. Smith bluntly addressed what 
she saw as the heart of the matter.
Those of us who shout the loudest about Americanism in making 
character assassinations are all too frequently those who, by 
our own words and acts, ignore some of the basic principles of 
Americanism:
The right to criticize;
The right to hold unpopular beliefs;
The right to protest;
The right to independent thought.
She worried that if people feared to “speak their minds” lest they 
be “politically smeared as ‘Communists’ or ‘Fascists,’ ” Americans’ 
freedom of speech would be destroyed.
She mostly blamed the Democrats for the situation. The Demo-
cratic administration had “failed pitifully to provide leadership” and 
thus had left Americans confused and fearful. Knowledge about cases 
of real spies frightened the public and left citizens with valid ques-
tions for the administration. When Truman and associates did not 
provide answers and seemed “complacen[t] to the threat of commu-
nism at home,” Americans became suspicious and paranoid. This 
attitude left them vulnerable to those who would use the real danger 
of communism for political and personal gain. She feared the nation 
would “continue to suffer as long as it [was] governed by the present 
ineffective Democratic Administration.”
The Republican Party, despite its own flaws, should, she stated, 
provide the necessary leadership to save America and American free-
doms. Drawing on images from Civil War days, Smith called on her 
colleagues to reunite the country as it had in the past. She wanted a 
Republican victory, but not at the cost of “political integrity and intel-
lectual honesty.” There were enough real issues on which to attack the 
Democrats, she cautioned, without resorting to innuendo and false 
accusations. Resorting to smear tactics would ultimately lead to the 
end of the two-party system and the American way of life. “Shocked 
at the way Republicans and Democrats alike” had played into “the 
Communist design of ‘confuse, divide and conquer,’ ” she longed to 
see Americans “recapture” their strength and unity. They needed, she 
explained, to fight the enemy, not one another.
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Interestingly for a woman who rarely mentioned her gender in 
her role as politician, Smith directly addressed the women of America: 
“As a woman, I wonder how the mothers, wives, sisters, and daugh-
ters feel about the way in which members of their families have been 
politically mangled in Senate debate—and I use the word ‘debate’ 
advisedly.” She obviously hoped to draw women into the debate by 
making them feel they were part of the situation. Her word choices, 
however, presented them as outsiders. Despite the fact that numerous 
women had been directly confronted by both McCarthy and other 
congressional investigatory bodies, she spoke only to women in their 
traditional role as homemakers who created a support system for 
men, the true political actors.
Smith’s speech posed a problem for anticommunist women. 
Although her speech attacked communism’s greatest opponent, 
McCarthy, there could be little doubt about Smith’s own anticommu-
nist credentials. The speech itself reinforced the importance of fighting 
communism. In particular, she encouraged women—as wives and 
mothers—to join the battle to defeat the enemy. She was doing what 
anticommunist women were supposed to do: take a firm stand against 
the spread of communistic ideas abroad and at home. If they criticized 
her for giving the speech, they would seem to undermine the very role 
they had chosen for themselves.
McCarthy, clearly the target of the speech even though his name was 
never mentioned, had listened in silence and left as soon as it was over. 
However, he soon made clear in gendered language that Smith’s speech 
was without value. According to one Maine newspaper, he refused to 
comment on the “spanking” he had received from Smith. “I don’t fight 
with women senators,” he sneered. At another point he labeled Smith 
and her co-signers “Snow White and the Six Dwarves.”62 In typical 
McCarthy fashion, he said one thing but acted in an entirely different 
manner. His condescending and sarcastic remarks about Smith’s speech 
were typical of his usual response to criticism. His restraint implied 
that her declaration was not worth commenting on and barely caused 
him a moment’s pause. She was a woman, after all, his words implied; 
what do you expect? In fact, however, his revenge, taken months later, 
proved that he was very angry at Smith. He had her removed from his 
Investigations Subcommittee without the courtesy usually accorded 
fellow party members and senators. The GOP, responding to pressure 
from McCarthyites, also tinkered with her committee assignments; in 
essence, she was demoted and exiled to “minor” committees.63
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Some of Smith’s constituents, as well as interested parties across 
the country, responded to the declaration in gender-neutral language. 
Newsweek editors noted that the senator’s colleagues “disapproved of 
her action on strategic grounds.” One constituent warned that Smith’s 
anti-McCarthy stance might force voters to retire her to a “nice warm 
corner next to the hearth.” Others were even more blunt. “Moscow 
must be very proud of you,” wrote constituent James H. Carroll. “No 
doubt,” he continued, “you will be disappointed if a citation is not 
forthcoming from the Kremlin.” An article in the Saturday Evening Post 
characterized her as part of the “Soft Underbelly of the Republican 
Party.”64 All these comments could as easily have been made about a 
male politician.
Most commentators, however, could not separate Smith’s actions 
from her gender. Her speech, according to constituent W. M. Jeffers, 
had obviously been written by a “schoolmam [sic] who used too much 
language.” How else, he seemed to imply, could she have said what 
she did? Carl T. Smith, another constituent, also seemed shocked that 
“a nice lady” like Senator Smith could be caught up in such a “dirty 
mess.”65 Journalist Elizabeth Churchill Brown, a friend of McCarthy’s 
as well as a fervent anticommunist, wrote condescendingly of “the 
little lady from Maine” who spoke “her piece” and “delighted” anti-
McCarthyites. In a book she drafted but never completed, Brown 
continued her scornful treatment of Smith. “No one ever knew,” she 
wrote, “precisely how . . . or exactly why” Smith gave the speech, 
since she was “unquestionably anti-Communist.” Referring to Smith 
as “Senator Maggie,” Brown turned her from a duly elected federal 
representative into a caricature. Brown further undermined Smith’s 
credibility by stating that she was “sensitive to attack—even some-
times anticipating an attack when none was intended.” Thus, Brown 
described Smith as a flighty, irresponsible woman who did not 
deserve the respect accorded “real” senators.66 Constituent Margaret 
Smith agreed with Brown. She found Senator Smith “too flighty—too 
gabby—too showofish [sic]” to represent Maine. Constituent Smith 
wondered who the senator was “trying to cover for” and thought she 
was “a complete flop as a senator.” In a letter to Newsweek in response 
to its story on Smith, Paul Clement likewise emphasized the senator’s 
feminine weaknesses. He accused Smith of thinking “that the busi-
ness of the Republicans is to drink tea and play Pollyanna.”67
Other critical commentators made Smith representative of all 
women. Viola Blumenstock, head of the Women’s Republican Club of 
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Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, scolded the senator for “acting like 
a spoiled child” and, in the process, “hurting all Republican women.” 
Because Smith reacted badly when she was feeling “dejected by what 
some man” had done to her, Blumenstock argued, she was making it 
more difficult for other women to win election to office. As Blumen-
stock explained, Smith was “Republican womanhood personified 
in Congress.” In other words, Blumenstock implied, Smith should 
expect this kind of treatment from men and ignore it, as most women 
did. Clara Aiken Speer, a member of the Federated Women’s Repub-
lican Clubs of Missouri, also felt Smith was setting a poor example. 
Claiming she had “always been an advocate of more women in 
government,” Speer found herself “grieved that you [Smith] repre-
sent your sex, your party, your state, and your American heritage so 
poorly.”68
Male co-signers of the declaration found their manhood ques-
tioned. An article in the Saturday Evening Post labeled the signers 
“sensitive” souls who were looking for something “to get mad about.” 
The author suggested that they do something more constructive with 
their anger than attack McCarthy. A pro-McCarthy pamphlet took a 
similar approach. The author, Kenneth Colegrove, called the declara-
tion a “curious [display] of self-righteousness” and an “act of affecta-
tion.” He postulated that the male signers had acted “at the behest 
of a lady Senator” and would soon regret their endorsement of her 
speech. Further impugning their masculinity, Colegrove described the 
participants as “too nice-minded” to “attack the problem” as a man 
would.69
The voices in support of Smith’s speech were almost as numerous 
as those in opposition. According to her biographer, Janann Sherman, 
Herman Wouk summed up the opinion of many when he wrote, “by 
one act of political courage, you have justified a lifetime in politics.” 
Many others were equally enthusiastic. The Chicago Sun-Times wrote 
her into the lexicon of American heroes, comparing her courage to that 
of the men who fought at Lexington and Concord. Margaret Frakes, 
in the Christian Century, claimed that if Smith “had done nothing in 
the Senate” but give her speech, “her claim on the gratitude of the 
American people would be secure.” Some constituents also wrote in 
support. Jim Glover congratulated her on saying “what a lot of people 
have been thinking.”70
Like Smith’s opponents, many supporters could not separate her 
words from her gender. Time titled its article about the declaration 
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“A Woman’s Conscience” rather than “A Senator’s Conscience,” as 
Frakes had done in Christian Century. Newsweek followed the same 
pattern, titling its article “The Lady from Maine.” In the article the 
author continually referred to Smith as “a woman” or “the diminutive 
lady” rather than as senator or simply “Smith,” as might have been 
done in discussing a man. Moreover, the author compared her rhet-
oric to “a broom sweeping out a mess,” further emphasizing her femi-
ninity. Both publications supported Smith’s speech, but their words 
indicated to readers that her actions should be viewed in terms of her 
gender rather than her political principles. Years later, Time referred 
back to the declaration as “Maggie’s most righteous indignation (and 
her finest hour in public life).” Even after she was nominated for pres-
ident in 1964, the national newsmagazine still treated her in a conde-
scending manner.71
Other supporters simply acknowledged her gender in offering 
congratulations. Elizabeth Cushing wrote that “women all over the 
United States . . . are proud of the fine record you are making in the 
Senate [and] . . . particularly proud of you since last Thursday when 
you had the courage to speak out” against McCarthyism. Taking his 
cue from her own characterizations in the declaration, Will Beale 
mentioned all her labels: woman, Republican, senator, American. 
He thought it was a “brave, precarious,” and important speech that 
brought “uplift and re-encouragement” to people looking for leader-
ship. In typical Yankee fashion, Maine resident Roland McDonald put 
the matter simply: “I think you are a god fearing honest woman.”72 
These letters, and many others like them, mentioned her gender but 
did not emphasize her feminine characteristics.
Some people could not help but recognize that Senator Smith 
had done what no man had been willing to do. Maine constituent 
Jack Cottrell wrote to “congratulate” her on the declaration. He also 
wondered, “[W]hy do some of these things that wear trousers have 
to be so timid for so long?” He seemed to assume that a man should 
have been the one to take the principled stand. Former Roosevelt aide 
Harold Ickes similarly recognized that while men had “caviled and 
equivocated and slandered,” a woman had led “the way back to the 
homely and decent Americanism we used to take . . . for granted.” 
Smith’s speech, he announced, “fully justified” women’s participa-
tion in politics. Ickes’s article, which appeared in The New Republic, 
certainly praised Smith. The need to justify women’s political partici-
pation thirty years after passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, 
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however, reinforced the fact that women were still outsiders in poli-
tics. Financier Bernard Baruch acknowledged this outright when he 
commented that if Smith had been a man and had made that speech, 
she would have been touted as the next presidential candidate.73
Smith’s speech sparked a variety of contradictory gendered 
responses. On the one hand, some people, including McCarthy, used 
her gender as an excuse to ignore her declaration publicly. Others 
used gender stereotypes to undermine the significance and impor-
tance of the address. Many anticommunist women searched for a way 
to disagree with the speech without undermining Smith’s duty, as 
an anticommunist woman, to act. They found the answer by concen-
trating on Smith as a particular kind of woman. She was weak, flighty, 
and too emotional. She did not have what it took to be a real anticom-
munist. On the other hand, men such as Connecticut senator William 
Benton, who had also spoken out against McCarthy, were ignored. 
Smith’s declaration at least received a national hearing, perhaps 
because she was a woman, the only woman in the Senate at the time. 
In a sense, the popular image of women as morally superior to men 
also gave her a credence a man might not have had. If McCarthy was a 
macho fighter, Smith was a stern mother. Above all, the episode illus-
trates the role of gender, gendered images, and gendered language in 
the political language of the early Cold War era.
One last example of the relationship between gendered language 
and anticommunist politics involves Doloris Bridges, the wife of 
Senator Styles Bridges. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Doloris 
Bridges chastised John F. Kennedy for his stand on communism. 
She did not say he was a communist; in fact, she thought that was 
an “absurd” notion. Instead, using his record as evidence, she cited 
his lack of intense feeling on the subject to condemn him. Comparing 
him unfavorably with Republican candidate Richard Nixon, who had 
“distinguished himself as an outstanding anti-Communist,” Bridges 
set out to prove that JFK was “very soft on Communism.” “Even 
when the issue was hot,” she explained, “Kennedy was absent and 
apparently uninterested when sound anti-Communist legislation 
reached the [Senate] Floor.”74 Senator Henry Jackson quickly accused 
Nixon of orchestrating the attack on his opponent. According to Jack-
son’s tortured logic, Mrs. Bridges would not have made the comment 
without clearing it with her husband; since her husband was one of 
Nixon’s top strategists, the accusation must really have come from the 
candidate himself, using his friend’s wife as a decoy.
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Jackson’s reaction to Mrs. Bridges’s speech was immediate and 
again reflected the difficult position in which anticommunist women 
found themselves. She had said nothing she and numerous other anti-
communist women had not said before. She was speaking to a group of 
women, making a typical argument. JFK and his staff ignored the situ-
ation. Her disapproval hardly constituted a threat to JFK’s candidacy.
Both Democratic national chair Senator Henry Jackson and Demo-
cratic state chair J. Murray Devine ignored Doloris and instead used 
the incident to indict Nixon and accuse him of weakness. Devine saw 
“tactics of desperation” in the speech; Styles Bridges did not dare 
make such “wild, reckless charges” himself, so he had his wife do it 
for him. Jackson was astounded that the Republicans had resorted to 
“hiding behind a woman’s skirts to launch the most vicious under-
handed attack imaginable.” Neither man gave Doloris a role in the act; 
she was simply the unthinking mouthpiece for her husband and his 
colleague. Both assumed that she, merely the wife of a senator, could 
not possibly have made the accusation on her own. According to their 
way of thinking, the men were using her to do their dirty work. Since 
the Democrats, as gentlemen, would not dare attack a lady as they 
would a male political opponent, Nixon could make the accusation 
public without negative political consequences.75
Most ingeniously, the Democrats had been able to insert their own 
use of gendered language, so frequently associated with their anti-
communist opponents, into the affair by using Bridges’s statement to 
denigrate the GOP candidate’s masculinity. Both men insinuated that 
Nixon was too frightened or weak to do his own fighting. The Repub-
licans, Jackson and Devine charged, hid behind their women to win 
the campaign. By taking this approach, the Democrats attempted to 
turn Doloris Bridges’s charge of softness back onto the Republicans. 
Ironically, some of Doloris’s supporters took the same approach. Using 
Senator Jackson’s remarks as further proof of Democrats’ “softness,” 
William Loeb of the Manchester Union Leader castigated the senator for 
“fighting with women.” The “viciousness” of his statement, Loeb felt, 
indicated just how worried Democrats were by the truth. The way 
Loeb worded his editorial, however, inferred more than just agree-
ment with Bridges’s statement. Loeb seemed to imply that Jackson 
was less than a real man because he was attacking a woman rather 
than waging war against the truly dangerous enemy.76
An editorial in the Washington Evening Star took Loeb’s insinua-
tions a step further. The author offered one reason for Jackson’s “irra-
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tional reasoning”: he was a bachelor. Implying that most “normal” 
men had wives, the editor hinted that Jackson was somehow less than 
healthy. Perhaps, he suggested, the senator’s statements might also 
have resulted from the “fevered imagination of a man who has no 
first-hand knowledge of married life.” The editorial not only called 
Jackson’s manhood into doubt but also, by implication, his dedication 
to the fight against communism.77
Thus, conservative journalists who supported Mrs. Bridges’s 
actions employed gendered language to make their point even if that 
language also belittled her and women in general. The Star editorial 
assumed that everyone would know that wives cannot be controlled 
by their husbands; the joke was that wives, and women in general, 
said whatever they wanted to and men had to put up with it. Loeb, 
however, went beyond gender stereotypes by praising her for having 
the courage to expose JFK’s “horrible voting record” when Nixon had 
been “tip-toeing” around the issue. Hinting that Nixon had been too 
easy on Kennedy, Loeb used Bridges’s statement to attack Nixon from 
the Right. “The tragedy” of the campaign was that Nixon had not 
directly confronted JFK on what Loeb thought was the truly important 
issue: the presence of communism in the United States and around the 
world. Instead, “it remained for Mrs. Bridges to point to the [voting] 
record.” Echoing Jackson’s remarks, Loeb implied that Nixon had not 
been “man enough to fight his own battles.”78
Male reactions to Bridges’s statements revealed much about 
the gendered nature of the political system. The Democrats, repre-
sented by Jackson and Devine, fell back on the traditional relation-
ship between men and women as well as the accepted role of women 
in election campaigns. Assuming she could not or would not have 
spoken her own mind, Jackson and Devine attributed her remarks to 
her husband and his associate. This assumption gave them a way to 
shift attention from her characterization of their candidate to the char-
acter of their political opponent. From their perspective, Nixon looked 
weak; he had a woman fighting his battles for him. Because this view 
conformed to the standard interpretation of gender characteristics—
Doloris as unwitting mouthpiece—it was easy to portray and accept. 
Regardless of whether they actually believed Doloris was merely her 
husband’s puppet, that image suited their purpose of undermining 
Nixon.
Republicans relied on traditional gender images as well in their 
counterattack, using the incident to their political advantage as much as 
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possible. To that end, they also utilized accepted gender stereotypes to 
attack Jackson and Devine. In questioning the Democrats’ masculinity 
and chivalry, Republicans assigned everyone traditional gender roles: 
real men fought only other men. Republicans could thus undercut the 
attack on their candidate by deflecting criticism back onto the Demo-
crats. Conservatives like Loeb used the same strategy to prod Nixon 
into a more forceful stance: if a woman had bravely stated a “truth” 
about Kennedy, surely Nixon should be “man enough” to do so.
Both sides ignored Doloris as an active anticommunist woman. 
She made the decision to make the comment; she wrote and delivered 
the speech to a group of like-minded activist women. All of that was 
lost as the men with power used her efforts to their own advantage. 
Doloris, like Jean Kerr and numerous other anticommunist women, 
overlooked the insult and concentrated on the larger picture of 
advancing the anticommunist movement.
Jean, Margaret, Doloris, and countless other women like them 
across the country willingly accepted and even helped create the 
gendered images so important to anticommunism. Like their male 
counterparts, they saw them as an essential ingredient in the fight 
against communist forces. The image of the strong man with the 
helpful woman at his side reassured an American public confused 
and frightened by the changes around them. In the midst of a world 
gone mad, at least family remained the same. Referring to this ideal 
family was a way of encouraging others to join the anticommunist 
crusade and validating the importance of the fight.
For anticommunist women, however, the situation was compli-
cated by their desire to participate actively in the movement. They 
believed in both the images and the cause. Much of the time, they 
could convince themselves and many others that no contradiction 
existed between the two. Their male compatriots seemed to agree. The 
limitations of that agreement and the shallowness of the men’s respect 
for women’s efforts quickly became apparent in the men’s willing-
ness, through their language or their actions, to undermine women 
as political actors if it served their political goals. Anticommunist 
women thus often found their work diminished and their position 
in the movement relegated to caricature. They accepted this because 
to them the movement was more important than any other consid-
eration, but gendered images and language—however ideologically 





Anticommunism in America was a gendered affair. Those defending 
the American system against the menace of communist expansion 
understood their society to be one in which men and women had 
specific roles. Earning a living and running the government was the 
males’ function. Raising families, managing households, and keeping 
their husbands content was the female role. Maintaining separate 
spheres of activity for men and women was believed to be the foun-
dation of U.S. society and the freedoms it enjoyed, and communism 
directly threatened that foundation. Individuals who did not fit neatly 
into these gendered categories, most noticeably homosexuals, were 
castigated as communist sympathizers. Thus, the images and language 
of the anticommunist movement possessed a gendered subtext that 
frequently emerged in the battle in which these individuals were 
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engaged. Nevertheless, defeating communism proved a long and 
arduous affair. In the course of pursing victory, the strict gender sepa-
ration all true believers wanted was altered for practical reasons. Most 
significant, as this study has demonstrated, women began to emerge 
as significant contributors to the attempt to save America and its fami-
lies from the communist menace, creating in the process a gendered 
activity uniquely suited to the women who pursued it.
When female activists appealed directly to women, they drew on 
a long tradition of female activism. Anticommunist women under-
stood that sometimes even derogatory stereotypes of women could be 
manipulated to convince women of the importance of their participa-
tion in the cause. Journalist Elizabeth Churchill Brown explained that 
her book was the “result of a woman’s curiosity, so often maligned by 
the opposit [sic] sex.” Using her ignorance of foreign policy as well as 
her gender to her advantage, she “ask[ed] questions no intelligent man 
would ask.” Similarly, Doloris Bridges felt women’s lack of knowl-
edge and experience in politics often made them the best warriors. As 
she explained, “[W]omen don’t know when they are licked.” Conse-
quently, they kept on fighting and could even be downright “reck-
less when the fate of their loved ones is at stake.” This language was 
echoed by grassroots activists as well. Praising Senator Margaret Chase 
Smith for making a “sensible speech,” one constituent wondered why 
it had taken so long for the senator to be forthcoming about something 
even “a poor nitwit of a woman like me” knew. This sort of diffident 
language frequently undermined male critics and allowed women 
some voice in the debate. Of course, it also reinforced the stereotype 
of women as ignorant and unintelligent.1
For female activists, however, appealing to women as house-
wives and mothers provided more than just a common language 
with which to approach potential female converts. Talking to women 
about these particular concerns allowed female activists to claim a 
special mission of their own. Who was better equipped to convert 
housewives, mothers, and women in general than other housewives, 
mothers, and women? Frequently, female activists proudly displayed 
their homemaking credentials as one way of creating common ground 
with audiences.
In describing themselves as housewives with a mission, women 
with political ambitions disarmed some of their critics, built a rapport 
with other women, and claimed a unique role within the movement. 
Frequently, women like Margaret Chase Smith and Phyllis Schlafly 
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would allow themselves to be photographed performing typical 
homemaking tasks. They emphasized their ability to combine work 
for the cause with their family responsibilities. Often, the press helped 
bolster this image. One reporter referred to Senator Smith as “the very 
picture of the American housewife up in arms.” Since at the time the 
senator was “hammer[ing]” a fellow senator with “her implacable 
questions,” this characterization made Smith seem less threatening 
and more “properly” feminine.2
Activist women, proudly wearing the housewife mantle, also 
empowered housewives in general. If Smith, Schlafly, and the others 
could juggle families, husbands, and political work, then other women 
could as well. Moreover, by emphasizing the importance of household 
labor, these activists transformed drudgery into something requiring 
skill and intelligence and deserving of respect. Margaret Chase Smith, 
for example, frequently suggested that a housewife would know how 
to run the government “on a strict budget” better than the men in 
Washington. While such language was intended to shame the over-
spending bureaucrats, it also boosted the egos of homemakers.
Such appeals convinced women that they could have an impact 
on the political process, particularly at the local level. Through writing 
letters, attending meetings, and voicing public disapproval, women 
let their leaders know they were concerned and interested. In addi-
tion, the number of women voting increased by 40 percent between 
1948 and 1956.3 Elected officials could ill afford to ignore these voters. 
From Houston to Los Angeles, groups such as the Minute Women 
and the General Federation of Women’s Clubs succeeded in turning 
out record numbers of their supporters at polling places. Although 
women had never voted as a bloc, the fear that they would haunted 
male politicians. Women’s potential power turned their votes into a 
force that could not be ignored. Moreover, as an author in National 
Business Woman argued, “on local and state issues, wives probably 
influence their husbands because women usually take a more active 
community interest.”4
In addition, during the 1950s, political organizers increasingly 
turned to suburban women for help with the day-to-day operations of 
party machinery. The booming economy made it easy for men to find 
work without relying on party patronage, thus creating a need for 
new volunteers. Middle-class housewives had both the time and the 
desire to participate. As a result, men found themselves dealing with 
women not just as a large voting constituency but also as political 
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allies who needed to be informed, motivated, and appreciated. This 
was especially true within the Republican Party, where the Federation 
of Republican Women’s Clubs provided essential volunteers during 
campaign seasons.5
Women who did not join formal political organizations still played 
a role in shaping the overall movement. From the informal groups that 
sprang up in response to a local crisis to the newsletters printed on 
mimeograph machines in someone’s garage, countless women partic-
ipated in some aspect of the anticommunist crusade. Their actions 
may not have directly affected national foreign or domestic policy, but 
in challenging a school board decision or trying to get a librarian fired 
or picketing a visiting foreign leader, their efforts provided concrete 
examples of proper anticommunist activity for many Americans. 
Regardless of whether people agreed with the action, the public asso-
ciated it with the broader movement. The newsletters served a similar 
function. For women who did not have the time or the energy to read 
a newspaper, newsletters provided a window to understanding what 
was happening in their country and their local communities. Many of 
the newsletters and pamphlets promoting local events were written in 
an informal tone, so they provided their readers with a language for 
translating national issues and ideological arguments into everyday 
concerns.
Women did not, however, limit themselves to addressing local 
issues or even an exclusively female public. A number contributed 
directly to the national debate over communism. Freda Utley, Margaret 
Chase Smith, and Phyllis Schlafly participated in the ongoing discus-
sion about the meaning, purpose, and direction of anticommunism. 
Utley attempted to use her own experiences to teach U.S. foreign 
policy makers about the dangers inherent in Chinese communism 
and foreign policy in general. Smith took a more moderate but no 
less intense stance on controlling communism’s impact in America. 
Schlafly’s work in educating the public about the threat of commu-
nism succeeded in paving the way for conservative anticommunist 
Barry Goldwater to win the Republican presidential nomination.
All of these women, whether they were active on a national or 
a local level, as well as the women they encouraged to join them in 
their crusade, espoused an anticommunism that went beyond polit-
ical or diplomatic concerns. At the heart of anticommunism for many 
American women was the defense of their idealized vision of the 
United States. In this perfect world, all Americans lived happy lives 
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in well-equipped homes. Everyone believed in God and the flag and 
got along with one another. There was no racism or poverty or crime. 
If there were problems, they were minor flaws that the constitutional 
system would eventually correct. The linchpin in this entire image 
was the family, with Mom, Dad, and children. Anticommunists feared 
communism would destroy that family picture. If that happened, 
they worried, everything else would fall apart as well. To that end, the 
family must be maintained in its current form.
Anticommunist women thus found themselves making two contra- 
dictory arguments. On the one hand, many middle-class suburban 
women fought communism to protect their children, their families, 
and their way of life. That “way of life” meant women ruled the home 
while men ruled the world. Many women believed, as Margaret Chase 
Smith stated, that “the first and original governor in our democracy 
is the woman. Woman administers the home. . . . [T]here is not a finer 
role that you can play in the defense of democracy and our Amer-
ican way of life than that of wife, mother, and homemaker.”6 On the 
other hand, as many discovered, defending that way of life expanded 
the notion of “wife, mother, and homemaker” to include not just 
husbands and children but their communities and country as well. 
In fact, anticommunists were encouraging women to leave the very 
homes and families they had declared sacrosanct to get involved in 
political activity. In their minds, their actions were both legitimate and 
consistent. Because communism was so dangerous, women had to 
join the political fight to protect their families. Anticommunist women 
assumed that once the battle had been won, women would go back 
home willingly and eagerly.
Men as well seemed to accept this female behavior as a tempo-
rary expedient. Male anticommunists eagerly accepted the help of 
their female counterparts when it suited their purpose. They expected 
that women would perform the mundane clerical duties involved in 
a political campaign; they appreciated women’s volunteer efforts in 
gathering signatures on petitions, organizing teas and fund-raisers, 
and getting voters to the polls. They were willing to use women 
when there was a job a man could not do, even if it meant risking 
the women’s freedom or reputations. Joe McCarthy encouraged Jean 
and numerous other members of his staff to help defeat his political 
enemy. He, like many anticommunist men, even acknowledged that 
the women’s work was valuable to the overall movement. He was 
equally willing, however, to ignore the work the women had done 
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and focus instead on their role as wives, mothers, or victims of 
their opponents’ unchivalrous behavior. Rather than equal partners 
working toward a common goal, men sometimes treated their female 
teammates as pawns to be moved at will. The men gave no indication 
that their dismissal of their associates’ effort would cause problems or 
even be challenged.
Most of the time, they were correct. Women seemed not to notice 
boorish male behavior and to overlook the insults directed toward 
their efforts. The cause, they implied, was more important. If, as some 
women argued, men had fallen down on the job of protecting Amer-
ican families from communism or did not appreciate what women 
had accomplished, that just meant the women had more work to do. 
They should roll up their sleeves and get to it. After all, that was what 
mothers had done.
In the end, what does it all mean? Most middle-class white 
women did not join anticommunist clubs, write letters, give speeches, 
or run for offices. Most of those who did participate in some way 
were less extreme in their views than several of the women described 
in this study. Clearly, most women supported the existing gender 
structure and did little to challenge the authority of men. Neverthe-
less, although the anticommunist crusade did not drastically change 
women’s everyday lives in terms of household responsibilities, equity 
issues, or power relationships, it did have an impact on the anticom-
munist movement and on gender relations.
In ways both subtle and obvious, the actions of anticommunist 
women weakened rigid stereotypes of female behavior. Although 
they paid homage to female domesticity, they continually encour-
aged women to expand their horizons beyond housekeeping and 
cooking. They demanded that women participate more actively in 
the political system. Perhaps more significant, despite their white 
gloves and frilly hats, these women were warriors who wanted the 
complete destruction of their communist opponents. These were not 
nice little old ladies telling everyone to calm down before someone 
got hurt or suggesting some kind of peaceful dialogue. No, anticom-
munist women disparaged compromise as a weakness and spoke of 
the need for their enemies to be annihilated. They might have looked 
like “girls,” but they talked like men. Distracted by the fact that these 
activists looked like respectable women, most Americans missed their 
adoption of masculine behavior. By the time anyone noticed, it was 
too late to rebuild the old mold of femininity.
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The traditional story of the postwar years has largely ignored 
anticommunist women. In picturing anticommunism solely as a male 
crusade, historians and contemporaries have slighted the efforts of 
women, misinterpreted public feelings about communism, and rein-
forced conventional stereotypes about women. In some ways, this 
is symptomatic of the larger society’s failure to recognize women’s 
contributions during this period and throughout American history. It 
is the same tendency that has caused historians to focus on Martin 
Luther King Jr. while ignoring Ella Baker, that made Cesar Chavez 
a household name while leaving Deloris Huerta in the dust, or that 
analyzed Adlai Stevenson’s politics while turning Eleanor Roosevelt 
into a caricature. Historians have tended to focus on male actors 
while ignoring the women who made political movements viable 
operations.
In a larger sense, then, this study reinforces a historiography that 
challenges long-held views of postwar American women. Neither the 
hopeless victims of Friedan’s Feminine Mystique nor the happy Step-
ford Wives of television sitcoms, women of the 1950s and 1960s lived 
complex lives that defied simplistic categories like “housewife” or 
“career woman.” The public might have expected a leftist woman to 
ignore the rules; they would have been shocked to find that conserva-
tive women also acted as though limitations on their behavior did not 
exist.
Were these women feminists? The answer would seem to be no. 
As historian Kim Nielsen has pointed out, “[E]mpowered women do 
not necessarily feminists make.” In fact, to label them as such does 
them a disservice by treating them as the anticommunist men of their 
time did. These women said they believed in the patriarchal system; 
they were working to support and protect it by fighting communism. 
To interpret other meanings from their actions would discount their 
own statements to the contrary; it would imply that these women did 
not know their own minds. Moreover, to call these conservative, anti-
communist women feminist is to make “feminism” so elastic a term as 
to be almost meaningless. They were women acting as political agents 
for a conservative agenda that included the belief that a woman’s 
first responsibility was to her family. They did not find that notion 
limiting, since they believed it demanded their political involvement 
when necessary.7
In the midst of a world beset by communism, conservative women 
believed all Americans should fight to preserve the American way of 
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life. Significantly, anticommunist rhetoric condemned not only the 
actions of the Soviets and the Chinese but of anyone who threatened 
the stability of the rapidly changing postwar world. The U.S. public 
had dealt with a tremendous amount of change in the two decades 
prior to the end of World War II: the Depression, the New Deal, Hitler, 
the Holocaust, the war, the bomb, population shifts, labor unrest, and 
a Civil Rights Movement. The onset of hostilities with the Soviet Union 
and China increased the pressure on an already stressed population. 
Although there was legitimate fear of what the communists might do 
abroad, at home the anxiety became entangled with the multiplicity 
of other changes taking place. Frequently, it was hard to tell whether 
conservatives truly feared a “communist” force at work or, more 
broadly, the transformation of U.S. society threatened by political and 
social change.
Without recognizing the key role women played in the anticom-
munist crusade, the social and political landscape of postwar society 
remains obscured. Only in seeing how intimately women were 
involved with all aspects of anticommunism can we see the true nature 
of the movement and the way it was intertwined with larger concerns 
about the shifting American landscape. Anticommunism was a tool 
used by men and women to express their fears and anxieties about 
their changing world. The irony, of course, was that in joining the 
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